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ABSTRACT 
 
A Deliberative Account of Causation: 
 
How the Evidence of Deliberating Agents Accounts for  
 




In my dissertation I develop and defend a deliberative account of causation: causal relations 
correspond to the evidential relations we use when we decide on one thing in order to 
achieve another. Tamsin’s taking her umbrella is a cause of her staying dry, for example, if 
and only if her deciding to take her umbrella for the sake of staying dry is adequate grounds for 
believing she’ll stay dry. I defend the account in the form of a biconditional that relates causal 
relations to evidential relations. This biconditional makes claims about causal relations, not 
just our causal concepts, and constrains metaphysical accounts of causation, including 
reductive ones. Surely we need science to investigate causal structure. But we can’t justify any 
particular account of causation independently of its relevance for us. This deliberative 
account explains why we should care about causation, why we deliberate on the future and 
not the past, and even why causes come prior in time to their effects. 
 
In chapter 1 I introduce the motivations for the project: to reconcile causation and our 
freedom as agents with the picture of the world presented by physics. Fundamental physics 
makes no mention of causes. And the lawlike character of the world seems to rule out 
freedom to decide. My dissertation offers a combined solution—I explain our freedom in 
epistemic terms and use this freedom to make sense of causation.  
 
In chapter 2 I draw on philosophy of action and decision theory to develop an epistemic 
model of deliberation, one based in requirements on belief. If we’re to deliberate, our beliefs 
can’t epistemically settle how we’ll decide, yet our decisions must epistemically settle what 
we’ll do. This combination of belief and suspension of belief explains why we rationally take 
ourselves to be free to decide on different options in deliberation.  
 
In chapter 3 I defend this model from near rivals that also explain freedom in terms of 
belief. Accounts of ‘epistemic freedom’ from David Velleman, James Joyce and Jenann 
Ismael appeal to our justification to form beliefs ‘unconstrained’ by evidence. Yet, I will 
argue, these accounts are susceptible to counterexamples and turn out to rely on a primitive 
ability to believe at will—one that makes the appeal to justification redundant. J. G. Fichte’s 
Idealist account of freedom, based in a primitive activity of the ‘I’, nicely illustrates the kind 
of freedom these accounts rely on. 
 
In chapter 4 I develop the epistemic model of deliberation into a deliberative account of 
causation. I argue that A is a type-level cause of B if and only if an agent deciding on a state of 
affairs of type A in ‘proper deliberation’, for the sake of a state of affairs of type B, would be 
good evidence of a state of affairs of type B obtaining. This biconditional explains why we 
should care about causal relations—they direct us to good decisions. But existing accounts 
of causation don’t adequately explain why causation matters. James Woodward’s 
interventionist account explicates ‘control’ and ‘causation’ in the very same terms—and so 
can’t appeal to a relation between them to explain why we should care about causal relations. 
David Lewis’ reductive account relies on standards for evaluating counterfactuals, but 
doesn’t motivate them or explain why a causal relation analysed in these terms should matter. 
Delivering the right verdicts is not enough. The deliberative account explains why causation 
matters, by relating causal relations to the evidential relations needed for deliberation.  
 
In chapter 5 I use the deliberative account to explain causal asymmetry—why, contingently, 
causes come before their effects. Following an approach from Huw Price, because 
deliberation comes prior to decision, deliberation undermines evidential relations towards 
the past. So an agent’s deciding for the sake of the past in proper deliberation won’t be 
appropriate evidence of the past, and backwards causation is not implied. To explain why 
deliberation comes prior to decision, I appeal to an epistemic asymmetry, one that is 
explained by statistical-mechanical accounts of causation in non-causal terms. But statistical-
mechanical accounts still need the deliberative account to justify why the relations they pick 
out as causal should matter to us.  
 
The deliberative account of causation relates causal relations to the evidential relations of use 
to deliberating agents. It constrains metaphysical accounts, while revealing their underlying 
explanatory structure. And it does not rule out explanations of causal asymmetry based in 
physics, but complements them. Overall this project makes sense of causation by 
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To friends near and far 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Freedom and Causation 
1.1 The Problem with Causation 
Causation plays an essential role in our scientific and everyday understanding of the world. 
We discover causal relations, construct causal theories, and explain effects by appealing to 
their causes.1 And yet, I will argue, we lack a good philosophical account of causation. Why? 
Because we lack an account that explains why causation should matter to us—and this is 
crucial for making sense of causation. In the following chapters, I’ll develop and defend a 
deliberative account of causation—one that accounts for causation by considering its 
relevance for deliberation. I’ll argue, in fact, that causal relations correspond to the evidential 
relations agents need when they decide on one thing in order to achieve another. Say Tamsin 
is deliberating on whether to take her umbrella in order to stay dry. I’ll argue that Tamsin’s 
taking her umbrella is a cause of her staying dry if and only if her deciding to take her 
umbrella (in an appropriate deliberation) would be adequate grounds for believing she’ll stay dry. 
There is an important correspondence between the belief-justifying (what I’ll call ‘evidential’) 
relations that hold for deliberators like Tamsin, and causal relations.  
 
I’ll defend this account in the form of a biconditional that relates causal relations to 
evidential relations. This biconditional makes claims about causal relations, not just causal 
concepts. It tells us how causal and evidential relations relate. While the biconditional can be 
used to reduce causal relations to evidential relations, that is not my main aim. The 
biconditional is useful and interesting because of what it explains—it explains why causal 
relations should matter to us. In the remainder of this introduction, I’ll say more about the 
                                                
1 I’ll use the term ‘causation’ for the general relation of causation. I’ll use the term ‘causal relations’ for 
particular instances of causation. I won’t use the term ‘causality’ at all.  
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motivations for this project (sections 1−2), before outlining my accounts of deliberation and 
causation (sections 3−4). I’ll end (section 5) with brief summaries of the chapters to come.  
 
Why do we need an account of causation, when we seem to have a good understanding of 
causation from science? We discover causal relations using experiments, whether in labs, 
studies or even everyday life—such as when a chemist tests to see if adding too much acid 
caused the wrong product to precipitate, or when statistical data are used to determine if a 
new drug causes a decrease in cholesterol levels, or even when you experiment with having 
less coffee to see if it improves your sleep. We also construct theories that describe and 
explain causal relations.2 Biologists map the causal relations involved in photosynthesis, 
physicists use models to explain why absorbing a photon causes an electron to jump to a 
higher energy level, and I might hypothesise about how too little sunlight is affecting my 
plant’s health. Talk of causation is ubiquitous. But why would we need an account of it? 
  
The problem is that when we look to our best candidates for fundamental scientific theories, 
those that aim to be universal in scope and explain the success of other scientific theories, 
causes don’t appear. Fundamental physical theories don’t identify particular states as causes, 
and others as effects. What we have instead are dynamical equations that relate different 
states of affairs at different times—no mention of causes. Furthermore, when we look at 
how fundamental physical laws operate, they seem to have precisely the wrong features to 
pick out causes. As I’ll explain, following Russell (1912−13), fundamental laws only 
determine states of affairs at other times, given information about the entire global state of 
                                                
2 We appeal to causes for a variety of purposes, including giving explanations. I will refer to both causes and 
causal explanations in what follows, taking it as a minimal condition that causal explanations correctly describe 
causal relations. But my main concern is with causal relations, not with causal explanation per se.   
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affairs. Yet causes seem to be local states of affairs that directly determine their effects. 
Secondly, fundamental physical laws, in relevant respects, work equally well in both temporal 
directions. Yet causes seem to come prior to their effects. So there’s a problem 
understanding how causation fits into the world, given the picture presented by fundamental 
physics. This is why we need an account of causation. We need an account that makes sense 
of what function causation serves, beyond the predictions and derivations of fundamental 
physics. 
 
Let’s look in more detail at how physical laws operate. Imagine a closed system consisting of 
26 billiard balls bouncing off one other. For simplicity, we’ll ignore friction and 
electrodynamics, take the collisions to be elastic (without loss of kinetic energy), and take the 
system to be described by simple Newtonian laws of motion.3 Say billiard ball A knocks into 
stationary billiard ball B, and then billiard ball B moves off. It seems that the movement of A 
caused the movement of B. But there is nothing in the fundamental physical laws to tell us 
this. What the fundamental physical laws tell us is that given the positions and velocities of 
all 26 billiard balls at one time, t1, this is what their positions and velocities will be at another 
time, t2. In other words, the dynamical equations relate states of affairs of the whole system. 
They do not select out particular events as causes and other events as effects. So when we 
ask a question such as, ‘what caused ball B to move off at velocity v at time t2?’, what answer 
can we expect from the theory? None. Newtonian mechanics does not tell us what the 
causes are. The theory does tell us which of the balls collided with ball B. But this by itself 
doesn’t tell us what caused B’s motion: some further analysis of causation is required. If ball 
                                                
3 While Newtonian mechanics is known to be false when taken as a theory of fundamental physics, it serves as 
a good illustration of points that apply even under more sophisticated candidates for fundamental theories. I 
return to this point below. 
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A collides with ball B, we may want to say that ball A’s motion caused ball B’s subsequent 
motion. And we may want to call ball C’s motion a cause of B’s, if ball C previously collided 
with A. But Newtonian mechanics gives us no direct guide to such choices. It says nothing 
explicitly about causes and effects. 
 
That’s the first problem: fundamental physical theories don’t mention causes. Here’s a 
second closely related problem. Fundamental physical theories, such as Newtonian 
mechanics, relate the whole state of a system at one time with its whole state at another time. 
They relate global states of affairs. They don’t relate individual local states of affairs to one 
another. They don’t tell us what ball B’s motion will be, given merely the motion of ball A 
and B. Let’s consider our billiard balls again. It’s tempting to say that, by the laws of 
Newtonian mechanics, if ball A moves in such and such a way, then stationary ball B waiting 
nearby has to move off at velocity v. But this is not the case. It matters to ball B’s subsequent 
motion that ball D is off to the side, failing to collide with it. And similarly for all the other 
23 balls. Newtonian mechanics does not allow us to derive the motion of ball A, or any other 
part of the system, without knowing information about all the other balls at a given time.4 If 
we want local causes to ‘determine’ or ‘necessitate’ their effects, we have a problem. Unless 
we are willing to take the entire state of the system at a given time to be the cause of its state 
at another time, and give up the project of individuating causes more finely, the kind of 
determinacy we find in fundamental physics is not the kind we seem to find in causation.  
 
                                                
4 More precisely, one needs a linear combination of information about the positions and velocities of all the 
other balls.   
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Bertrand Russell expressed precisely this concern in his influential ‘On the Notion of Cause’ 
(1912−13).5 Russell argued that if causes had to necessitate their effects, nothing less than the 
full state of a system at a one time could be identified as a cause. But science investigates 
general types of events—those that can be repeated—not global states. So, he argued, there 
can’t reasonably be a cause-based science: 
 
In order to be sure of the expected effect, we must know that there is nothing in the 
environment to interfere with it. But this means that the supposed cause is not, by 
itself, adequate to insure the effect. And as soon as we include the environment, the 
probability of repetition is diminished, until at last, when the whole environment is 
included, the probability of repetition becomes almost nil.  
(1912−13, pp. 7−8) 
Either the causes would be so extensive and detailed as to be unique, and not the subject of 
scientific investigation, or causes would not necessitate their effects. Bracketing the question 
of whether causal science might still be possible, Russell gave us a powerful argument for 
why local individual causes cannot necessitate their effects, given the laws of fundamental 
physics. 
 
Is it a peculiar feature of Newtonian mechanics that it is ‘global’ in this sense and does not 
individuate local causes? Might there be better candidates for fundamental physical theories 
that are more local? While one can certainly posit theories of this form, none of the theories 
we take to be anything like plausible candidates for fundamental physics at our world have 
this character. Instead, they retain the same global form. To see why, firstly note that the 
problem with globalism arises even before we get to an explicit formulation of the laws, such 
as Newtonian mechanics. The conflict arises whenever parts of a system can potentially 
interfere with relations between other parts. If a theory is to correctly predict what will 
                                                
5 For further discussion of Russell’s arguments, see Earman (1976), Field (2003), Hitchcock (2007) and Eagle 
(2007). 
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happen next, using causes, and causes are to necessitate their effects, then all the potentially 
interfering parts have to be included as causes. In the billiard ball example above, I didn’t 
need to appeal explicitly to laws like F = ma. I appealed instead to intuitions about our 
everyday experience with situations like these, where we know we have to consider potential 
influences from the whole system if we are to work out what happens next.  
 
Secondly, it might seem like the determinism of Newtonian mechanics is playing a role—the 
fact that only one subsequent state of the system is compatible with its current state and the 
laws.6 But determinism is not a crucial feature. Indeterministic theories such as GRW and 
other chancy versions of quantum mechanics have the same global structure. The fact that 
more than one subsequent state is compatible with a system’s present state and the laws does 
not mean that individual local causes enter the picture. The best that such theories can do in 
deriving subsequent states still requires information concerning every part of the system. 
Even if we move to indeterministic laws, and accept that causes can’t strictly ‘necessitate’ 
their effects, the problem remains.  
 
Thirdly, these arguments don’t rely on a commitment metaphysical necessity of the kind 
Hume argued against ([1738], book I part III). I haven’t relied on any particular metaphysics 
of lawhood. One can even be Humean and deny that the laws metaphysically necessitate. 
The problem is about relating the kind of necessity found in the laws to the kind of necessity 
found in causation, however deflationarily we characterise each of these. The problem is that 
there is no clear relation between the two.  
 
                                                
6 This characterisation of determinism is rough—see Earman (1986) for a rich discussion of how to 
characterise determinism, and whether Newtonian mechanics is in fact deterministic.  
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Altogether, the problem of relating local causes to global laws is not due to particular 
features, formulations or a particular metaphysics of fundamental physical theories. It is due 
to deep features of what we expect a fundamental physical theory to do. What we ask of a 
fundamental physical theory is that given full information about the state of the world at a 
given time, there is no further structural information than is provided by the theory that 
would allow us to tell more about what happens at a different time.7 Put loosely (and more 
metaphysically) as much necessity as there is in the system should be reflected in the laws. 
We will be limited by the kinds of structures and patterns found in nature—there may be 
irreducibly chancy laws. But a fundamental theory aims to derive as much as possible about 
events at one time, given information about other times and sufficiently general laws. And it 
is no surprise that doing so accurately requires a vast amount of detailed information about 
what is happening at other times. We need fundamental physical theories to be global. 
 
Might a fundamental physical theory require less than information about each part of the 
system to determine what happens at another time? Could we then zero in on individual 
causes? The prospects don’t look promising. We might imagine a toy theory that requires 
less than information about the full system to derive subsequent states—such as Newtonian 
mechanics with an additional restriction on faster-than-light influence. With such a theory, 
we would not need information about the full system to determine subsequent local states. 
The backwards or forwards light-cone of the local state would suffice, since there would be 
insufficient time for any state beyond the light-cone to influence it.8 But this still leaves an 
                                                
7 It is of course no easy task to say what counts as such structural information and whether it can be 
characterised, for example, in terms of generality and simplicity as a Humean analysis of laws suggest. I take no 
stand here on the nature of laws themselves, noting that various analyses of laws are compatible with them 
playing the kind of role I appeal to here.  
8 More precisely, we would need information about each point in the light cone—see Field (2003).  
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ever-expanding slice of the world as a potential influence, and so a potential cause, a slice 
that increases in radius at the speed of light. The set of potential causes is still too large for 
the theory to pick out individual causes.  
 
Nor is a restriction to local states justified by current physics. General relativity doesn’t 
involve a restriction on faster than light travel or influence (Maudlin 2004, ch. 3). While 
ordinary particles cannot be accelerated faster than the speed of light, the theory does allow 
for particles that travel faster, as well as for faster than light influence and information 
transfer. Furthermore, any theory that is able to reproduce the experimental results of Bell 
inequalities, predicted by quantum mechanics, must include correlations at space-like 
separations (separations that light cannot traverse). If these correlations are to be accounted 
for by a fundamental physical theory, the theory must require more than local information 
for its application.  
 
In fact, when we move from Newtonian mechanics to more plausible candidates for 
fundamental physical theories, the situation becomes, if anything, much worse. Quantum 
mechanics, in its various interpretations and variations, posits entangled states, implying that 
the full state of a system cannot even be described in terms of the states of its individual 
local parts. Even before we get as far as prediction and explanation, if anything like quantum 
mechanics is right, fundamental science is not based on local individual states of affairs at all. 
While the hope is that any results about causation we get from the Newtonian case will 
extend to quantum mechanics and general relativity, we will not be missing out on a 
straightforward solution to the problem of causation by beginning with Newtonian 
mechanics.  
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Finally, there’s a third problem relating causation to fundamental physics—reconciling the 
temporal asymmetry of causation with the temporal symmetry of fundamental laws. An 
important feature of Newtonian laws is that they are temporally reversible. Newtonian laws 
do not distinguish between a forward and a backwards direction in time—they take the same 
form in either direction. For example, if one were to film a movie of our idealised billiard 
balls bouncing around, and then play the movie backward, their motion would still be 
perfectly described by the same Newtonian laws. As Russell noted, ‘the future “determines” 
the past in exactly the same sense in which the past “determines” the future’ (1912−1913, p. 
15). Yet we take causes to come prior in time to their effects. Fundamental physics does not 
seem to have the characteristic temporal asymmetry that we find with causation.  
 
There are candidates for fundamental physical theories that do employ time-irreversible laws. 
Variations on quantum mechanics, such as GRW, employ stochastic chancy laws that apply 
in one temporal direction only. But, as I’ll argue in chapter 5, these asymmetries aren’t well-
placed to explain the pervasive macroscopic temporal asymmetry of causation. Moreover, 
even if the asymmetry of laws could directly explain the asymmetry of causation, the 
problem with globalism would remain. Even if a theory explicitly distinguished between later 
and earlier states, and we stipulated that later states of the system can’t be causes of earlier 
states, we would still be left with whole previous time slices causing later ones. We wouldn’t 
be able to pinpoint individual causes using the theory.  
 
Russell used similar points to argue for the wholesale elimination of causal talk from science 
and philosophy. If causes aren’t found in fundamental physics, talk of them should be 
expunged altogether—it does more harm than good (1912−13, p. 1). But we needn’t go so 
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far. Causation may still be useful in science, even if fundamental theories do not employ 
causal terms, and even if causation does not imply necessitation by physical laws. Nor do the 
above arguments show that fundamental physics is somehow incompatible with causation, 
such that there is a contradiction between causal claims and the claims of fundamental 
physics, or an incompatibility between the kind of determinacy present in causes and the 
laws. In fact, a sensible desideratum on a philosophical account of causation is that it 
guarantees that causation is compatible with fundamental physical laws (or at least our best 
guess as to the form these will take).  
 
But compatibility does not mean that we can look to our fundamental theories alone to 
distinguish causes, tell us what makes one thing the cause of another, or tell us how 
causation and fundamental laws relate. Russell’s arguments set up an important challenge: 
given that causes do not feature in fundamental science, and do not carry the kind of 
necessity present in fundamental laws, how do they feature in our scientific picture of the 
world?  
 
1.2 The Problem with Agency 
There is a second concern that motivates this project. How do we make sense of free 
agency, particularly our apparent freedom in deliberation, given the picture presented to us 
by physics? As we deliberate about whether to do this or that, different possibilities appear 
to us as options we are free to decide on. As you read this page, I imagine, it seems to you 
that you can choose whether to continue reading or take a break. You appear free to make 
such choices and determine how the world subsequently goes. What might account for this 
apparent freedom? One thought is that the world really is radically open. We seem free 
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because the world itself, like us, is ‘undecided’ about which way to go; there is nothing in its 
current state that determines whether it goes one way or another. Until we decide, different 
alternative futures are compatible with its current state. The indeterminacy of the world is 
then reflected in our experience as agents—what happens next seems ‘up to us’ because our 
decisions are required, as additional features beyond the world’s present state, to determine 
how the world goes. 
 
But a problem immediately arises, concerning the character of physical laws. As we’ve seen, 
Newtonian laws relate the entire state of a system at one time to its state at any other time. 
Given the state of the universe at any one time, and the laws, there is nothing further 
required to determine everything that happens in the universe at any other time.9 This means 
that facts about what happened long before you were born, combined with the laws, are 
enough to determine all your subsequent decisions and actions. There is nothing undecided 
about which way the world is to go.10 Your experience of freedom does not reflect any actual 
freedom you have. 
 
Various alternatives have been explored to explain how deterministic laws might be 
compatible with our freedom as agents. For example, our freedom as agents might be closely 
connected to moral responsibility and the appropriateness of praise or blame, which the 
determinacy of physical laws seems to have little bearing on (Strawson 1974). Or our 
freedom might be connected to a lack of coercion, and to whether our actions are 
                                                
9 Assuming deterministic laws for the moment and noting exceptions explored in Earman (1986).  
10 van Inwagen presents a similar line of thought in his ‘consequence argument’ (1983). If you have no control 
over the laws or the state of the world before you were born, and the state of the world before you were born 
and the laws determine the state of the world at all other times, then you have no control over the state of the 
world at other times. 
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appropriately caused by our desires and decisions (Hume [1748], sec. 8; Frankfurt 1971). Or 
freedom might be connected to guidance by a reasons-responsive mechanism (Fischer 2006), 
or to our ability to reflectively endorse our desires (Korsgaard 1996). Some of these 
‘compatibilist’ alternatives have become so familiar, that it might seem naïve to think there is 
even a prima facie conflict between our freedom and the kind of determinism present in the 
laws. So it is worth pausing on just how compelling the above conception of freedom 
appears. There seems something right in the idea that it is up to us, as an additional fact 
about the world beyond its previous state and laws, how we decide, and so how the future of 
the world is to go—something reflected in an experience as we deliberate. This appearance 
of freedom needs explaining.  
 
Moreover, these compatibilist solutions don’t straightforwardly explain our experience of 
freedom as we deliberate. Compatibilist responses tend to highlight the moral dimension of 
practical reasoning. For example, Strawson attempts to show that metaphysical concerns 
over the nature of free will do not endanger our moral practices. Other accounts aim at 
giving more or less precise specifications of the conditions under which we are appropriately 
held morally responsible. In the hands of these compatibilists, the debate concerning free 
will has shifted away from metaphysical concerns over determinism, and towards normative 
and ethical concerns about moral responsibility. Indeed, many compatibilists speak of the 
freedom they’re concerned with as simply that which is required for moral responsibility 
(Strawson 1962; Frankfurt 1971; Korsgaard 1996; Fischer 2006). But explaining why you can 
be appropriately held responsible is not the same as explaining why it seems to you that you 
can decide and act in different ways. While one may be able to build an explanation of how 
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things seem for the deliberating agent from attributions of moral responsibility, the steps 
required are not trivial. Alternatives are worth exploring.  
 
There are also problems with other straightforward attempts to explain our apparent 
freedom in deliberation. Firstly, it might seem that only deterministic physical laws are 
incompatible with free agency—because only deterministic laws completely constrain the 
state of the world at all other times. If fundamental physical laws are indeterministic, as 
quantum mechanics suggests, then several different futures are compatible with the current 
and previous states of the world.11 So perhaps our apparent freedom can be explained by the 
indeterminism of the laws?  
 
However, appealing to indeterministic quantum mechanical laws does not explain our 
apparent freedom. Firstly, the indeterminism in quantum mechanics is largely hidden from 
investigations that proceed at ordinary macroscopic energy and length scales—explaining 
why quantum phenomena took so long to discover.12 Any fundamental physical theory must 
explain why deterministic Newtonian laws work so well, and so cannot allow for large-scale 
deviations from deterministic behaviour at the kind of energy and length scales at which 
agents typically operate. The environment and stimuli we respond to are readily 
characterisable in macroscopic ways. And so are our behavioural outputs, in the form of 
bodily movements, as well as much of our inner workings. While quantum-mechanical 
phenomena may play a role at the neurological level, we would need a positive reason to 
                                                
11 I’ll bracket the issue of whether quantum mechanical laws are in fact indeterministic. Two prominent 
accounts of quantum mechanics employ deterministic laws, at least at the fundamental level—Bohmian 
mechanics and Everettian (Many Worlds) quantum mechanics. 
12 This is not to say that quantum effects don’t turn up at the macroscopic level, or that we can’t bring about 
correlations between macroscopic states and quantum states. This is precisely what happens in quantum-
mechanical experiments. But the indeterminacy present in quantum-mechanical phenomena are still not readily 
apparent from macroscopic behaviour. 
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think that quantum indeterminism here would scale up to produce indeterminism at the 
macroscopic level. Absent such grounds, we have no reason to think that deterministic 
macroscopic laws would often be violated. So the conflict between laws and our apparent 
freedom as agents remains.  
 
Secondly, even if there were macroscopic indeterministic laws, this wouldn’t capture what 
we seem to require by free choice. For example, if the indeterministic laws imply that with 
50% probability you choose chocolate ice cream, and with 50% probability you choose 
vanilla, in what sense is it up to you what ice cream flavour you choose? You can’t always 
choose chocolate in similar set ups without diverging from the laws.13 Provided we hold the 
laws fixed, our behaviour is still constrained in ways that seem incompatible with free 
agency.14  
 
Here’s another attempt to explain our apparent freedom as agents. Russell, as we saw, argued 
that we should jettison the concept of causation altogether (1912−13). He distinguished 
causation from fundamental physical laws, accepted only the latter, and was optimistic that 
by separating the two, the question of freedom and determinism could be easily resolved. 
Once one realised that laws were not the kind of things that pushed and pulled us around, 
forcing and compelling us as our typical experience of causes suggests, determination by laws 
would no longer seem even prima facie incompatible with freedom. But distinguishing 
between laws and causation is not enough to resolve the problem. Even if laws are not the 
kind of things that push and pull us around, they are still enough to constrain what we do. 
                                                
13 In epistemic terms, this is a case of disconfirming a probabilistic law.  
14 For further discussion of why quantum mechanics does not explain free agency, see Dennett (1984, pp. 135-
6) and van Inwagen (2008, p. 263 ff.). 
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They imply that the world is not radically open to choice in deliberation, as our experience 
suggests.  
 
Finally, it might seem that the conflict over freedom and the laws is due to a particular 
conception of lawhood—that physical laws ‘govern’ how the world evolves (Armstrong 
1983; Tooley 1977). So it might seem we can avoid the conflict by adopting a less 
metaphysically robust Humean conception of lawhood and taking laws to merely describe 
the evolution of the world (Lewis 1973; 1983; 1994). If laws merely describe, and do not 
govern, perhaps this removes the tensions with freedom. But this appearance is misleading. 
Those who adopt descriptive laws still aim to explain our practices of holding laws fixed 
when we evaluate counterfactuals or work out the future evolution of a system. And this is 
what produces the tension with free choice. With the laws fixed, nothing more than the 
current state of the world is required to determine the evolution of the system, with as much 
as determinacy as is present in nature. Perhaps one of the above responses can ultimately 
explain our freedom or apparent freedom in deliberation, in a way compatible with physical 
laws. But there are enough concerns with these responses to make other explanations of our 
apparent freedom worth exploring.  
 
1.3 What is an Epistemic Model of Deliberation? 
My accounts of deliberation and causation are addressed to two problems: understanding 
how deliberative freedom and causation fit into the world, given the picture presented to us 
by fundamental physics. I offer a combined solution: I account for our apparent freedom in 
deliberation in epistemic terms. And I use this apparent freedom to make sense of causation. 
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By understanding how the world leaves room for apparent deliberative freedom, we can 
understand how it leaves room for causation.  
 
I begin, in chapter 2, by developing and defending an ‘epistemic model’ of deliberation, 
which explains our apparent freedom in deliberation. This model characterises deliberation 
by placing constraints on what beliefs we can and can’t reasonably have while deliberating. 
For example, I’ll argue that we can’t reasonably deliberate about what we’re going to do if 
we’re already certain of what we’re going to do. Yet we must take our decisions to settle 
what we’ll in fact do. This account is a ‘model’ in the sense that it doesn’t attempt to fully 
characterise deliberation. Like models in science and architecture (rather than logic), it 
selectively highlights certain features, while neglecting others. In this case, the model 
highlights epistemic features of deliberation, while neglecting causal and normative features. 
By neglecting causal features, the model holds out the possibility for non-circularly 
accounting for causation in terms of deliberation. By neglecting normative features, the 
model does commit to a particular view of ethics or practical reasons for action. Even 
though my epistemic account is only a model, I’ll argue that it does important work: it 
explains why the world appears open to choice in deliberation, and so accounts for the kind 
of apparent freedom required to make sense of causation.   
 
My main interest is in exploring deliberative freedom in order to account for causation. For 
this reason, there are aspects of freedom and deliberation I won’t explore. I won’t take a 
strong stance on whether we are free in deliberation or not. This would require settling what 
such freedom should amount to—a weighty issue indeed. My claim is that the epistemic 
model can explain why we appear free, leaving open the question of whether this appearance 
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is veridical. For the record, my view is that we should adopt a relatively deflated picture of 
what our freedom in deliberation amounts to, so the epistemic model can explain why we’re 
free. But I won’t have room to defend this view, or to argue against more robust 
conceptions of freedom—and this isn’t my main purpose. My main purpose is to develop a 
sufficiently rich model of deliberation that proceeds in non-causal terms, and so can be used 
to give a non-circular deliberative account of causation.  
 
Others have also appealed to ignorance of some form to explain our freedom in 
deliberation, our apparent freedom, the apparent indeterminateness of the future, or to give 
conditions on deliberation—including Baruch Spinoza ([1677], IIIp2s), Bertrand Russell 
([1910], pp. 29−33; 1912−13, pp. 20−21; [1914], pp. 237−240), Ludwig Wittgenstein ([1921], 
5.1362), Michael Dummett (1954), Isaac Levi (1986, ch. 4; 1997, chs. 2 and 4; 2000) and 
Tomis Kapitan (1986; 1989). But, to my knowledge, no one has previously used an 
ignorance-based account of deliberation to give an account of causation. This point is not 
obvious, however. In chapter 3, I’ll do further work to distinguish my ignorance-based 
account from other accounts of deliberation that also appeal to beliefs, including accounts 
by David E. Velleman (1989a; 1989b), James M. Joyce (2002; 2007), Jenann Ismael (2002; 
2007) and Huw Price (2012). These accounts explain our (apparent) freedom in deliberation 
by our ability to form beliefs about what we’ll decide or do, unconstrained by evidence. We 
are unconstrained by evidence because the beliefs concerned are ‘self-fulfilling’—they bring 
about their own truth. And because these beliefs constitute our decisions, we have ‘epistemic 
freedom’ over our decisions. This kind of freedom has been appealed to in giving agent-
based accounts of causation (Ismael 2007; Price 2012). I’ll reject these accounts of 
deliberation. I’ll argue that they are distinct from ignorance-based accounts (contra Price 
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2012), that they are susceptible to counterexamples, and that they rely problematically on 
primitive or desire-based freedom. If we’re to explain our apparent freedom in deliberation 
by appealing to beliefs, we should appeal instead to ignorance—not to the idea that we can 
form beliefs unconstrained by evidence. 
 
The epistemic model of deliberation I develop is relevant for understanding causation, but it 
also has important implications for debates about deliberation and freedom in decision 
theory, philosophy of action and meta-ethics. The epistemic model constrains idealised 
models of deliberation—defending it means arguing against competing models, such as 
Joyce’s (2002; 2007). Defending the model also means arguing against competing 
explanations of our apparent freedom to decide from philosophy of action, such as 
Velleman’s (1989a; 1989b), as well as accounts from meta-ethics that appeal to normative 
beliefs, such as Korsgaard’s (1996). Insofar as an epistemic model explains our apparent 
freedom in deliberation, normative beliefs aren’t needed to. The epistemic model therefore 
undercuts arguments from our apparent freedom in deliberation to the existence of 
normative facts. 
 
1.4 What is a Deliberative Account of Causation? 
In section 1, I argued that there was a problem understanding how causation fits into the 
world, given the picture presented to us by fundamental physics. So we need an account of 
causation. But why would we need a specifically deliberative account of causation? In chapters 
4 and 5, I’ll argue that an account of causation that relates causation to deliberation satisfies 
important desiderata on accounts of causation. Firstly, a deliberative account can explain 
why causal relations should matter to us. Given that causes don’t feature in the predictions 
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and derivations characteristic of fundamental physics, and aren’t needed to determine events, 
we need an account that makes sense of what other role causes play. According to the 
biconditional I defend, Tamsin’s taking her umbrella is a cause of her staying dry, if and only 
if her deciding to take her umbrella (in proper deliberation) is good evidence of her staying 
dry—where good evidence is the kind of state that justifies belief. According to this 
biconditional, if Tamsin knows about the causal structure of the situation, she can use this 
knowledge to make decisions that are evidence for outcomes she seeks. This is why agents 
should care about causation—causal knowledge is needed for good decision-making.  
 
In chapter 4, I’ll argue that prominent existing accounts of causation don’t adequately 
explain why causal relations should matter to us. James Woodward (2003) and Judea Pearl 
(2000) defend ‘interventionist’ accounts of causation. They analyse causal relations in terms 
of counterfactuals concerning what would happen to a variable under interventions. These 
accounts are non-reductive: they don’t reduce causal relations to non-causal relations. My 
concern with these accounts is not that they are non-reductive. My concern is that they don’t 
adequately explain why agents should care about causation. As I’ll argue, they rely either on 
trivial definitional explanations, or appeal worryingly to primitive notions of agency.  
 
Reductive accounts also fail to explain why we should care about causation. These accounts 
attempt to reduce causal relations to non-causal relations, typically fundamental laws and 
contingent features. David Lewis (1973; 1979), for example, reduces causal relations to 
counterfactuals, and then evaluates these counterfactuals using a ‘comparative similarity 
ordering’ between possible worlds. While Lewis takes the similarity ordering to be a 
metaphysical primitive, he identifies standards by which similarity is to be evaluated. The 
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problem, I’ll argue, is that Lewis fails to justify these standards. He uses apparently arbitrary 
criteria that leave it mysterious why a causal relation formulated in these terms should matter 
to us—even if it delivers the right verdicts. Other reductive accounts inherit this problem, 
including the more sophisticated statistical-mechanical accounts of David Albert (2000) and 
Barry Loewer (2007).  
 
The deliberative account aims to do better. It explains why causation should matter to us, by 
relating causal relations to the evidential relations needed for deliberation. When we’re 
deliberating, we should make decisions that are evidence for outcomes seek. When Tamsin is 
deciding whether to take her umbrella, for the sake of staying dry, she should decide to take 
her umbrella if and only if her decision to take her umbrella is in fact good evidence of her 
staying dry. If she then decides to take her umbrella, she will have made an appropriate 
decision. Similarly, when Suzy is deliberating about whether to throw her rock for the sake 
of breaking the bottle, she’ll have made an appropriate decision to throw if and only if her 
decision to throw is good evidence of the bottle breaking. And when politicians consider 
whether to introduce carbon credits to reduce the rate of global warming, their decision will 
be appropriate if only if their decision to introduce carbon credits is in fact evidence of a 
reduction in the rate of global warming. Causal relations matter to us because knowledge of 
them directs us to good decisions.  
 
The deliberative account has other advantages as well. It explains why causes come prior in 
time to their effects, for macroscopic causes at our world. This is another explanatory 
challenge that Russell’s arguments set up—given fundamental laws work equally in both 
temporal directions, why do causes only operate in one direction? The deliberative account 
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has an answer. In chapter 5, I’ll argue that because deliberation comes prior to decision, 
deliberation breaks or ‘undermines’ evidential relations towards the past.15 Say Tamsin 
typically takes her umbrella after there are storm clouds in the sky, so her decision to take 
her umbrella is usually good evidence of earlier storm clouds. Would a deliberative account 
imply (incorrectly) that Tamsin’s taking her umbrella is a cause of the earlier storm clouds? I’ll 
argue that if Tamsin is properly deliberating, her decision to take her umbrella for the sake of 
there being earlier storm clouds won’t be evidence of earlier storm clouds. Why? Because 
proper deliberation requires that Tamsin doesn’t have evidence of there already being storm 
clouds as she deliberates. And if she doesn’t have this evidence there’s no reason to think 
her decision now will be correlated with there being earlier storm clouds. So these ordinary 
cases don’t imply backwards causation. By generalising Tamsin’s case, I’ll argue that the 
deliberative account explains why causes come prior in time to their effects at our world. 
 
Finally, the biconditional I defend also acts as an important constraint on metaphysical 
accounts of causation—the deliberative account can function as a ‘meta-account’ of 
causation. The biconditional determines how causal relations relate to evidential relations. 
Provided one can show that this correspondence is satisfied for a given account of causation 
and evidence, we have an explanation for why causation, analysed in these terms, should 
matter to agents. In this sense, the deliberative account is compatible with first-order 
metaphysical accounts. But the deliberative account is still what does the work in explaining 
why causal relations, understood in these particular terms, should matter—and even why 
causes come before their effects. I’ll argue in chapter 5, for example, that while a deliberative 
account is compatible with statistical-mechanical accounts of causation, the success of these 
                                                
15 This undermining relates to the ‘screening-off’ appealed to by Huw Price (1992) and other evidential decision 
theorists. But there are crucial differences, explored chapter 5.  
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accounts should be understood in evidential and agent-based terms. It is insofar as these 
accounts pick up on a correspondence between evidential and causal relations that they 
deliver plausible accounts of causation. 
 
On the other hand, it also turns out that the deliberative account should appeal to resources 
from statistical-mechanical accounts. Statistical-mechanical accounts explain an epistemic 
asymmetry in terms of entropy. Under the deliberative account, this same epistemic 
asymmetry can be used to explain why we deliberate before we decide—and so why 
correlations towards the past are undermined by deliberation. In common with statistical-
mechanical accounts, I’ll argue that causal asymmetry is ultimately due to an initial entropic 
boundary condition on the universe. For this reason, statistical-mechanical accounts and 
deliberative accounts turn out to be a particularly neat package. Statistical-mechanical 
accounts relate causation, evidence and entropy. The deliberative account explains why these 
evidence-based causal relations matter—they matter to deliberating agents.  
 
I won’t defend a particular account of what evidential relations are (although I’ll consider 
some options in chapter 4). So I won’t advocate a particular account of what causal relations 
fundamentally are or reduce to. The deliberative account can be used as a half-way step to 
ultimately reducing causal relations to fundamental laws and contingent features, via 
evidential relations. But such a reduction is not mandatory. The deliberative account is 
compatible with a variety of reductive accounts, as well as with accounts in which causation 
is irreducible.  
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Why don’t I plump for a particular metaphysics of causation? To lay my metaphysical cards 
on the table, I believe the important work of metaphysics is to relate things to one another, 
in a way that is illuminating—not to reduce one set of things down to other more 
fundamental things. I’m suspicious of the asymmetrical notions of reduction and 
fundamentality involved. But this doesn’t mean I reject metaphysics entirely. My own 
deliberative account of causation aims to relate causal and evidential relations in a way that is 
illuminating and explanatory. Reductive metaphysical accounts more generally can be read as 
doing similar work. Humean accounts of laws, for example, can be read as relating 
contingent features to laws in a way that is explanatory—but without taking contingent 
features to be more fundamental. For this reason, I don’t think causation can be ultimately 
reduced in the way many metaphysicians intend. But I remain hopeful that interesting work 
can be done relating causation to laws and contingent features, via the deliberative account. 
 
The metaphysical aspirations of my account are one of the ways in which it differs from 
other agent-based accounts. The account I offer shares important features with accounts 
from Huw Price (1991; 1992; 1993; (Menzies and Price) 1993; 1996; 2007; (Price and 
Weslake) 2009; 2012; forthcoming) and Jenann Ismael (2007), as well as early manipulationist 
accounts from R. G. Collingwood (1940, pp. 296−312), Douglas Gasking (1955) and G. H. 
von Wright (1971, ch. 2). These all share the idea that we must make sense of causation 
through its relevance for agency, deliberation and control. Price, whose account is furthest 
developed, defends a ‘perspectivalist’ account, arguing that for causation to appear in our 
worldview, we must take up the perspective of an agent, capable of intervening in the world. 
But while Price and I agree on the relevance of agents for understanding causation, we 
disagree about the metaphysical upshots of an agent-based account. Price most often takes 
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his agency theory to concern the function of causal talk, the assertibility conditions on the 
concept causation, or the genealogy of the concept. My own account is directly concerned 
with causation itself. It aims to deliver causal relations that appear from outside the 
perspective of the agent. And it aims to be compatible with metaphysical accounts of 
causation. 
 
Overall, my deliberative account sits between various existing counterfactual accounts of 
causation, sharing features in common with each. In common with reductive metaphysical 
accounts, I am interested in causal relations themselves, and how causation relates to 
fundamental laws. But unlike reductive accounts, I don’t think a reduction of causation to 
fundamental laws and contingent features gives us a sufficiently illuminating account of 
causation. We need to think about why causal relations matter. In common with 
interventionist account, I think causal relations should be thought of in terms of their 
relevance for manipulation and control. But unlike interventionist accounts, I don’t think 
merely relating causal relations to one another is enough. In common with Price’s 
perspectivalist account, I think we can’t make sense of causation without thinking about its 
relevance for deliberation. But unlike Price, I don’t think making sense of causation by 
appeal to deliberation means giving up all aspects of the metaphysical project.  
 
1.5 Summary of Chapters 
In the chapters to come, I present and defend an epistemic model of deliberation (chapters 
2−3), and a deliberative account of causation (chapters 4−5). In chapter 2, I put forward an 
epistemic model of deliberation. This model explains our apparent freedom in deliberation 
using requirements on the beliefs we can and can’t have while deliberating. I argue, for 
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example, that Tamsin can’t reasonably deliberate on taking her umbrella if she’s already 
certain she won’t. Her ignorance of what she’ll do, along with other epistemic conditions, 
explains her apparent freedom to deliberate. The model appeals only to epistemic features, 
not metaphysical notions of freedom. And so it explains our experience of free deliberation 
in a way compatible with physical laws. 
 
In chapter 3, I defend this model from rivals that also appeal to beliefs to explain our 
apparent freedom. These rival accounts appeal to the idea that agents can properly form 
certain beliefs ‘unconstrained’ by evidence. These beliefs constitute their decisions, giving 
agents a kind of ‘epistemic freedom’ over their decisions. This epistemic freedom is 
supposed to explain their freedom to decide. I’ll argue that these accounts incorrectly imply 
agents have epistemic freedom even over beliefs formed on the basis of evidence, and rely 
on a faulty notion of justification. Underlying these troubles, I’ll argue that these accounts 
rely problematically on a primitive ability to believe in different ways—they don’t actually 
explain our freedom in purely epistemic terms.   
 
In chapter 4, I develop my preferred epistemic model of deliberation into a ‘deliberative 
account’ of causation. Say Tamsin is deliberating about whether to take her umbrella, and 
properly considers her evidence. I argue that her taking her umbrella counts as a cause of her 
staying dry just in case her deciding to take her umbrella is good evidence she’ll stay dry. This 
account explains why causal relations matter—causal relations are needed for good decision-
making. But the account does not make causal relations merely subjective or up to us. Causal 
relations are as objective as the evidential relations we use when we reason, and are related to 
fundamental laws precisely because laws are also required for good evidential reasoning.  
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Finally, in chapter 5, I argue that the deliberative account can also explain why causes come 
before their effects. I begin by showing that if Tamsin is properly deliberating, her decisions 
won’t be evidence for past outcomes she seeks. For example, Tamsin’s decision to take her 
umbrella won’t be evidence of earlier rain, if she decides to take her umbrella for the sake of 
there being earlier rain. Her deliberation, if it is proper, undermines the evidential relation 
that would otherwise obtain to the past. So a causal relation that corresponds to the 
evidential relations that hold for deliberators like Tamsin won’t run backwards.  
 
Ultimately, my project aims to make sense of our apparent freedom in deliberation and use 
this apparent freedom to make sense of causation. So we can understand how causation and 








 An Epistemic Model of Practical Deliberation 
 
 
Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be free, simply because they 
are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined. 
Baruch de Spinoza ([1677], IIIp2s) 
 
In this chapter, I present and defend an epistemic model of practical deliberation. This 
model characterises deliberation by placing constraints on the beliefs an agent can and can’t 
reasonably have while deliberating. I’ll argue, for example, that agents can’t reasonably 
deliberate on what to do when they’re already certain of what they’re going to do. Yet they 
must take their decisions to epistemically settle what they’ll do. This model does not attempt 
to capture all aspects of deliberation. But it captures enough, I will argue, to explain why 
different options appear available to be decided on in deliberation, and so why the world 
appears open to choice. This is precisely the kind of apparent freedom we need to make 
sense of causation, and to understand how our apparent freedom in deliberation fits into a 
scientific picture of the world.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 1, I’ll introduce the kind of deliberation I’m 
concerned with and the general approach I’ll take. In section 2, I argue for a set of necessary 
epistemic conditions on deliberation, which constitutes the epistemic model. In section 3, I 
show that the model is compatible with practical norms playing a role in deliberation. In 
section 4, I show how the model explains our apparent freedom in deliberation. And finally, 
in section 5, I advocate a certain picture about how practical and theoretical reason relate: 
practical deliberation is only allowed for by pre-existing gaps in our (theoretical) beliefs 
about the world.  
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2.1 What is Practical Deliberation? 
In this chapter, I present a model of practical deliberation. I take the practical deliberation 
I’m concerned with to have the following features. It is a decision-making process in which 
an agent deliberates between different options that she takes to be available, and which she 
appears free to decide on. For example, Kyle might deliberate over whether to be in London 
or Edinburgh next week. Shyane might deliberate about whether to have milk in the fridge 
or not. In each case, possibilities appear to the agent as available options he or she is free to 
decide on. These options concern what is to be or to be made the case, where this is usually 
expressed in the future tense form of what one will do or what will be the case.16 Practical 
deliberation of this form relates closely to action—to our attempts to make the world fit 
with our decisions—hence, it is practical. There are other activities that may rightly be called 
practical deliberation, but which I won’t consider here—these include considering one’s ends 
or desires and working out what options are available. I take deliberation to be a process that 
occurs over time, which typically conclude in decision.17 Deliberation may be interrupted and 
returned to. A decision can be given up and deliberation restart. The decision may be 
implemented either at the end of deliberation, at some later point, or over a period of time. 
Decisions can be snap decisions, require short or long periods of deliberation, or be part of 
long term planning.  
 
As I go on to develop the epistemic model of practical deliberation, I’ll appeal primarily to 
work in decision theory rather than philosophy of action. This is for a number of reasons. 
                                                
16 While we often express practical decisions as concerning what ‘will be’, I will avoid such future-tensed 
language as far as possible. I allow for the possibility that we can decide on past state of affairs in order to give 
a non-trivial explanation of why we deliberate only on the future (chapter 5).  
17 But I don’t assume that the conclusion of deliberation comes temporally after deliberation—the fact that 
decision comes after deliberation is to be explained (see chapter 5).  
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Firstly, while philosophers of action typically assume a causal structure to the world that 
agents have ready access to, there are decision theorists who do not take this structure for 
granted—particularly evidential decision theorists. If we are interested in accounting for 
causation in terms of deliberation, we would do well to assume as little causal structure as 
possible to begin with. Secondly, the minimal conditions used by decision theorists are 
compatible with a variety of approaches to ethics and normative reasons for action. They do 
not settle questions such as whether reason-giving relations are objective features of the 
world, or based on our desires. I am interested in specifying conditions on deliberation that 
theorists with different views of normativity can accept, and so the very minimal conditions 
used in decision theory are preferable to the more normatively-laden views developed in 
philosophy of action. While decision theorists are still concerned with principles of 
rationality that are taken to be normative, an attempt is made to be otherwise neutral 
concerning reasons for action.  
 
Because I bracket causation and practical normativity as much as possible, the account of 
deliberation I develop is going to look strange and perhaps misguided to those more familiar 
with accounts of deliberation from ethics, meta-ethics and philosophy of action. I encourage 
such readers to press on with the account in an experimental spirit. Even if we can’t get a 
complete picture of deliberation while excising causal and normative notions, let’s see how 
far we can get. I’ll argue that an epistemic model of deliberation can capture enough of 
deliberation to give us a non-trivial deliberative account of causation. I don’t intend the 
epistemic model to rule out other more detailed investigations of deliberation. 
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For reasons just given, I have avoided characterising deliberation in normative terms. I have 
not characterised practical deliberation as working out what ought to be the case, or what one 
has reason to do, but as working out what is to be the case. This is not because I think 
practical deliberation can’t involve normative reasoning (as I’ll explain in section 2.3) but 
because I intend my account of deliberation to be compatible with a variety of view about 
practical normativity. Furthermore, normative reasoning doesn’t capture what I take to be 
the most important feature of practical deliberation—that it issues in decisions about how 
the world is or will be. Regardless of whether deliberation is meant to issue in a good, justified 
or rational conclusion, it is meant to issue in a conclusion about the state of the world. And 
this conclusion cannot be merely about normative features of the world. One can work out 
what ought to be even if one has no intention or expectation of things being settled that 
way. I am interested in a kind of practical deliberation that aims to settle how the world will 
be. While forming a normative belief about what ought to be may lead to a practical decision 
of this form, they are not the same thing.18  
 
For similar reasons, I focus on decision rather than intention—the more common topic in 
philosophy of action.19 Intention is often more closely linked to a commitment to make things a 
certain way, and so more bound up with norms and causation. I wish to abstract from these 
as much as possible. Decision, as I’ll argue below, is more closely linked with settling things 
being a certain way. While I take the epistemic conditions I argue for to still apply to 
intentions, in an attenuated form, decisions are the more straightforward place to start. I will, 
                                                
18 Owens (2009) considers cases in which one can rationally judge what to do without settling the normative 
question of what one ought to do. He also suggests that ‘some creatures might be capable of thinking about 
what to do without deploying normative concepts like ‘should’ and ‘ought’’(2009, p. 122). For a similar 
argument, see Holton (2006).  
19 Moran (2001) takes the event of deciding and the state of intending to be two aspects of the same 
phenomenon. I disagree. There are event and state correlates for both: there is the event of forming an 
intention, and also the state of being decided. 
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however, refer to work on intention as it is relevant for decision, and follow decision 
theorists in also talking of ‘choosing’ and ‘choices’.  
 
I will typically characterise the options agents decide on in terms of states of affairs 
represented by propositions: an agent decides that he will be in London next week, or that 
there will be milk in the fridge.20 This is in preference to characterising the options in terms 
of actions: deciding to go to London or to buy milk. Given that we often do talk of an agent 
deciding to ø, where ø is an action, let me say something about how these formulations relate. 
In many cases, states of affairs and action-based formulations can be converted into each 
other in a straightforward way.21 Converting from actions to states of affairs, I might decide 
that I go to London next week or that I buy milk: more generally, that I ø. The states of 
affairs formulation can pick out actions to be performed by the agent. Using the first-person 
pronoun emphasises that such states of affairs may need to include personal indexicals.22 
Converting from states of affairs to actions, I might decide to act-so-as-to bring it about that 
a, where a picks out the state of affairs.23 Part of the reason these formulations can be 
converted is that when we choose actions, we choose them under descriptions. Taking an 
example from Davidson (1980, ch. 1), I might decide to switch on the light, but not decide 
to alert the burglar,, even if these are, in some sense, the very same action. The description 
                                                
20 I take propositions to be the objects of propositional attitudes like belief and to be bearers of truth-values. I 
take states of affairs to be situations that either obtain or fail to obtain and imply the truth or falsity of 
propositions. I leave to one side the substantive issue of how finely individuated states of affairs should be, and 
how they relate to the propositions that represent them. 
21 For arguments that they are not convertible, see Schroeder (2011). Schroeder is concerned about 
downstream effects in normative theories and meta-ethics, as well as semantic issues I do not engage with here. 
But he accepts that the propositions-formulation can say everything the action-based formulation can, and that 
is enough for my purposes. 
22 If states of affairs and propositions cannot be indexical, states of affairs and propositions will need to be 
replaced by theoretical equivalents, of whatever kind are needed to deal with indexical beliefs and indexical 
propositional attitudes more generally (Perry 1979).  
23 Note that ‘bringing it about’ does not imply that there is an action that is a part of a that the agent performs: 
I might decide that my walls are to be painted blue, without deciding to paint the walls (since I do not envisage 
painting them myself). 
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we choose actions under can then be invoked in giving a first-person tensed proposition 
representing the option.  
 
Despite their convertibility, there is good reason to prefer the state of affairs (or some other 
broadly propositional) formulation, at least for the following project.24 Firstly, if we are 
considering the relations between an agent’s beliefs and the options she takes to be available, 
it will be useful if the beliefs and options can be directly compared. This will be easier if the 
options are characterised in terms of the objects of belief, that is, propositionally. Secondly, 
characterising options without appealing to actions helps ensure we do not smuggle in 
features of action that trivialise the explanation of our apparent freedom in deliberation—as 
we might if we assume that actions are performed freely. Thirdly, as mentioned, since I will 
use this epistemic model of deliberation to give an account of causation, it will be better to 
excise causal notions as much as possible from the start. Since the general formulation in 
terms of deciding to uses the notion of ‘bringing about’, this is a reason against using it. 
Finally, if we can characterise options in terms of states of affairs that do not mention 
actions, we leave open the possibility of explaining why certain movements count as actions 
in a non-circular manner.25 For example, we might account for why the movement of 
Georgie’s arm counts as an action by appealing to the fact that her decision to move her arm 
is appropriately related to the movement. While we may be able to give such explanations 
even if options are characterised in terms of actions, we risk trivializing these explanations. 
Action theorists, often pursuing other projects, may have reason to prefer the action 
                                                
24 One could also hold, for example, that we decide on events, or events under descriptions. The differences 
between states of affairs and events won’t affect the accounts of deliberation and causation I develop. 
25 On a number of views, our capacity for intentional action is closely tied to our capacity to intend or decide. 
According to the ‘Simple View’, an agent who intentionally ø’s must have ‘an intention to ø’—suggested by 
Bratman (1984) and held by Kaptian (1990; 1994). A weaker view is that intentionally ø-ing requires having an 
intention, but not necessarily an intention to ø (Bratman 1984). Owens (2009) also argues that our capacity for 
free action depends on our capacity for decision-making. 
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formulation: perhaps decisions to act are required for certain kinds of action explanation, or 
for agents to be self-determining. But provided the reader is willing to accept that we at least 
decide on actions under descriptions, the conversions given above should be sufficient. For 
grammatical ease, I will also sometimes talk of deciding to ø, shorthand for deciding that I ø. 
 
I don’t assume that deliberation is always conscious. But I will primarily consider intuitions 
and examples based on conscious deliberation—the kind we are aware of and experience 
ourselves as involved in—rather than unconscious deliberation—the kind we may, 
sometimes after that fact, infer ourselves to be engaged in. I choose to focus on conscious 
deliberation for several reasons. Firstly, it is in conscious deliberation that we typically are 
aware of our apparent freedom more fully and pay close attention to our mental lives. This 
makes it easier to identify what epistemic conditions are required for deliberation and 
apparent freedom. Secondly, cases where we act as a result of conscious deliberation are 
paradigmatic cases of free agency. Plausibly, it is the possibility of consciously deliberating 
that ultimately explains why we seem free in cases where we do not act as a result of 
conscious deliberation. But note that even though the epistemic model is motivated by cases 
of conscious deliberation, it does not rule out unconscious deliberation. The epistemic 
model I give can accommodate unconscious deliberation, provided we allow for the 
possibility of unconscious beliefs as well. There may be difficult cases where beliefs or 
deliberation are actively hidden or suppressed from consciousness in order to hide tensions 
between areas of our mental lives. While the conditions I outline below may sometimes hold 
for these cases, they need not, and these cases should then be treated as aberrant—cases 
where our mental lives are not sufficiently well ordered for standard conditions of 
deliberation to apply (see section 2.2c). To highlight the fact that these conditions need not 
 34 
hold of all deliberations, I will sometimes speak of them as conditions on ‘reasonable 
deliberation’.  
 
The conditions I argue for serve two kinds of purposes. Firstly, they aim to identify broad 
structural features of deliberation that are shared across practical deliberations with different 
content. In this sense, the conditions aim to characterise deliberation, by highlighting its 
epistemic structure. But I don’t intend these conditions to demarcate a mere arbitrary 
activity. I’ll argue that they mark out a coherent and unified phenomenon that plays an 
important role in our lives. Deliberation serves an epistemic function—it helps epistemically 
settle what we will do and what will occur, so that we can engage in further planning. For 
these reasons, I’ll argue that these conditions are also constitutive norms of deliberation. If we 
had an activity that systematically flouted these epistemic conditions, it would not rightly be 
called deliberation. 
 
2.2 The Epistemic Model  
2.2a Epistemic Conditions on Deliberation 
In this section, I argue for a set of epistemic conditions that must obtain if an agent is to 
take an option to be available to decide on in deliberation.26 By stipulation, an agent must 
take an option to be available to decide on if she is to deliberate concerning that option.27 
The conditions are necessary for deliberation, but are not each non-redundant. And while I 
                                                
26 In developing these conditions, I have relied substantially on the work of Isaac Levi (1980; 1986; 1997; 2000). 
I discuss the major difference between our approaches in the next chapter (section 3.1c), and other more minor 
differences as they arise. Tomis Kapitan (1984; 1986; 1989; 1990) uses conditions that are closer to my own, 
although he takes options to be essentially actions (1986, p. 248). I discuss other differences as they arise. 
27 Note that taking an option to be available does not imply that the option will result if she chooses it, nor the 
reverse. For this reason, I have avoided speaking of agents ‘recognising’ an option as available, which suggests 
the option really is available. For other ways of marking these distinctions, see Smith (2010) and Bok (1998, p. 
106). 
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will argue that the conditions can do interesting explanatory work, they don’t aim to give a 
complete characterisation of deliberation.  
 
An agent takes an option a to be available only if: 
(a) her deciding on a is a serious possibility for her;  
(b) she is practically certain that if she decides on a, then a;  
(c) a is a serious possibility for her;  
(d) it is a serious possibility for her that if she does not decide on a, a does not obtain.  
 
An agent deliberates only if: 
(e) she takes several options to be available; 
(f) she takes her apparently-available options to be incompatible.  
 
To begin, let me clarify these requirements. Firstly, these requirements all concern an agent’s 
beliefs—they concern what she takes to be the case, what are ‘serious possibilities’ and 
‘practical certainties’ for her. I discuss these latter two notions shortly. By stipulation, ‘taking’ 
is a weak doxastic attitude, such that the agent has the disposition to affirm the belief when 
asked, but the belief need not be high-level or conceptualised—it can be merely a low-level 
awareness or presumption.28 Secondly, these conditions are inherently first-personal and are 
indexed to the first-person throughout (such that ‘she’ takes a de se reading). They are not 
claims about what other agents believe, or what is more generally the case. Thirdly, the 
conditionals in conditions b and d are to be read as indicative conditionals. While material 
                                                
28 A similar notion is discussed by Kapitan (1986, p. 235). This usage implies that the agent need not have fully 
articulated concepts of serious possibility, for example, in order to deliberate—contra Coffman and Warfield 
(2005). 
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conditionals would suffice for my purposes, indicative conditionals more plausibly capture 
an agent’s beliefs. 
 
Conditions a, c and d concern ‘serious possibilities’. By definition, a state of affairs p is a 
serious possibility for an agent, if its obtaining is not ruled out of consideration by her other 
beliefs—that is, if not-p is not a logical consequence of her beliefs (or any subset of her 
beliefs, if agents have inconsistent beliefs). Serious possibility is a kind of relativised 
epistemic possibility. The notion is adapted from Levi (1980; 1986), where it helps explain 
how a possibility can be assigned a degree of belief zero, and yet still be given consideration. 
For example, an agent may assign equal probability to a dart landing at any of an infinite 
number of points in a finite interval of the real number line. This means an agent has a 
degree of belief zero in each possible outcome. But he still countenances these outcomes as 
possibilities because each is compatible with his other beliefs. 
 
Kapitan also appeals to a similar notion. Kapitan is concerned with actions that are 
contingent relative to what the agent takes it he believes (1989, p. 35). A state of affairs p is 
contingent relative to a set of states of affairs S just in case neither p nor not-p is a 
consequence of S, i.e., ‘that the obtaining of the members of S is not sufficient for the 
obtaining of p nor for that of not-p’ (1984, p. 41).29 Similarly, we might claim, an option a is a 
serious possibility for an agent, if he takes it that if S represents any subset of his beliefs not-a 
is not a logical consequence of S—implying a is logically possible, given S. But note that 
under this formulation, unlike mine, an option may be a serious possibility for an agent, even 
if it is inconsistent with his other beliefs. Kapitan’s formulation allows for more everyday 
                                                
29 For arguments on why beliefs should be relativised in this way, see Kapitan (1986, pp. 237, 244; 1989, p. 32; 
1990, pp. 130−2).  
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forms of irrationality. But it only does so by appealing to higher order beliefs. My own 
formulation aims to avoid appealing to higher-order beliefs, and so is closer to Levi’s.30  
 
Practical certainty is my own notion, and relates to serious possibility as follows: if an agent 
is practically certain of p, then not-p is not a serious possibility for her; and if p is a serious 
possibility for her, then not-p is not a practical certainty for her.31 Note that having a degree 
of belief 1 does not imply practical certainty. As noted, p can be serious possibility for an 
agent, even if he has a degree of belief 0 in p. In the example above, the agent can have a 
degree of belief 0 that the dart will land on a certain point, and so a degree of belief 1 that it 
won’t land on that point. But its landing on that point can still be a serious possibility for him. 
So he can have a degree of belief 1 that it won’t land on that point, yet this not be a practical 
certainty.  
 
Nor does practical certainty imply having a degree of belief 1, or a degree of belief above a 
certain threshold—although such characterisations will often work in a rough-and-ready 
way. The term ‘practical certainty’ has been used because it suggests that our practical 
certainties will depend partly on practical matters and on what possibilities we do in fact 
countenance when reasoning. A belief is practically certain when it is settled for all intents 
and purposes in an agent’s subsequent practical and theoretical deliberations, and when its 
falsity is taken not to be a serious possibility. This belief can be later revisited, but it is 
something currently held fixed. A belief can be treated in this way, even if an agent does not 
                                                
30 The difference between Kapitan’s approach and my own won’t matter when I move to more demanding 
requirements on deliberation in chapter 4.  
31 Levi uses a notion of ‘full belief’ rather than ‘practical certainty’, where having full belief rules out 
incompatible proposition as serious possibilities. If an agent has full belief in a proposition, she takes there to 
be no serious possibility of its being false. But full belief implies a degree of belief 1, unlike practical certainty.  
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have a degree of belief 1. What will count as a sufficiently high degree of belief to have 
practical certainty, on any given occasion, will depend on the needs of the agent regarding 
her subsequent deliberations—it will be heavily context-dependent, and so not a robust 
threshold value.32 Harman appeals to a similar notion in the context of intention: ‘forming 
the intention to do A settles in one’s mind the question whether one is going to do A…in 
any additional theoretical or practical reasoning, one will be able to take it for granted that 
one will be doing A’ (1976, p. 438). Dennett also appeals to a similar combination of 
epistemic and practical constraints in characterising what options an agent takes to be 
available (1984, p. 113).   
 
With these points in mind, it is time to consider the requirements more closely. Condition a 
is that the agent’s deciding on a is a serious possibility for her. Aside from whether a obtains 
or not, an agent takes her actual deciding on a to be something that may obtain. In Levi’s 
terms, her beliefs do not rule out her choosing a true (1986, pp. 48−52; 1997, p. 77). It is 
uncontroversial that there must be some sense in which an agent is ‘able’ to decide on a, for 
a to be an available option. If Raamy knows he can’t decide to swim into a river swimming 
with crocodiles, because he is so fearful of them that he can’t even form the decision, then 
swimming into the river is not an available option for him—and he won’t appear free to 
decide to. But it’s controversial to take an epistemic sense of possibility to capture the 
relevant ability. One might think that epistemic possibility is neither necessary nor sufficient 
(with the other conditions) to capture an agent’s ability to choose a.  
 
                                                
32 For examples of such context-relativity, see Owens (2009, p. 131). If practical certainty is heavily context-
dependent, we may need to specify that the belief is held fixed in a sufficient range of potential deliberations. 
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I will say more in defence of condition a’s necessity in the next section. But why think an 
epistemic sense of possibility would be sufficient? Ultimately the epistemic model can only be 
judged as a whole. The question is whether the conditions together give a sufficient 
characterisation of deliberation. In the remainder of this chapter, I’ll argue that the epistemic 
model provides a sufficiently rich characterisation of deliberation to explain our apparent 
freedom in deliberation (section 2.4). But for now, my motivation for this epistemic 
condition is that it’s our best hope for characterising deliberation in a non-causal fashion, 
without appealing to primitive agent abilities. Competing conditions are usually either causal, 
where the agent believes she can cause the decision (Joyce 2002, p. 88), or appeal to agent 
abilities—for example, that the agent believes ‘her choosing is a conscious effort of her own’ 
(Kapitan 1986, p. 249, his emphasis).33 But if we’re to explain an agent’s apparent freedom, 
we do better not to appeal to agential primitives. And if we’re to explain causation, we do 
better not to appeal to causal notions. In the next chapter, I’ll also argue against competing 
attempts to explain our apparent freedom in epistemic terms. 
 
Condition b requires that the agent be practically certain that if she decides on a, then a. For 
an agent to recognise an option as available in deliberation, she must be practically certain 
that if she decide on a, then a. Choosing a settles the truth of a for her, such that it is no 
longer something she needs to deliberate or question herself concerning. For example, 
Shyane should take deciding on there being milk in the fridge to settle the question of 
whether there will be milk in the fridge. The state of affairs is now a fixed point in what she 
                                                
33 One could also appeal to desires—an agent feels free to make a decision, just in case her decision is in 
keeping with her desires. But if we’re to explain why an agent feels free to decide in different ways, we need to 
appeal to more—perhaps that her desires are conflicting, or may change, or she doesn’t know her current 
desires—so that her desires leave more than one option ‘open’. I suggest we’ll have to crucially appeal to 
epistemic notions as well. I consider some of the ways desires (or other evaluations) can play a role in 
deliberation under the epistemic model in section 2.3, and consider other desire-based accounts in section 3.4. 
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believes to be the case, such that she can make further plans and preparations without 
having to revisit the question.34 Shyane may still renege on her decision and revisit the 
deliberation. But she cannot take reneging to be a serious possibility as she decides.35 Note 
that this does not imply that a decision is a belief, or has belief as a component part: decision 
merely implies belief in the outcome.  
 
Conditions a and b imply condition c: that a, the state of affairs obtaining, is a serious 
possibility for the agent—something that may come about for all she believes. If deciding on 
a is a serious possibility, and deciding on a epistemically settles the obtaining of a, then a 
must also be a serious possibility. So if Shyane is to deliberate concerning two available 
options, such whether to have milk in the fridge or not, then both states of affairs must be 
serious possibilities for her: her beliefs about the world can’t fix for her whether there is milk 
in the fridge or not. Because this condition plays a particularly important role in the account, 
I have included it as a separate condition. Condition c, like a, is controversial; defending it 
will take up much of the next section.  
 
Condition b is also controversial: that deciding on an option epistemically settles its 
obtaining. I’ll say something in defence of it here. The condition has it adherents.36 It also 
helps explain what options are taken to be available in deliberation. Consider van Inwagen’s 
case of a man in a room with two doors, believing one to be locked, the other unlocked, but 
who does not have beliefs that settle which is which (1983, p. 154). Van Inwagen claims that 
                                                
34 For more on the epistemic function of intention in allowing for further deliberation, planning and 
coordination, see Bratman (1984).  
35 For discussion of how new evidence may bring an agent to re-enter deliberation, without being part of 
deliberation, see Owens (2008, p. 263).  
36 Grice (1971), Harman (1976), Levi (1986, 1997) Kapitan (1986, 1989) all endorse such a condition. Slightly 
weaker conditions are defended by Hampshire and Hart (1958), Ginet (1962), Taylor (1964), Schick (1979) 
Holton (2006) and Setiya (2008).  
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the man cannot sensibly deliberate about which door to open—and uses this to support his 
metaphysical account of free choice. Condition b secures the same result without requiring 
metaphysical possibilities. Even if the man takes door 1 being unlocked to be a serious 
epistemic possibility, and door 2 being unlocked to be a serious possibility, he is not 
practically certain that if he decides on door 1 being open, door 1 will be open, and likewise 
for door 2. So he does not take these options to be available.  
 
One might worry that condition b is too strong: an agent need not be certain a will obtain in 
order to recognise a as available. He need only consider it likely that a will obtain, or take his 
deciding to raise the probability of a. For example, it might seem golfer-Dan may recognise 
making a difficult putt as an available option, even if he is uncertain of whether he will 
succeed. In response, consider what happens when we try to apply the language of ‘decision’ 
to such cases. While we might speak of the Dan as intending to make the putt, as intending to 
try for the putt, or as deciding to try for the putt, we would not naturally speak of him deciding 
to make the putt. Similarly, we would not usually describe a player as deciding to win a lottery, 
or deciding to win a coin toss, even if that is what they intend, try for, or think they raise the 
probability of. We reserve the term ‘deciding’ for an outcome that is settled, an outcome that 
we hold fixed in our own further planning and deliberation, and license others to hold fixed 
as well.37 And the reason for this is not simply that we happen to use words in this way—
these words pick up on important distinctions, distinction that themselves map to features of 
our practices. It makes an interesting difference whether a choice settles for one that the 
                                                
37 Separating intention and decision in this way also allows us to accommodate competing intuitions concerning 
whether an agent can intend an event that he cannot reliably bring about. Under my preferred view, the agent 
can intend the state of affairs (because of the commitment involved) but not decide on it. The etymology of 
‘intend’ and ‘decide’ bears out this point (although I don’t place much weight on this). ‘Intend’ derives from the 
Latin intendere, whose meanings relate to stretching and extending, such as when one bends oneself towards a 
certain end. ‘Decide’ comes from the Latin ‘decidere’ and has meanings related to cutting off, settling or 
determining something in question or doubt (Oxford English Dictionary, Murray and Burchfield (eds.) 1933). 
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option will occur, or whether it merely settles that the option will be sought. If an option is 
settled, we can justifiably inform others of its occurrence, and plan around the occurrence 
ourselves.38 If it is merely sought, we cannot. Taking into account possible failures of 
performance, in particular, is essential to good planning. Moreover, note that an agent can 
still decide that the probability of an outcome be raised, or to try for an outcome, even if an 
outcome is too unlikely to be decided on directly. We can still preserve the same conditions 
on decision, with no loss of generality. If we do wish to extend this account of practical 
deliberation to cover options that are too unlikely to be decided on, what we should do is 
alter the option-descriptions, rather than condition d. The option-descriptions could be 
deciding on a state that raises the raise the probability of a.39  
 
One might still wish to argue that there is a certain threshold degree of belief at which the 
outcome counts as decided upon. Much of what I say in the following is compatible with 
such a view. But it is difficult to imagine that there is any robust exact value at which this 
occurs—it will be heavily context-dependent. Because the threshold value must be sensitive 
to the needs of the agent’s subsequent deliberations, we will be lead to something like the 
pragmatic account of certainty that I prefer: a belief is practically certain when it is settled for 
all intents and purposes in an agent’s subsequent practical and theoretical deliberations.  
 
                                                
38 Grice make a similar point: in stating ‘I will do A’, an agent ‘is ordinarily held both to have given others a 
justification for planning on the assumption that he will do A and to have committed himself, on pain of being 
convicted of insincerity, to planning on that assumption himself’ (1971, p. 4). See also Harman (1976, p. 434).  
39 If the epistemic conditions are to explain why options that have been rejected are no longer available, we 
can’t weaken condition b, or rejected options will still count as available. A second reason to alter the option 
descriptions rather than the conditions is that the incompatibility required by condition f, considered below, 
concerns decided states, not the intended ones. Unless there is some incompatibility in trying for (or raising the 
probability of) two incompatible outcomes, there is no associated irrationality in intending both of them. While 
there are situations in which trying for (or raising the probability of) two incompatible options may undermine 
one’s ability to achieve either, if this is not the case, it not irrational to intend both. 
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Condition d requires a’s not obtaining to be a serious possibility for the agent, given she does 
not decide on a. In other words, the agent can’t be certain that a will obtain, regardless of 
how she decides. For example, an agent cannot decide that 2+2=4, or that the sun will rise 
tomorrow, if she takes these to be settled, regardless of what she decides. This would 
prevent her deliberation from having any epistemic bearing on what option obtains, and 
agents must take their decisions to be epistemically relevant for how the world goes. I take 
condition d to be uncontroversial as a necessary condition on recognising an option as 
available, and I will say nothing further in defence of its necessity.40 Causal decision theorists 
may also require the agent to take her decision to be causally efficacious. But this is no 
reason to deny this minimal epistemic condition.41  
 
In addition to these four conditions on an agent taking an option to be available, there are 
two conditions on an agent deliberating: 
(e) she takes several options to be available; 
(f) she takes at her apparently-available options to be incompatible.  
 
If an agent is to deliberate, she must take more than one option to be available. And she 
must take her apparently-available options to be incompatible, in the sense that she takes any 
one option to rule out the possibility of any other. Options might be taken to be 
                                                
40 One could also allow the option to be taken as available, but maintain that deliberation could not take place, 
since there would be no alternative options available (Levi 1986, p. 60). I take this to be a notational variant and 
not a substantive disagreement. Note that condition d is redundant if one assumes that an option can only be 
available if another incompatible option is available. I’ve allowed that an option may be available in this 
situation, but that an agent may not reasonably deliberate (by conditions e and f).  
41 Kapitan introduces a stronger condition—that the agent takes it he will act if and only if he chooses to (1986, 
p.234). This is plausible, but only if options are actions. If options are states of affairs, the condition is too 
strong as a condition on intention (as it is for Kapitan). I can intend a state, even if I’m aware that the state may 
be brought about by other means. But ultimately my conditions on decision will have similar consequences as 
Kapitan’s, since I also require the agent to take some of her available options to be incompatible.  
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incompatible because of nomological, causal or logical grounds: for example, an agent might 
deliberate between being in Manhattan or Brooklyn tomorrow at 8pm, presuming she 
cannot be in both places at once. Or she might deliberate between being on the London 
train or not being on the London train, taking these options to logically exclude one another. 
Together conditions e and f imply that an agent takes it that several incompatible options are 
available.  
 
Why think that alternatives must be taken to be incompatible? Say Alice deliberates about 
whether to hit the top two-thirds of a dartboard, or the bottom two-thirds. Her options are 
compatible—the dart may land in the middle third, which is compatible with both options. 
Let’s further specify the case and say that Alice can’t decide to hit any single third—she’s not 
a good shot, so these (incompatible) options aren’t available to her. But there are other 
incompatible options available to her. Alice can decide that she aim in an upwards direction, 
or decide that she aim in a downwards direction. So we haven’t ruled out Alice deliberating 
by requiring options to be incompatible. Are there reasons for Alice to prefer to demarcate 
her options in this way? In some cases, it may help Alice focus on the differences between 
her options, rather than the similarities—if aiming in an upwards direction rules out hitting 
Alice’s disliked bottom third, this may be a reason for her to prefer it. In these cases, while 
there are reasons to carve available options into incompatible ones, I suspect they are not 
decisive. 
 
But what if more finely demarcated incompatible options are available? Say Alice is a good 
shot, and can decide to hit any single third. Or say Alice can choose any of the items on a 
café menu. In these cases there are stronger reasons for carving up options into 
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incompatible ones. Say Alice is deliberating between a chocolate desert and a tart, where 
there are several of each on the menu. If there is also a chocolate tart on the menu, this is 
not a good way for Alice to carve up her options. Why? Because having chosen a tart, she 
will still have to decide on whether to take a chocolate one or another, and conversely for 
deciding on a chocolate desert—and precisely the same reasons, concerns and desires will be 
in play both times. In addition, it may be difficult for Alice to decide between chocolate or a 
tart. Yet there is no need to do so if she chooses the chocolate tart. Alice does not need to 
determine whether she chooses the chocolate tart in virtue of its chocolaty or tarty qualities. 
These are strong reasons in favour of carving up options into incompatible ones. Finally, 
note that allowing for partially overlapping options will not affect my arguments below—it 
just makes them more difficult to state. It will still be in terms of the incompatible parts of 
the option alternatives that we make sense of deliberation and its epistemic function. 
 
What if the options are in no way incompatible? Say Alice deliberates between the mango 
tart, and the chocolate truffle, where taking one doesn’t rule out taking the other. Once 
again, it seems Alice hasn’t demarcated her options well. If she decides to have the mango 
tart, this in no way settle her not having the chocolate truffle, and she will have to continue to 
deliberate with the same kinds of considerations in play. And if different considerations are in 
play, it’s hard to see why we should call it a single deliberation. If Alice’s choosing her first 
desert is in no way relevant for her second choice, it’s hard to see why this is not simply two 
deliberations—one for her first choice, one for her second—and incompatible options are 
again in play. Deliberation must be between (at least partly) incompatible options.  
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Altogether, we now have six necessary conditions on taking an option to be available in 
deliberation. Only four of these are non-redundant: a, b, e, f. As already noted, a and b imply 
c. Furthermore, d is implied by the other conditions. Here’s why. Deliberation is between 
apparently incompatible alternatives (e and f), where the decisions settle the states obtaining 
(b). So if an agent decides on an option taken to be incompatible with a, she must take not-a 
to obtain. So an agent must take it to be a serious possibility that if she does not decide on a, 
then not-a (condition d). It’s worth keeping in mind that these are relatively weak 
requirements on deliberation, and allow an agent to be unsure about her abilities and the 
state of the world—only one of these requirements requires certainty, and only practical 
certainty at that. Note also that my claim at this stage is only that these are necessary 
requirements. They may not be jointly sufficient, and there may be other necessary 
requirements.  
 
But even though these epistemic conditions are minimal, they already do important 
explanatory work. Firstly, they capture an agent’s unsettledness about her decision in 
deliberation. Conditions a, e and f imply that she takes several decisions to be possibilities for 
her, and that her beliefs do not settle which decision she will make. Secondly, they capture 
an agent’s unsettledness about subsequent states of the world. Conditions c, e and f imply that 
the agent’s beliefs do not settle which of several incompatible states of affairs will obtain. 
She is uncertain of the world. Thirdly, they capture how the state of the world depends 
(epistemically) on the agent’s decision. Conditions b and d imply that an agent’s decisions 
settles what state of affairs obtains, where this is otherwise unsettled. So these conditions 
capture the way in which an agent’s decisions are epistemically relevant to how the world goes, 
the proof of which follows.  
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Proof of epistemic relevance: 
Where a is taken to be an available option by a deliberator S: 
S is practically certain (S decides(a) → (a)) (b) 
S decides(a) → S is practically certain (a) (conditional belief) 
S is not practically certain (not(S decides(a)) → (a)) (d, def. of practical certainty) 
not(A decides(a)) → S is not practically certain (a) (conditional belief) 
∴ S decides(a) is relevant to A’s practical certainty in a 
S deliberates between some options she takes to be incompatible (e, f) 
∴ S’s decisions are epistemically relevant to states of affairs she takes to be incompatible. 
 
2.2b The Impossibility of Predicting Your Own Decisions 
If we accept the above epistemic conditions on deliberation, we can derive the following 




Proof of the impossibility thesis: 
Where a is taken to be an available option by a deliberator S,  
S is practically certain S decides(a)  
    → S practically certain ((S decides(a) → a)!(S decides(a)) (b) 
 → S practically certain (a) (indicative conditional) 
    → not(A takes b to be a serious possibility) (definition) 
         (for any b taken to be incompatible with a) 
    → not(A takes b to be available) (c) 
∴ S takes no options taken to be incompatible with a to be available 
∴ S does not deliberate (by e,f) 
 
If an agent were to become practically certain of her decision a while deliberating, this would 
imply (by condition b) that she is practically certain of a. Condition b requires that choosing 
                                                
42 Claims that the deliberator must be ignorant of the decision or the outcome during deliberation are made by 
Shackle (1958), Hampshire and Hart (1958), Ginet (1962), Taylor (1964), Perry (1965), Prior (1968), Harman 
(1976) Jeffrey (1977), Schick (1979), Dennett (1984) and Gilboa (1999). Pereboom (1995) also raises this 
possibility. Jones (1968) and Kapitan (1986, 1989) explicitly analyse our freedom in deliberation in terms of 
ignorance. For objections, see Cox (1963), Stocker (1968), Velleman (1989a; 1989b) and Joyce (2002; 2007). 
Note that I am not making the further claim, as Ginet, Taylor and Prior do, that there must be a similar 
ignorance with respect to other people’s decisions—for arguments against this claim, see Perry (1965). Levi 
argues for a somewhat stronger thesis under the slogan ‘deliberation crowds out prediction’, requiring that 
agents cannot have any credence concerning their decision during deliberation (1986, ch. 4; 1997, chs. 2, 4; 
2000), tracing his arguments to Spohn (1977). I consider Levi’s view in the next chapter, section 3.1c. 
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an option settles the option’s obtaining. This implies (given minimal rationality) that for any 
other option b taken to be incompatible with a, she does not take b to be a serious 
possibility. So by condition c, b cannot be taken as an available option. Condition c requires 
options to be serious possibilities. The above holds for any option taken to be incompatible 
with a. So no apparently incompatible options can be taken to be available. Since more than 
one incompatible option is not taken to be  available, there can be no deliberation (by 
conditions e and f). While prior to deliberation the agent may predict what she will decide, 
she cannot maintain this prediction if deliberation is to take place.43  
 
Before providing further defence of this thesis, let me say something about the kind of 
impossibility involved. Recall, these requirements on deliberation were put forward partly as 
normative requirements on deliberation. These conditions may sometimes be broken, for 
agents who are less than fully rational. But the failure to live up to these normative standards 
of deliberation, if widespread, would prevent the activity being properly characterised as 
deliberation. For example, we might accept the conceptual possibility of a neurotic who 
seems to “decide” everything twice, in the sense that he engages in two successive 
deliberation-like activities for every choice (without abandoning or forgetting his first 
“decision”). But if his second “deliberation” contravenes the epistemic conditions in a 
sufficiently wide range of cases, the activity should no longer properly count as deliberation.  
 
The impossibility here is similar to the impossibility involved in holding plainly contradictory 
beliefs. It is in some sense psychologically possible for an agent to hold plainly contradictory 
                                                
43 If one is dissatisfied with the pragmatic approach to characterising certainty and serious possibility above, 
one could replace these notions with others and still derive the same result, provided conditions a and d were 
related in such a way that believing an option will be chosen makes other incompatible options no longer 
serious possibilities. 
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beliefs, beliefs whose incompatibility is clearly apparent when the beliefs are brought to the 
agent’s attention. But holding plainly contradictory beliefs not only goes against norms of 
rationality, but, if wide-spread across an agent’s belief-forming practices, prevents her states 
being well-characterised as beliefs. Precisely because plainly contradictory beliefs flout 
epistemic norms so flagrantly, when it comes to interpreting what a particular mental state 
might be, we are left without our usual guidance. If we think that mental states like beliefs 
and decisions are accessible through this kind of interpretation, we are led to impossibility 
theses regarding beliefs and practical deliberation.  
 
One might think the impossibility thesis is too weak to be of interest. Could we ever be 
completely convinced of what we’ll do before we do it? I’ll consider some cases in the next 
section. But, for now, recall the kind of certainty involved is only ‘practical certainty’—
holding the state fixed and settled as far as one’s subsequent deliberations go. It is not 
complete certainty. We do seem to encounter this kind of certainty in our ordinary lives—
when we take it for granted that the store will be open at the usual time, that we’ll act as 
we’ve decided, that the sun will rise.  
 
Why should we believe the impossibility thesis? In the next chapter I’ll consider competing 
models of deliberation from James M. Joyce and David E. Velleman that directly challenge 
the incompatibility thesis. Here I’ll consider other general arguments in its favour and against 
it. Note that the arguments I give to defend it also act as defences of requirements a and c—
that apparently-available options and decisions are serious epistemic possibilities. Both of 
these conditions are typically rejected when attacking the impossibility thesis.  
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To begin, it does seem to be a deep component of our understanding of deliberation, that if 
an agent knows how she will decide, and what will result from her deliberation, deliberation 
is out of place. Say Matt becomes convinced that he will decide to call his mother this 
Sunday, and that he will call her this Sunday. Is this something he can then sensibly 
deliberate concerning? His calling her is something he has already settled, and can hold fixed 
in his subsequent practical and theoretical deliberations. He can already send her a quick 
message letting her know he’ll call. He can tell other people he won’t be free at that time. He 
can engage in more extensive planning, and think about what they might talk about. As far as 
Matt’s calling her goes, there seems nothing left for him to decide. Imagine Mat reporting 
being certain of the outcome of a deliberation, yet still deliberating: ‘I’m going to call mum 
on Sunday night…but I’m still not sure whether to call her’. This sounds decidedly odd. 
Our difficulty in conceiving of such scenarios reflects a deep feature of deliberation. 
 
Here’s another reason for thinking deliberation requires uncertainty. Making a decision is 
often taken to imply forming a belief about what one will do (Hampshire and Hart 1958; Pears 
1968; Grice 1971). If making a decision implies forming a belief, this explain why there is 
typically an equivalence between reporting what one has decided to do, and what one is 
going to do—both can be expressed by a phrase like ‘I’m going to call my mum on Sunday 
night’. One’s decision and belief get settled together. If so, deliberation would require one’s 
belief not to already be settled.44 There are also accounts that take decisions to be beliefs 
about what one will decide or do (Velleman 1989a; 1989b; Joyce 2002; 2007; Ismael 2012). 
                                                
44 A number of authors also note an analogy between deciding and realising, discovering and being surprised 
(Ginet 1970, p. 177; Schick 1979; Sorensen 1984). One cannot be certain of A immediately prior (or while 
being) realising, discovering or being surprised by A. 
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As I’ll argue in the next chapter (section 3.2), these views also plausibly require that an agent 
doesn’t already have the relevant belief if she is to deliberate.  
 
We can get a deeper understanding and defence of the impossibility thesis by considering the 
epistemic and doxastic functions of deliberation. Its doxastic function is to allow us to 
become certain of what we will do. We can then rely on this certainty in our subsequent 
deliberations and planning, and license others to rely on it as well. Belief in the decision 
allows the agent to infer the outcome, in a way she was not able to otherwise. As Kapitan 
puts it, ‘[i]f deliberation aims at settling the mind upon a course of action, then a deliberator 
must be partly unsettled prior to decision’ (1990, p. 127). Harman makes a similar functional 
argument (1976, p. 438): 45 
…forming the intention to do A settles in one’s mind the question whether one is 
going to do A. It can be useful to settle that question because, having done so, one 
will no longer need to consider whether or not to do A and one can turn one’s mind 
to other issues…in any additional theoretical or practical reasoning, one will be able 
to take it for granted that one will be doing A.  
 
While deciding may not give one complete certainty that the event will occur, it provides as 
much certainty as predicting the decision. 
 
There is a closely related epistemic function of deliberation: coming to justified certainty. Carl 
Ginet is particularly explicit concerning this function: ‘the whole point of making up one’s 
mind is to pass from uncertainty to a kind of knowledge about what one will do or try to do’ 
(1962, p. 52). The epistemic requirements on deliberation I’ve argued for can explain how we 
can come to justified belief, not just certainty, of what we will do. Agents often have direct 
                                                
45 Similar arguments are made in Ginet (1962), O’Shaughnessy (1980, p. 297), Holton (2006) and Levi (1986, p. 
86). 
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knowledge of their own decisions. So by forming decisions, agents can come to know what 
options will obtain. Whether an agent has knowledge or mere certainty will depend partly on 
whether she justified in believing that the decision settles the option.46 In general, if an agent 
is so justified, she can come to know of an option’s obtaining by making a decision. And if 
she comes to know her the state that will obtain through deliberation, this requires her not 
knowing the state beforehand. There may of course be some cases where an agent merely 
believes (but does not know) what option will obtain. In such cases, satisfying this epistemic 
function of deliberation does not require failing to have beliefs beforehand, but only failing 
to have knowledge. But unless we habitually form unjustified beliefs in what option will 
result, satisfying the epistemic requirement will usually require the agent to fail to have 
beliefs beforehand. So deliberation having an epistemic function also provides further 
support for the impossibility thesis. 
 
A competing conception of the function of deliberation is that it fixes the will of the agent 
upon a certain course, helping to overcome phenomena such as weakness of will. Fulfilling 
this function might seem compatible with the agent being certain of how he will decide, and 
so would constitute an argument against the impossibility thesis. Stocker, for example, 
argues that ‘the point in deciding to do something that one knows one will do may not lie in 
the further traffic with reason or knowing, but rather with the will, desire, or conation’ 
(1968, p. 68, emphasis removed). However, taking there to be an important epistemic 
function to deliberation does not prevent us acknowledging conative functions as well. The 
epistemic model requires the agent to believe that the option will occur, given she decides on 
                                                
46 Further requirements may be needed as well. But condition b will likely still play an important role in 
accounting for such knowledge.  
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it. Fulfilling this epistemic condition may well require various conative resources to be in 
place, such as an agent being motivated to act as she decides.  
 
By appealing to the epistemic function of deliberation, we go a little deeper than merely 
claiming it to be part of the nature of deliberation that several options are recognised as 
serious possibilities. But we are not committed to the unintuitive claim that the only benefits 
of deliberation are of this epistemic type. Deliberation may also be a way of working out a 
rational or reasonable choice. Nor are we committed to the claim that other kinds of 
reasoning are unimportant in this context. Once a decision is made, one can become clearer 
about one’s reasons, and so better placed to justify or explain one’s decision to others. One 
can consider the benefits involved or one’s justification and perhaps regret or even renege 
on the original decision—and so re-enter deliberation. Recognising an epistemic function to 
deliberation does not prevent us recognising other functions to deliberation and other forms 
of practical reasoning.  
 
2.2c Decision Predictions by Others 
So that we can further examine the impossibility thesis and its consequences, let’s consider 
some cases where decision predictions actually occurs—cases where someone else predicts 
an agent’s decisions. Even if the agent herself cannot predict her decision while deliberating, 
nothing I have said prevents another person doing so (including her earlier and later 
selves).47 If the agent trusts the predictor’s skills, she may have good evidence of what she 
will decide. This is the kind of situation in which the epistemic limits on deliberation are 
manifest.  
                                                
47 Some unusual circumstances may be required for an agent to predict his decision, and then forget that 
prediction at the time of deliberation. For examples, see Goldman (1970, ch. 6).  
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Consider a case. Jacinta is deliberating about whether to spend her week off at home or 
travelling on the coast. If a friend of hers tells her that she will decide to stay home, there are 
a number of responses Jacinta could make that would be consistent with the impossibility 
thesis. Firstly, Jacinta might take the apparent ‘prediction’ as a recommendation—her friend 
thinks she should stay home (or wants her to) without its being, on the basis of evidence, 
what she will do. Perhaps her friend is trying to influence her. Secondly, Jacinta may for this 
or some other reason mistrust her friend’s prediction, disregard it or ignore it, and thereby 
not form a belief based on it. She might consider it poor evidence of what she will decide. 
Thirdly, Jacinta might forget or more actively repress the prediction, not through explicit 
mistrust her friend’s ability or sincerity, but through carelessness or self-deception. She 
might not want to face up to being the type of person that stays home. Or, fourthly, Jacinta 
might accept that the prediction was an accurate prediction before it was expressed—but 
now that she has heard it, the decision context has changed, and she now has new 
information that invalidates the previous prediction. Jacinta might take it she has evidence 
about what decision she would have formed, but not evidence of what decision she will form. 
A good predictor should take such changes of context into account, and make their 
prediction for the decision context the deliberator will be in once they’ve heard the 
prediction.48 But Jacinta may not believe her friend to be as skilled predictor as that, able to 
take into account the way expressing the prediction changes the context.  
 
                                                
48 Hilary Bok claims the only way one could accurately predict an action is if the action is one that would be 
performed regardless of the prediction (1998, p. 82). This is false. As Goldman notes, a predictor can 
consistently take into account the effect of his prediction in the prediction itself and, under certain continuity 
conditions, there will always be at least one stable prediction available (1970, p. 183−5). Perhaps Bok’s concern 
is that if there is more than one prediction that would be accurate, were it to be expressed, they cannot be 
predictions. But whatever they are, they function as predictions once made.  
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But what if there were a predictor that skilled? Someone with infallible access to the future, 
or able to calculate the effect their prediction will have on an agent’s action and determine a 
fixed point where the expressed prediction matches the agent’s subsequent action. Let’s call 
such a predictor ‘Sandy’, an anthropomorphised ‘Book of Life’ of the type discussed by 
Alvin Goldman (1970, ch. 6). One day ordinary Mark meets Sandy. Mark has lots of 
experience with Sandy, watching her make predictions of himself and others, testing the 
results, and observing that all her predictions come true. After being sceptical for some time, 
Mark begins to trust Sandy, taking whatever prediction she makes to be good evidence about 
what he will decide. What then? 
 
One line of thought is that even if Mark trusts Sandy and her prediction, there is still 
something left for him to work out: what to decide. Even if he believes the future is 
epistemically closed, he can still take himself to be a free participant in its creation—he 
knows his decision is part of what makes the future the way it will be. And so Mark’s 
apparent freedom in deliberation remains, even if he is certain of what he will decide. So the 
impossibility thesis is false.  
 
I want to resist such a line. We can keep the impossibility thesis. If we do so, what in fact 
happens will depend on what we hold fixed: which features are part of the setup of the case, 
the independent variables, and which are dependent variables. Say we hold the infallibility 
and sincerity of Sandy fixed. In this case, if Sandy predicts that Mark will decide to stay 
home, rather than travel, and informs him, then Mark will indeed decide to say home. This 
much is guaranteed. But Mark may still satisfy the epistemic conditions on deliberation. He 
may mistrust her prediction after all, and perhaps foolishly take it that she has not taken into 
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account the new context they are in. So he won’t form the relevant belief. Or he might be 
irrational or forgetful, and so not form the relevant belief, even while trusting Sandy in 
general. In any of these cases, the impossibility thesis holds.  
 
Alternatively, we might hold both Mark’s rationality and his trust in Sandy fixed—such that 
he appropriately forms beliefs based on Sandy’s testimony. If Sandy tells him he will decide to 
stay home, he will believe he will. If the impossibility thesis is true, Mark can’t then 
reasonably deliberate on staying home. He might still end up staying home—but this won’t 
be through deliberating and deciding. So Sandy turns out to be unreliable after all. If the 
impossibility thesis is true, Mark is rational, and the prediction is expressed, understood and 
believed, then a prediction that Mark will decide on a turns out to be undermining.49 
 
However, if Sandy’s prediction is merely about what Mark will do, not about what he will 
decide, another option is available. Sandy can keep her infallibility. And Mark can still keep his 
trust in her and his rationality. Mark does stay home and believes he will. But Mark’s ability 
to reasonably deliberate and decide will still have to go. Mark will also, I will later argue, lose 
his apparent freedom in deliberation. There are different attitudes Mark may take to his 
staying home. He may still consider it his action, something he does, but an instinctual one 
over which he has not deliberated. Or he may consider it to be not his action at all, and take 
himself to become merely an instrument for the world.50  
 
                                                
49 Sandy might also make a conditional prediction: that if Mark decides at all, he decides on a. Conditional 
predictions are not similarly undermined.  
50 Robert Silverberg’s The Stochastic Man (1975) and other works of science fiction attempt to describe what such 
an attitude may be like. Related attitudes are also explored in the context of time travel (Smith 2005). 
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Sandy may even be malicious, and (incorrectly) predict Mark’s decision or (correctly) predict 
Mark’s action in order to prevent his deciding. She may be aware that her prediction is part 
of the causal history for why he acts as he does, and why he doesn’t deliberate. But even if 
such manipulation occurs, it doesn’t imply that Mark incorrectly takes Sandy’s prediction as a 
reason to decide. Unless alternative options are taken to be available, there can be no practical 
deliberation in which reasons might play a role. Nor does the case imply that Mark makes 
the fatalistic error of assuming that his decisions and actions come about regardless of what he 
does. None of the consistent alternatives I have described require the agent to think his 
decision-making is irrelevant to what occurs. While it is unfortunate that agents can be 
manipulated by being told the truth, this is a standing possibility for life, and we should not 
be required to adopt conditions on rationality that make us immune from it.  
 
When beings like Sandy predict our decisions, there are solutions available that are perfectly 
consistent with the impossibility thesis. It can be hard to see them. And some of these 
solutions may look prima facie unlikely. But these are not sufficient reasons to reject the 
impossibility thesis. While supernatural cases are good for laying out the logical implications 
of a view, we need to be careful when appealing directly to our intuitions regarding them. 
We live in a world without oracular entities like Sandy. To include such entities, we have to 
change the epistemic and causal structure of the world we conceive of drastically. It is no 
surprise that we then have difficulty keeping track of what else might change in such a world, 
particularly regarding our attitudes and behaviour. In dealing with non-standard cases, rather 
than appeal to one-off intuitions about what will occur, we do better by laying out consistent 
solutions and principles and seeing how they accord with our theories elsewhere. We might 
not be able to keep all our prima facie intuitions. But given we have limited experience with 
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beings like Sandy, and given the radical changes involved from cases of ordinary deliberation 
we are familiar with, this is not a surprising result.  
 
2.3 Normative Reasons in Deliberation 
At the start of this chapter, I characterised practical deliberation without appealing to 
normative reasons about what one should or ought to do. I will now say something about 
how normative reasons for action can feature in deliberation, and even be essential, while 
retaining the epistemic model and the impossibility thesis. When I qualify reasons as 
‘normative’, I intend to distinguish them from both explanatory reasons as well as from 
more neutral ‘deliberative considerations’, where these are just features considered in the 
course of deliberation. By stipulation, a consideration being a normative reason implies 
something stronger than an agent merely treating it as a consideration in favour of or against 
a proposal. Normative reasons carry normative force, requiring, for example, that someone 
in relevantly similar circumstances should take the same consideration to count in favour of 
the action. Considerations, even considerations I act in light of, need not have or be taken to 
have normative force.51  
 
To begin, lets consider a normative-based objection to the impossibility thesis. I argued 
above that if an agent is practically certain of a, or that she will decide on a, she can no 
longer deliberate concerning a. But one might argue that there is still something important 
left for her to decide: what to do or whether a ought to obtain.52 Working out what one ought 
to do might be thought an essential part of practical deliberation. If so, since prediction 
                                                
51 One might take all considerations appealed to in deliberation to be or be treated as normative reasons. I have 
no objection to such a view. I simply note the bare logical possibility of more neutral kinds of considerations. 
52 For this section, I will switch to an action-based characterisation of options, in keeping with how action 
theorists characterise the normative reasons involved. 
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leaves the normative question undecided, an agent can practically deliberate while predicting 
her decision. Christine Korsgaard defends such a view, claiming that even if we predict our 
own behaviour, we must still ‘decide the case on its merits’ (1996, p. 95). Richard Moran 
suggests a similar line, by distinguishing between practical and theoretical uncertainty (2001, 
p. 56). It seems one may be theoretically certain of what one will do, yet practically 
uncertain—and so still deliberate.53  
 
In order to respond to this challenge, we first need to be clear on how normative 
deliberation might feature in practical deliberation. Firstly, we might take practical 
deliberation to be working out what one ought to do, regardless of what one believes about 
one will do. In this case, it is clear that predicting what one will do does not prevent practical 
deliberation. But then it seems we are simply changing the topic. If working out what one 
ought to do carries no implications for what one believes one is will do (or vice versa), this 
type of deliberation is merely a type of theoretical deliberation about normative reasons, and, 
without further argument connecting it to action, we have no reason to characterise it as 
practical deliberation at all. The impossibility thesis could still apply to practical deliberation. 
Similarly for the suggestion that settling the normative question and settling what one will do 
are entirely independent and separable parts of practical deliberation. Not only is this an 
implausible view, but the impossibility thesis would still apply to the non-normative part of 
deliberation.  
 
Secondly, one might suggest that the active considering of normative reasons is essential for 
practical deliberation, and this is why practical deliberation can take place even while 
                                                
53 Joyce (2002) also suggests decisions must be formed in response to normative judgments (see section 3.4), 
but without using this as an argument against ignorance conditions. 
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decisions are predicted. Considering reasons might be essential because doing so is relevant 
to the normative part of deliberation (working out what one ought to do), or because doing 
so is independently important (perhaps it allows us to justify our decisions and reason with 
others). However, on either approach, this requirement is no threat to the impossibility 
thesis. If the benefit of such active considering holds independently of the normative part of 
deliberation, then one still has reason to require active considering, even if freedom in 
deliberation is to be explained in epistemic terms. In itself, this approach puts no pressure on 
the impossibility thesis. If such active considering is only helpful for reaching a normative 
conclusion to deliberation, we are back with one of the above views—such active 
considering is not essential to the part of deliberation that settles beliefs in action. 
 
Thirdly, one might hold the rather unusual view that practical deliberation is about settling 
what one ought to do, but this only goes via settling what one will do: in virtue of deciding 
what I will do, I thereby decide what I ought do. While this does establish a connection 
between the two components of deliberation, it suggests that practical deliberation consists 
in post-hoc rationalisations. It is surely not what theorists like Korsgaard have in mind.  
 
Finally, we might claim that we settle what we will do via considering what we ought to do. 
This is the most plausible way in which normative reasoning might be a necessary 
component of practical deliberation. This is surely the view that Korsgaard has in mind. 
However, this view is perfectly compatible with the claim that when it comes to deliberating 
on how to act, we are limited in epistemic ways—to what options are serious possibilities for 
us. Normative considerations are then only relevant to practical deliberation insofar as they 
concern epistemically possibilities. If I am certain that I will not ø, then normative reasons 
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concerning ø are not relevant to my decision. Reasoning normatively in practical deliberation 
will then imply that different options are epistemically possible. But the normative part of 
the deliberation will not independently determine which options are available. Instead, the 
epistemic model will explain the kind of freedom we experience in normative deliberation, of 
the type that is relevant to practical deliberation. 
 
The lesson of all this is that even if we take normative reasoning to imply a type of apparent 
freedom or openness, this doesn’t imply that normative reasoning is the source of this 
apparent freedom or openness. Korsgaard intends to explain our sense of freedom in terms 
of normative reasoning. She claims that in deliberating we act ‘under the idea of freedom’ 
(1996, p. 97) and that it is our reason-responsive reflective nature that ‘gives us a choice 
about what to do’ (ibid., p. 96). But taking normative reasoning to be an essential part of 
deliberation is compatible with the freedom we take ourselves to have in practical 
deliberation having its source in epistemic features. Attributing a kind of freedom to our 
normative reason driven deliberations does not show the impossibility thesis to be false.  
 
However, a problem arises with this picture of how normative reasoning is part of practical 
deliberation. I’ll spend the remainder of this section addressing it. Say Grant is certain, in 
general, that he’ll decide and act as he ought. And say he becomes certain of what he ought 
to do. He really ought to take his daughter to the park. He thereby becomes certain that this 
is what he is going to decide to do and do. His normative reasoning allows him to predict his 
decision. But then it seems his certainty about what he ought to do gets in the way of his 
actually deliberating and deciding what to do. According to the epistemic conditions I’ve 
argued for, Grant no longer takes several options to be available. So he can no longer 
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reasonably deliberate and decide between them. More generally, even if normative reasoning 
doesn’t allow Grant to pick out a single option as what he ought do, the options left 
available to him are options that normative reasoning can no longer help him decide 
between.54 If normative principles should play a non-trivial role in the agent making his final 
choice, epistemic conditions on deliberation seem to land us in trouble.55 
 
Levi’s response to this problem is to claim that deliberators must not, at the moment of 
decision, believe they will choose rationally—they must give up what he calls the ‘smugness 
assumption’ (1997, p. 31).56 He argues that this assumption is never needed, at any point in 
deliberation, for agents to apply principles of rationality to their choice. And he argues that it 
is plausible than an agent will not make this assumption, given he might fall victim to 
weakness of will and decide out of step with what he believes he ought to do (1997, p. 33). 
Gilboa’s response is similar. He argues that ‘regarding others, one may “believe” or even 
“know” that they make choices in a consistent way with past ones, so that their utility 
functions may be used for prediction. As for one’s own self, however, no similar consistency 
axiom can be known or believed’ (1999, pp. 169−70).  
 
But Levi’s response is problematic. Firstly, it requires systematic irrationality on the part of 
the agent: even if an agent has excellent evidence that he will decide and act in keeping with 
                                                
54 The remaining options may be incomparable or strictly equivalent. While one might allow that choosing in 
the first case still allows for a substantive application of normative principles, this is far more difficult to 
maintain in the second. The second is plausibly a case of ‘picking’, rather than ‘choosing’ (Ullmann-Margalit 
and Morgenbesser 1977). 
55 See Levi (1986, pp. 61−4; 1997, pp. 25, 78−80). For further discussion of the problem, see Jeffrey (1977), 
Shackle (1958, pp. 21−2), Schick (1979,) and Gilboa (1999). Pears also considers such cases (1968, pp. 101−2), 
in responding to an argument by Cox (1963).  
56 In fact, Levi requires agents not to have any credence whatsoever that they will choose rationally, since he 
commits to the much stronger claim that agents cannot have any credence in their decisions (see sections 2.2b 
and 3.1c). With this stronger requirement, the concerns I raise below carry even more force. 
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what he believes he ought to do, he will not believe he will, or will lose this belief by some 
unspecified means at the moment of decision. The response is ad hoc, requiring a systematic 
breakdown in our theoretical reasoning capacities to allow for practical deliberation. While 
weakness of will may explain why some agents never form the belief, it is difficult to see why 
it should be a standing condition on practical rationality. And note that the problem, in its 
most pressing form, requires agents to be perfectly rational in other ways. Secondly, this 
response requires agents to give up on one of the central beliefs that accounts for why 
normative reasoning is relevant for practical deliberation. If the agent no longer accepts a 
strong connection between deciding what he ought to do, and deciding what to do, 
normative deliberation becomes apparently irrelevant to practical decision. Particularly if 
normative reasons are taken to be essential for practical deliberation, one should not require 
agents to give up on the belief that they will choose rationally.  
 
Other responders have argued that agents won’t recognise their available options prior to the 
moment of decision. Shackle, for example, ascribes an ‘ultimate creative originality’ to the 
agent, the ability to create ‘pure visions of states to be desired’ (1958, pp. 21−2). Through 
this ability the agent creates apparent options at the moment of decision that did not exist 
and were not predictable beforehand. Shackle also seems to identify our freedom in 
deliberation with this ability (1958, pp. 21−2). But while there may be cases in which we are 
uncertain of the available options in advance, there are also cases in which the options are 
clearly demarcated and recognised in advance. Grant’s deliberation might be very simple—to 
take his daughter to the park, or not. Agents still deliberate in such cases. Jeffrey also 
responds to the problem along similar lines. He claims that an agent may not yet recognise 
her options and preferences, or may not be certain her beliefs and preferences will not 
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change (1977, pp. 77, 137). So the set of options that are determined by normative 
principles, given her current beliefs and preferences, do not restrict her available options at 
the moment of decision.57 Again, this may account for some cases, particularly when the 
moment of decision is far off. But as agents approach the moment of decision, their beliefs 
and preferences will be just as accessible in making the decision than they are prior to 
decision. We shouldn’t require agents to presume their beliefs, desires, or available options 
will change, or require them to be unknowable in advance of decision.  
 
Instead, I recommend a simpler response—give up the idea that forming a normative belief 
is always separated, temporally or otherwise, from making a practical decision. Say Grant is 
committed by a previous standing decision to decide and act as he believes he ought. And 
say it is by way of this commitment that he is certain he will decide as he ought. In this case 
it is not surprising if by working out what he ought to do, he thereby becomes decided on a 
particular option. Given his standing commitment, his making a normative decision on what 
he ought to do immediately implies his making a decision about what to do. No further 
deliberation is required. And it is clear why, for Grant, considering normative reasons is 
essential to practical deliberation—it is the necessary means by which he works out what to 
do. Consider an analogy. I may decide to act on the result of a coin toss, and buy the 
feathered hat just in case the coin lands tails. In this case, by the coin landing tails, I thereby 
become decided on a particular action option. There is no need for me to then deliberate on 
whether I will act in accord with the coin—I’m already committed to this. This is not to say 
                                                
57 Schick is not explicit about which particular beliefs an agent should give up. But he argues that since we are 
not committed to full self-knowledge, it should not be disturbing if rationality and the logic of decision-making 
put limits on what we can justifiably believe about ourselves (1979, p. 244). Searle also requires that deliberation 
only starts where our beliefs and desires leave off, but without directly addressing the problem above (2001, pp. 
13−4).  
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that I can’t revise my decision and commitment on seeing the result—one of the main uses 
of the coin toss being to reveal one’s hidden preferences. But this is a case of revisiting a 
prior decision—nothing in original decision was irrational or inconsistent.  
 
If we offer this last response to the problem, and allow agents to keep their firm beliefs that 
they will decide rationally, we can acknowledge a strong role for normative reasoning in 
deliberation. An agent’s practical choices may be guided by normative reasons. Provided the 
agent’s belief that she will act in accord with what she takes her reasons to be is sufficiently 
strong, the impossibility thesis percolates up to the normative level—practical deliberation 
requires the agent to be uncertain of what she ought do.58 The normative question of what 
one ought to do and the practical question of what to do won’t always be settled together—
one may not be committed to acting as one ought, be sceptical of whether the normative 
covers all cases, or simply sceptical that one has sufficient information and resources to work 
out what one really ought to do—but acknowledge that a decision has to be made anyway. 
But nothing about characterising deliberation in epistemic terms prevents acknowledging a 
place for normative reasoning in practical deliberation. 
 
The difficult remaining cases are those in which an agent is certain she’ll decide or act as she 
believes she ought, but where she doesn’t have a standing commitment to do so. Instead, the 
agent merely has reliable evidence of these correlations—from observation and induction, or 
reliable testimony. If such an agent is to practically decide, having decided what she ought to 
do, one of the other responses that I gave to the Sandy case must be given. But in this case, 
                                                
58 We may even account for an agent’s reneging on her decision in this way. If an agent revises her belief about 
what she ought to do, this may lead to uncertainty about what she will do. So she can then re-enter 
deliberation.   
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it is also plausible that such an agent does not practically deliberate—at best she can find out 
what she will do, using evidence of what she ought to do.59 The normative belief gets in the 
way of her being a practical deliberator. Such cases don’t rule out rational deliberation in 
general. Instead they reveal the connection between the apparent availability of options and 
gaps in our ordinary evidential beliefs. 
 
2.4 Explaining our Apparent Freedom in Deliberation 
Having considered some of the upshots of the impossibly thesis, we’re in a position to 
consider how these epistemic requirements on deliberation can explain our apparent 
freedom in deliberation. To begin, a few notes on the explanandum. I take the apparent 
freedom to be explained to be an apparent freedom to decide in different ways. I deliberately 
specify ‘apparent freedom’ in a very general fashion. This is because I want to be open-
minded about how such freedom might be explained. I also allow that this apparent freedom 
might be manifest in a variety of ways. It may manifest phenomenologically (thought not 
necessarily as any distinct phenomenology), or as a disposition to assent to being (or 
appearing) free, or more generally as a belief that one is (or appears) free. If a belief is 
involved, it need not be high-level or conceptual; agents need not be able to articulate their 
belief. I also leave the sense of possibility involved in an agent appearing ‘able’ to decide 
generic and unspecified. A similar generic sense is appealed to in principles like ‘ought 
implies can’. Finally, I don’t assume the appearance of freedom is either veridical or 
illusory—we may or may not be free. As I argued in chapter 1, explaining our apparent 
freedom doesn’t directly settle whether we are free.  
                                                
59 One might also hold a more minimal epistemic view of deliberation, where practical deliberation is always 
merely a process of finding out what one will do. I have no objection to such a position, but the epistemic 
model does not commit one to it. One can still maintain a distinction between theoretical beliefs about what is 
the case and practical decisions about what is to be the case.  
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How does the epistemic model explain our apparent freedom in deliberation? It does so by 
accounting for the openness and unsettledness of deliberation, as well as the evidential 
relevance of our practical decision for the world. As Jacinta deliberates on whether to stay 
home or travel on the coast, she is not sure of what she’ll decide to do or do. By condition a, 
for any available option she must be unsure of whether she will decide that way. By 
conditions c and d, she must be unsure of whether the available option will actually obtain. 
And by conditions e and f, she must take several incompatible options to be available. These 
requirements capture the uncertainty involved in deliberation. As she deliberates, Jacinta’s 
beliefs are genuinely unfixed concerning what she’ll do and decide at the conclusion of her 
deliberation. Note the important role being played by the impossibility thesis: it is by being 
ignorant of what she’ll decide, and what will happen, that there are different options 
available to her. This accounts for one aspect of the ‘openness’ involved in deliberation. 
 
But it is not ignorance alone that accounts for an agent’s sense of freedom. To distinguish 
cases of practical deliberation from mere ignorance, I put forward an additional requirement: 
the agent must be certain that the option will obtain, given that she decides on it (condition 
b). Jacinta must be practically certain that if she decides to stay home, she will stay home. In 
addition, Jacinta cannot be certain that she’ll stay home regardless of her decision (condition 
d). Together, these conditions captured a minimal sense in which we take our decision to be 
epistemically relevant for the state of the world.  
 
The epistemic relevance of the decision for the outcome is crucially what separates practical 
deliberation from theoretical reasoning. In working out what is the case in general 
(‘theoretical reasoning’), we are also usually ignorant of what is the case. But we can’t take 
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the conclusion of theoretical reasoning (a judgment, belief or decision about what is the 
case) to be a reason for thinking that very same thing is the case. Raamy can’t decide 
crocodiles are dangerous, and use this decision as a reason for thinking crocodiles are 
dangerous. To do so risks boot-strapping, making any theoretical belief or decision he makes 
self-reinforcing. In practical deliberation, an agent decision does nothing wrong in taking her 
decision to be good evidence for what is the case. 
 
It is the combination of uncertainty about her decision and the world, yet certainty about the 
relevance of her decision for the world that explains an agent’s apparent freedom in 
deliberation. Different decisions appear as epistemic possibilities for Jacinta. And she takes 
these decisions to be directly relevant for how the world goes. She seems able to make 
different decisions because she takes it she might, and takes the state of the world to depend 
epistemically on her decisions. These conditions explain why an agent’s takes various options 
to be available to her and takes these options to be determined by her decision. So they 
explain why an agent appears free to decide in different ways in deliberation. Agents like 
Jacinta can reasonably deliberate on different alternatives when the epistemic conditions are 
satisfied. And those same epistemic conditions explain why she appears free to decide in 
different ways.  
 
The conditions also explain why the feeling of freedom fades as deliberation concludes. 
Before a decision is made, an agent is necessarily uncertain about what she will do. But when 
an agent actually decides, and thereby becomes certain of her decision and what she will do, 
the epistemic conditions are no longer satisfied. Her decision space of available options 
collapses. The selection of one options means the other options are no longer serious 
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possibilities for her. And when there is only one available option, there is nothing left for her 
to deliberate concerning. The agent may still revisit the decision-problem, by reneging on her 
decision. She may also still fall prey to weakness of will, and not carry out her decision. But 
in either case, re-entering the deliberation will require giving up certainty in the outcome.  
 
Some will likely find this epistemic explanation of apparent freedom too deflationary or 
lightweight to be satisfying. I noted above that the conditions themselves are minimal, and 
many would prefer characterising deliberation in causal or agential terms. Action theorists 
and those interested in practical normativity may wish to characterise the options chosen as 
actions, and also stipulate that the decision is arrived at by a particular means—through 
considering normative reasons, for example, or in a reason-responsive way. Causal decision 
theorists may require the decision be taken to cause the option, rather than to merely 
provide epistemic certainty.60 In response, let me note some of the features of this epistemic 
explanation, as well as some of the other ways that causal and agential conditions can still be 
involved.  
 
Firstly, the epistemic explanation appeals to structural conditions required for deliberation—
what background epistemic conditions must be satisfied for deliberation to take place. These 
conditions were also put forward as constitutive norms, to demarcate a kind of activity that 
serves an important epistemic function. By appealing to structural and normative conditions, 
the epistemic explanation focuses on the background conditions required for deliberation to 
begin and be sustained, and less on how deliberation looks ‘from the inside’. Recall, the 
explanation doesn’t attempt to characterise or explain a particular phenomenology, or 
                                                
60 Note that causal decision theory is not committed to such a requirement, since the theory is about what it is 
rational for us to decide on, rather than requirements on deliberation per se.  
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explicate a particular belief in freedom. I don’t intend to rule out more particular 
explanations being given for aspects of deliberation. But these don’t rule out a more high-
level epistemic account being explanatory.  
 
Secondly, the epistemic model allows for the possibility that causal and agential notions have 
become bound up with our concepts of deliberation and decision. This is why I describe the 
epistemic model as a ‘model’ or ‘characterisation’ of deliberation, rather than a full account. 
But this doesn’t mean that the model itself is unexplanatory when we abstract from causal 
and agential features. With respect to causation, for example, I agree with causal decision 
theorists that causal concepts are relevant for deliberation; but I wish to come at this 
connection from the other direction, and explain causal notions via their relevance for 
practical deliberation, rather than presume causal notions from the start. Similarly, with 
respect to agency, recall that abstracting from agential notions allows for these to be 
explained by appeal to deliberation. For example, we might explain how we have a sense of 
direct control of bodily actions by appealing to the fact that we observe reliable evidential 
connections between our decisions and the movement of our bodies. In this way, agential 
notions can become bound up with deliberation, consistent with the epistemic model. 
 
Thirdly, the epistemic model does not attempt to explain how the epistemic conditions are in 
fact satisfied. It may be that when Jacinta takes her deciding on taking a coastal trip to settle 
that she will, this is because she assumes that her deciding is a cause of what she will do or 
because she is committed, as an agent, to acting as she decides. Both are consistent with the 
epistemic model characterising deliberation and explaining our apparent freedom. The 
epistemic model can explain our apparent freedom, and the relevance of causation to 
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deliberation, even if there is feedback between our causal concepts and our concepts of 
action and deliberation. 
 
I also argued (section 2.3) that normative notions could play an essential role in deliberation, 
consistent with the epistemic model. Other agential features, such as desires, might also play 
essential roles. We might require, for example, that decisions be formed in response to 
desires. But there are advantages to abstracting from particular accounts of normativity, 
desires and the finer-structure of agency and to allowing that we arrive at our decisions via a 
variety of means. Doing so means defending the account does not commit us to a particular 
account of practical normativity. Appealing to broader structural conditions on deliberation 
means we can relate agency to physics and science—however these agential and normative 
debates work out.  
 
Finally, note the model does not appeal to counter-causal or metaphysical notions of 
freedom. I don’t require agents to be able to decide in ways not determined by previous 
states of the world and causes. The epistemic conditions appealed to are perfectly 
compatible with a law-based understanding of the world and the model puts no pressure on 
determinism, laws or causal closure. It explains our apparent freedom in a way compatible 
with our scientific picture of the world. If we’re to make sense of causation by appeal to 
deliberation and agency, this is precisely the kind of account we need.   
 
2.5 Relating Practical and Theoretical Reason 
I end this chapter by considering what the model tells us about the relation between practical 
and theoretical reason. Along the way, I’ll reject two ways in which one might be tempted to 
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read the epistemic model. I’ll argue that while the epistemic conditions I’ve argued for are 
strictly compatible with relating practical and theoretical reason in various ways, the 
epistemic model takes theoretical reason to limit practical deliberation.  
 
The epistemic requirements above make claims about the relationship between an agent’s 
beliefs and what options she takes to be available in deliberation. Having a certain 
deliberative state (taking an option to be available) implies being in a particular epistemic 
state (such as taking the option to be a serious possibility). But the requirements in and of 
themselves make no claim about direction-of-fit: about whether an agent’s deliberative state 
determines her epistemic state, or whether her epistemic state determines her deliberative 
state. For example, consider the reliable predictor Sandy. Say Jacinta hears Sandy’s prediction 
of her decision. What might Jacinta do? She might form an appropriate belief based on 
Sandy’s prediction, and no longer deliberate. This is an example of her epistemic state 
determining her deliberative state. Jacinta’s beliefs, particularly beliefs arrived at through 
evidence, limit and determine the state she is in as a practical deliberator. So theoretical 
reason limits practical reason. Or Jacinta might mistrust Sandy’s prediction precisely because 
she takes it she is deliberating and can decide on different options. This is an example of an 
agent’s deliberative state determining her epistemic state. Under this approach, our apparent 
freedom to deliberate takes precedence over our beliefs, and we simply won’t form the 
beliefs that would prevent deliberation. In this case, practical reason limits theoretical reason.  
 
Which direction of fit should we expect under the epistemic model? We should take 
theoretical reason to limit practical reason. If Jacinta acquires evidence of what she will do, 
she will no longer deliberate on that option. While there may be some situations in which an 
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agent’s sense of her own free choice overrides her regular belief-forming practices, and so 
influences what she takes to be the case, this will not be the norm. This is the approach I will 
take in the chapters to come. Why take theoretical reasoning to limit practical deliberation? 
Firstly, this approach allows agents to satisfy an important norm of theoretical reasoning: 
that changes in belief should be justified on epistemic grounds. If Jacinta has good evidence 
of Sandy’s reliability as a predictor, and forms the belief that she is a reliable predictor, the 
fact that this belief gets in the way of her deliberating is not epistemic grounds to abandon the 
belief. So we shouldn’t require Jacinta to give up the belief. Conversely, taking an agent’s 
epistemic state to limit her deliberative state does not, in and of itself, imply that deliberative 
and practical norms are violated.61 Practical norms typically apply to the options an agent 
takes to be available. Jacinta can only be faulted for choosing badly among the options she 
takes to be available. Even if she may have a reason (in some sense) to do something she 
does not take it she’s free to do, we wouldn’t typically assign non-epistemic blame to her for 
failing to decide on an option she takes to be unavailable. The fault, if there is one, is an 
epistemic one of being mistaken about what her available options are.  
 
Secondly, taking epistemic reasoning to limit practical deliberation allows the epistemic 
model to do interesting explanatory work: the epistemic model can explains features of 
practical deliberation in terms of our epistemic access to the world. In chapter 5, for 
example, I’ll explain why we deliberate before we decide by appealing to an asymmetry of 
memory—the fact that we have memories of the past, but nothing like memories of the 
future. Such explanations are only available if theoretical reason limits practical reason.  
 
                                                
61 There are a number of controversial issues in this area. All I wish to claim is that we are not necessarily lead 
to violations of practical norms, whereas we are lead to violations of theoretical norms.    
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For these reasons, I take theoretical reason to limit practical reason, rather than the reverse. 
But there’s a third possibility as well. Perhaps the practical-deliberative and theoretical are 
two independent perspectives, such that epistemic requirements only apply from within the 
practical perspective. Rabinowicz suggests such a view when discussing Levi’s work: even if 
there are limitations on the beliefs an agent adopts during deliberation, these don’t apply to 
the beliefs she adopts in her ‘purely cognitive or doxastic capacity’, but only to the beliefs 
she adopts from her practical perspective (2002, p. 92). Agents might be able to switch 
between these perspectives with ease. And while the two perspectives can inform one 
another, they are largely independent.62 
 
This perspectives approach prevents beliefs formed in ordinary theoretical reasoning from 
limiting practical deliberation. It shares this in common with the view that practical reason 
limits theoretical reason. Both these approaches allow agents to simply drop or fail to have 
beliefs (at least from the practical stance) that get in the way of practical deliberation. So the 
perspectives view runs into the equivalent problems. Firstly, it countenances belief-forming 
practices that are in violation of epistemic norms: beliefs may be formed, not formed, or 
dropped, independently of an agent’s epistemic grounds (even if only within the practical 
perspective). Secondly, taking the perspectives approach means we can no longer explain 
features of practical deliberation in terms of features of our epistemic relation to the world. 
In addition, this third alternative faces an additional concern. The requirements I argued for 
above show how beliefs and deliberation relate. But if these were merely requirements that 
held from within a deliberative perspective, we’d need to introduce further additional 
                                                
62 Elements of this view are also found in Ramsey (1929), Spohn (1977, 2007), Levi (1997, p. 80) and Grice 
(1971, p. 6). Some of these alternatives are discussed in section 3.1d. Note that taking this third option does not 
automatically solve the problem above (section 2.3) of how normative beliefs may prevent deliberation, since 
one can still form beliefs within the practical perspective. 
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requirements to account for how the perspectives relate. So it seems we would still need to 
consider further epistemic requirements on deliberation.  
 
Under my preferred approach, theoretical reason limits practical reason. We may still talk of 
adopting different perspectives towards the world as practical deliberators and theoretical 
reasoners. But these perspectives aren’t so independent that beliefs from one don’t carry 
straightforwardly over to the other. Adopting this approach means that while the epistemic 
model remains perfectly compatible with physical laws, there is one way in which laws pose a 
threat to practical deliberation. If our epistemic abilities improved to such a degree that we 
were able to predict our own decisions and actions, then we would lose the ability to freely 
deliberate. Nothing in the laws being deterministic implies that we will be able to achieve 
this—but it leaves open the possibility.63  
 
Conclusion 
I’ve argued for an epistemic model of deliberation through defending a set of epistemic 
conditions on the beliefs we can have while deliberating. We must be uncertain of our 
decisions, and yet certain our decisions settle what option obtains. It is because we occupy 
an epistemic middle-ground, having some certainties, but being ignorant of much else, that 
deliberation is allowed for. These conditions are justified, given that deliberation serves an 
epistemic function—deciding is a way of settling what will be. While I haven’t characterised 
deliberation by appealing to its normative function, these requirements don’t rule out 
normative reasons playing an essential role in deliberation. The epistemic model that derives 
                                                
63 Some deterministic laws have built-in limitations on what one can know of the system, preventing such 
predictions, such as Bohmian mechanics. There are also computational arguments that even with deterministic 
laws, agents cannot predict their own future behaviour (Dennett 1984, p. 112). 
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from these conditions provides a sufficiently rich characterisation of deliberation to do 
useful explanatory work. The model explains why agents appear free to decide in different 
ways as they deliberate. And it also has direct implications for the relation between practical 
and theoretical reason—practical deliberation is only possible because of pre-existing gaps in 
our theoretical beliefs about the world.  
 
In the next chapter, I go on to distinguish this model from other competing epistemic 
accounts of deliberation. I’ll argue that competing accounts fail to explain our apparent 
freedom in deliberation in epistemic terms, despite their aspirations. If we’re to account for 




Competing Conceptions of Agential Freedom 
In a sense my present action is an ultimate and the only ultimate contingency. 
Frank P. Ramsey (1929, p. 146) 
 
As we deliberate on whether to do this or that, various options appear to us as possibilities 
we are free to decide on. How might we account for this apparent freedom? In the last 
chapter, I argued that an epistemic model of deliberation can explain an agent’s apparent 
freedom in deliberation. This model characterises deliberation by appealing to the beliefs 
agents can and can’t have while deliberating. I argued, for example, that agents can’t 
reasonably deliberate if they already know what they’re going to do. Yet agents must take 
their decisions to epistemically settle what they will in fact do. This ignorance-based model is 
not the only epistemic model on the market. Competing epistemic models have been used to 
characterise deliberation, to explain our apparent freedom, to explain the direction of 
causation and to directly argue against the ignorance conditions I’ve argued for. David E. 
Velleman, James M. Joyce, Jenann Ismael and Huw Price all defend competing epistemic 
accounts. Isaac Levi and Tomis Kapitan defend variants of my ignorance-based account. If 
any of these competing accounts are successful, the epistemic model is not a good place to 
start for developing a deliberative account of causation.  
 
The work of this chapter is to show that competing epistemic models aren’t a threat to my 
ignorance-based model of deliberation. I won’t consider competing models of deliberation in 
general—just epistemic ones. As I argued in the last chapter, epistemic models are good 
candidates for explaining causation without relying on causal or agential features of 
deliberation. 
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One competing type of account, defended by Velleman, Joyce and Ismael, attempts to 
explain our freedom in deliberation by appealing to the fact that we can form certain beliefs 
‘unconstrained’ by evidence. These beliefs constitute our decisions. Velleman (1985, 1989a, 
1989b) takes decisions to be beliefs about actions; Joyce (2002) and Ismael (2007, 2012) take 
decisions to be beliefs about decisions. We have epistemic freedom because we can form 
these beliefs unconstrained by evidence. However, it is controversial to label these models as 
‘competing’. Huw Price (2012) has argued that ignorance accounts like my own have their 
source in these unconstraint accounts. If so, the epistemic model wouldn’t be the right 
foundation for a deliberative account of causation (even if it might explain our apparent 
freedom). I will argue that Price is mistaken, and that these models are importantly distinct.  
 
I’ll also argue that unconstraint accounts face serious problems if used to explain apparent 
freedom. Firstly, agents turn out to have epistemic freedom even over beliefs formed in 
response to evidence. Secondly, I’ll argue that these accounts presume, incorrectly, that 
agents are justified in forming these decision-beliefs (not just justified in the beliefs once 
they’re formed). But agents aren’t so justified. So such justification can’t explain apparent 
freedom. Underlying these problems, I’ll argue that these accounts turn out to rely on a 
further apparent ability to form different beliefs. But once we introduce such an ability, the 
appeal to epistemic freedom becomes redundant—there are simpler ways to explain 
apparent freedom. I’ll illustrate this point by appealing to a related account of deliberation by 
the German Idealist J. G. Fichte. Altogether, unconstraint accounts turn out not be 
successful rivals to the ignorance account.  
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I begin in section 1, by presenting the competing models, and narrowing the field to those 
that are the most compelling alternatives to ignorance accounts—unconstraint accounts. In 
section 2, I argue that ignorance and unconstraint accounts are indeed distinct, and, 
furthermore, should not be combined. In section 3, I raise two serious problems for 
unconstraint accounts, which ignorance accounts avoid. Finally, in section 4, I diagnose what 
I take to be the underlying problem—unconstraint accounts rely on a further apparent 
freedom to believe in different ways of a type that makes the epistemic explanation of 
apparent freedom redundant.  
 
3.1 Epistemic Accounts of Deliberation 
As Tamsin deliberates about whether she will head to bed or stay up reading, these options 
appear to her as possibilities she is free to decide on. How might we account for this 
apparent freedom? We might appeal to beliefs—ordinary beliefs about the world, bodily 
motions, and mental states (rather than beliefs in metaphysical freedom or normative facts). 
The core idea of a number of accounts is that an agent’s beliefs while deliberating do not 
compel her to decide any particular way. So there is a kind of ‘epistemic gap’ between her 
beliefs or evidence and her decision. This epistemic gap gives her ‘epistemic freedom’ 
regarding her decision—a term of art from Velleman (1989a). This epistemic freedom might 
account for why agents seem free to decide in different ways. In this chapter, I’ll interpret 
these various epistemic accounts, including my own, as giving stipulative definitions of 
different types of epistemic freedom—rather than as offering competing analyses of a single 
phenomenon. Velleman, Joyce, Ismael, Levi, Kapitan, Price and I all give accounts of 
deliberation that include an epistemic gap. Velleman, Ismael, Kapitan and I also explicitly use 
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our accounts to explain our apparent freedom in deliberation. I’ll argue that the competitors 
to my own account don’t adequately explain our apparent freedom.  
 
Before I begin, a few preliminaries. The accounts I consider were developed in different 
areas of philosophy. To compare them, I have been flexible regarding what kind of apparent 
freedom they might explain. They might explain a phenomenal feeling of freedom 
(Velleman) or openness (Ismael, Velleman) or a belief in freedom or openness (Kapitan). 
Again, I don’t presume the appearance of freedom is veridical. I also consider accounts of 
epistemic freedom that weren’t developed to explain apparent freedom at all. Joyce and Levi 
primarily use epistemic freedom to delimit what options are rationally available to agents. 
But we should expect a close connection between what options are rationally available, and 
what options we appear free to choose. And my main concern is whether these accounts can 
be used to explain our apparent freedom in deliberation, on the way to giving a deliberative 
account of causation—not whether they have been used to do so. 
 
As in chapter 2, I follow the majority of accounts in discussing ‘decision’ rather than 
‘intention’. While Velleman uses the term ‘intention’, he characterises intentions as what 
we’re ‘decided’ on, and distinguishes them from the goals with which we act (1989a, pp. 
112−3). I’ll discuss both the act or process of deciding (forming a decision) and the product 
of that act (the decision). And I’ll assume decisions both conclude deliberation and imply 
beliefs about what one will do. This is common ground between the accounts—for 
discussion, see section 2.2a, as well as Hampshire and Hart (1958), Pears (1968), Grice 
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(1971) and Velleman (1989a, p 113).64 Some accounts take agents to decide on actions; they 
decide on what they will do (Velleman, Kapitan). Other accounts take agents to decide on 
propositions; they decide that something is so (Levi, Joyce, Ismael). As explained in the last 
chapter (section 2.1), while I prefer the proposition formulation, none of my arguments 
depend on how options are characterised. For simplicity, and ease of quoting, I will switch 
freely between the two formulations.  
 
3.1a Freedom to Form Self-fulfilling Beliefs 
How might we explain our apparent freedom in deliberation? Velleman (1985; 1989a; 1989b) 
claims agents appear free because they’re licensed to form a variety of self-fulfilling beliefs 
about what they’ll do. These are beliefs that cause the very states of affairs they represent—
such as when my belief that I’ll talk confidently brings it about that I do. Velleman argues 
that certain self-fulfilling beliefs constitute decisions. Say Tamsin is deliberating about 
whether to go to bed or stay up reading. She is somewhat motivated to go to bed, and 
somewhat motivated to stay up. Velleman claims that, as an agent, Tamsin has a standing 
desire to know what she’s doing as she begins to do it. This motivates her to act as she 
expects. So if she believes she’ll stay up, this additional motivation may be enough to tip the 
balance and cause her to stay up. And similarly if she believes she’ll go to bed. If so, her 
beliefs are self-fulfilling.  
 
For beliefs to count as decisions, the agent has to also know they are self-fulfilling. Decisions 
are self-fulfilling beliefs that ‘represent themselves’ as such (1989a, p. 98). Once Tamsin has 
                                                
64 This assumption is slightly weaker than what is captured by condition b of the epistemic model. Condition b 
requires agents to be practically certain that if they decide on the option, the option obtains—which means 
decisions will typically imply certainties. The shared assumption here only requires decisions to imply plain 
beliefs. 
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formed a decision-belief, she has evidence of its truth—she has the belief, and knows it’s 
self-fulfilling. And so, Velleman argues, her beliefs are still responsible for being true, still 
governed by appropriate norms, and still count as beliefs (1989a, pp. 56−64, 127−9). 
Velleman claims, moreover, that Tamsin can be ‘licensed’ to form a variety of self-fulfilling 
beliefs, safe in the knowledge that what she believes will turn out to be true. She’s 
unconstrained by evidence of what she’ll decide or do—she has ‘epistemic freedom’ (1989a, ch. 
5; 1989b; 2000, pp. 22−6, ch. 2). This is ‘the freedom to affirm any one of several 
incompatible propositions without risk of being wrong’ (1989b, p. 73). She has this epistemic 
freedom whenever she knows, for at least two beliefs that are incompatible, that either 
would be true if formed. Because she is licensed to form beliefs as she likes in these cases, 
no wonder she appears free to decide in different ways: ‘we mistake the license to affirm any 
one of various things about what we’ll do for the (metaphysical) possibility that we might do 
any one of those things’ (1989b, p. 74).65 
 
Evidential unconstraint plays a central role in Velleman’s account. What makes an agent ‘feel 
free…[is her] freedom from the evidence’ (1989b, p. 77). Tamsin is not constrained by 
evidence about what she will decide or do. Even if she has evidence that she won’t go to 
bed, or won’t form the belief, she can still know that the belief would be self-fulfilling, were 
she to form it. This gives her epistemic freedom. She is ‘licensed’ to form the belief, even if 
the totality of her evidence is conclusive and guarantees the belief’s content is false (1989a, 
pp. 149−153, 165−6, 1989b, pp. 78−80). So freedom is not a matter of ignorance. Adapting 
an example from Anscombe, Velleman (1998b, p. 79) argues that a doctor is licensed to 
                                                
65 Related accounts include Harman (1976) and Joyce (2007, pp. 556−61). Harman takes decisions to merely 
‘involve’ beliefs, and doesn’t use beliefs to explain apparent freedom. Joyce generalises Velleman’s account to 
include common cause structures. 
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make various predictions of where a nurse will take a patient, even when he knows where 
the patient will go: 
 
 The evidence…contains one component that licenses the doctor to contradict 
 what all of the evidence, taken together, conclusively proves. This component 
 of evidence shows that the doctor would be correct in predicting whatever he 
 likes, within reason, irrespective of what the totality of evidence demonstrates 
 is bound to occur…The central evidence shows the doctor that even if the totality 
 of evidence guarantees one outcome, he would still be correct in predicting others. It 
 shows, in short, that he is epistemically free.  
 
There are some ways in which evidence limits epistemic freedom (1989a, pp. 158−9; 1989b, 
n. 5). Tamsin must know her belief would be self-fulfilling. If she has evidence that she’s 
been glued to her armchair, for example, or her motivation for going to bed is very weak, 
she won’t be epistemically free to decide to go to bed. But if she knows the relevant 
counterfactuals are true, she is licensed to form different incompatible beliefs.66 
 
If Velleman’s account succeeds, we have an explanation of how we usually know what we’re 
doing as we begin to do it—forming a decision simply is forming a justified belief about 
what we’re going to do. And we seem to explain our freedom in practical deliberation in 
terms of something much more familiar—the kind of justification we have in theoretical 
reasoning. If Tamsin really is licensed to form different beliefs about what she’s going to do, 
this might explain how she appears free. While Velleman’s explanation relies on Tamsin 
having a desire to know what she’s doing, perhaps such a desire isn’t so strange. Our lives 
wouldn’t go well if we often didn’t know what we were doing. And this desire need not be 
conscious or person-level.  
                                                
66 Velleman acknowledges that actions that we’re highly motivated towards can’t be decided on, since the 
beliefs would not be self-fulfilling (1989a, p. 159). This is a concern for Velleman’s account, but one I won’t 
press.  
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To summarise, Velleman’s account has the following important features. It identifies 
decisions as beliefs. It takes these beliefs to be justified once formed. And it uses an agent’s 
license to form these beliefs to explain apparent freedom. The special license agents have in 
decision contexts means they aren’t constrained by evidence of what they’ll do. This 
epistemic freedom looks like just the thing to explain apparent freedom—it is a freedom 
agents only have while deliberating that does not rely on metaphysical notions of freedom.   
 
3.1b Freedom to Form Self-constituting Beliefs 
Joyce (2002, pp. 94−8; 2007, pp. 556−61) and Ismael (2007; 2012) defend variants of 
Velleman’s account. They agree with Velleman that decisions are beliefs, and that agents 
form these beliefs unconstrained by evidence. But, rather than taking decisions to be beliefs 
in actions, they take them to be beliefs in the very decisions themselves. The belief in the 
decision is the decision. Tamsin’s deciding to go to bed, for example, is her forming the 
belief that she decides to go to bed. ‘The volition stated in the first person at the conclusion 
of a piece of deliberative reasoning (“I will that so and so”) is at once volition and belief 
about my volition’ (Ismael 2012, p. 154). In Joyce’s terms, ‘believing that one has decided to 
do A can, under the right conditions, be a decision to do A. The “right” conditions are just 
those of deliberation’ (2002, p. 97). The belief does not cause the states of affairs it 
represents—it constitutes the state of affairs.67 The belief in the decision is self-constituting. 
While Joyce and Ismael call these beliefs ‘self-fulfilling’, I’ll reserve that term for beliefs that 
are casually self-fulfilling. 
 
                                                
67 Does this identification lead to an infinite regress of beliefs in decision? While Joyce and Ismael don’t discuss 
this, presumably the decision gets its content through its causal connections to action, and so a regress is 
avoided. These reflexive beliefs are still odd, but I won’t take that as a reason to reject them. 
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Ismael (2007, p. 5; 2012, p. 155) and Joyce (2002, p. 98) liken these self-constituting beliefs 
to speech acts called performatives. When Ben asserts ‘I hereby promise…’, his act of asserting 
constitutes his promising. In asserting, Ben is unconstrained by prior evidence of what he 
will promise. Joyce and Ismael claim that because beliefs in decisions are similarly self-
constituting, we form them unconstrained by evidence. ‘The decision-maker is ‘never 
“hemmed in” by her evidence’ (Joyce 2002, p. 98). In Ismael’s words (2012, p. 154):  
 
evidence is irrelevant because I cannot be wrong. My beliefs about my own pending 
decisions (are) epistemically unconstrained by any information I might have…any 
such information is automatically overridden by the decision process itself, and 
(hence) it can’t constrain its development. 
 
An agent can form whatever belief she likes, safe in the knowledge that it will turn out to be 
true. There are still some constraints. For a belief in a decision to be a decision, the belief 
must be formed ‘during’ deliberation on how to act (Joyce 2002, p. 97) or at the ‘conclusion’ 
of such deliberation (Ismael 2012, p. 154). And, at least for Joyce, the agent must believe that 
the decision will cause the act (2002, p. 98). But, within these constraints, agents can form a 
variety of incompatible beliefs, unconstrained by evidence—they have ‘epistemic freedom’ 
(Joyce 2002, p. 96), a connection Ismael also notes (2012, p. 156).  
 
Joyce and Ismael’s unconstraint account of epistemic freedom seems to deliver the same 
important benefits as Velleman’s. It doesn’t rely on metaphysical notions of freedom. And it 
can explain our apparent freedom in deliberation—we appear free because we can form a 
variety of incompatible beliefs, unconstrained by evidence. 
 
 86 
3.1c Competing Ignorance Accounts 
In chapter 2, I argued for an ignorance-based epistemic model of deliberation. This model 
characterised deliberation using six necessary conditions on deliberation. An agent takes an 
option a to be an available option in deliberation only if: 
 
(a) her deciding on a is a serious possibility for her;  
(b) she is practically certain that if she decides on a, then a;  
(c) a is a serious possibility for her;  
(d) it is a serious possibility for her that if she does not decide on a, a does not obtain. 
(e) she takes several options to be available; 
(f) she takes her apparently-available options to be incompatible.  
 
I argued that these conditions are individually necessary for deliberation, and jointly 
characterise deliberation. I also argued that they explain an agent’s apparent freedom in 
deliberation. An agent appears free to decide in different ways as she deliberates because her 
beliefs leave open how she will decide, yet she takes her decision to settle what option 
obtains.  
 
In keeping with this model, I take an ignorance variety of epistemic freedom to be 
characterised by the following requirement: an agent must be ignorant of what she will 
decide and do if she is to be epistemically free. This ignorance-based gap between her beliefs 
and decisions may then explain her apparent freedom in deliberation. If so, we have an 
ignorance account of apparent freedom. Unlike unconstraint accounts, ignorance accounts 
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need not take decisions to be beliefs. Decisions need only imply beliefs about what one is 
going to do. 
 
Levi and Kapitan both give accounts of decision-making that appeal to ignorance conditions. 
Kapitan argues for the following two conditions on an agent taking an action to be an open 
option (1986, p. 241; see also 1984; 1989; 1990):   
 
an agent presumes that his ø-ing is an open course of action for him if and only if  
(i) he presumes that he would ø if and only if he were to choose to ø, and (ii) he 
presumes that if S is any set of his beliefs then his ø ing is contingent relative to S. 
 
According to the second condition, an agent will only take an option to be available if she 
presumes she is ignorant of what she will do, taking it that none of her beliefs either 
individually, or as a set, or a subset, settle what she will do. Typically an agent will presume 
this because she is actually ignorant, and does not have beliefs that settle what she will do. 
Kapitan includes a third condition as well: an agent deliberates between a set of options only 
if she presumes the options are not all conjointly realizable (1986, p. 243). Kapitan’s 
conditions are similar to my own. I noted some of the minor differences between our 
conditions in the last chapter, section 2.2a. 
 
There are more significant differences between Levi’s ignorance account and my own. Levi 
and I agree that an agent can only recognise an option as available if it is a ‘serious 
possibility’ for her—a possibility not ruled out of consideration by her beliefs (1986, ch. 4; 
1997, ch. 2 and 4; 2000, pp. 393−6). This requirement means that an agent must be ignorant 
during deliberation of what option she will choose, for all but trivial forms of deciding. But 
ignorance conditions come in various strengths. Levi argues that agents can’t properly have 
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beliefs of any degree in their decisions while deliberating. Tamsin, for example, can’t believe 
to degree 50% that she will stay up reading, while she deliberates on whether to. 
Deliberation ‘crowds out’ prediction of any degree (1997, p. 32). I only argue that agents 
can’t properly have beliefs that give them practical certainty of what they will do. I allow that 
Tamsin can deliberate while having degrees of beliefs in her impending decisions. 
 
Why does Levi think beliefs of any degree are ruled out? His first argument (1997, pp. 32, 
76−7) draws on Spohn (1977, pp. 114−5). Levi argues that agents need not assign credal 
probabilities to options in decision-making, and so as theorists we should not assign them 
either. What Levi seems to have in mind is the following. Tamsin doesn’t need to have any 
degree of belief about whether she will take her umbrella in order to appropriately deliberate 
about whether to. She needs beliefs about what will happen if she decides to take her 
umbrella (or not). But beliefs about whether she’s likely to don’t play a role in her decision-
making.68 However, this argument is not enough to support the claim that agents can’t 
properly have degrees of beliefs while deliberating. Even if such beliefs play (or should play) 
no role in that particular deliberation, they may play important roles in other deliberations 
the agent is engaged in. For example, Tamsin may also be deliberating on which bag she 
should pack, at the same time as she deliberates on whether to take her umbrella. If she 
needs to pack her bag before she decides whether to take her umbrella, it may be useful for 
her to know how likely it is that she’ll take her umbrella, in order to decide which bag to 
pack.  
 
                                                
68 Levi might also argue that agents should not let their beliefs about impending actions play any role in decision-
making—even if they sometimes do. 
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Levi (1997, pp. 32, 76−7) gives a second argument against agents having degrees of beliefs in 
their impending decision, again drawing on Spohn (1977, pp. 114−5). Levi argues that if we 
measure degrees of belief by the usual means, offering bets, agents turn out not to have 
degrees of belief (except 1 and 0) in their impending actions. This is because in decision 
contexts an agent’s willingness to accept bets is no longer sensitive to the odds at which 
those bets are offered. For example, say we offer Tamsin a bet that gives her $100 if she 
takes her umbrella and nothing otherwise. If taking her umbrella were out of her control, 
and Tamsin is 50% certain she would take her umbrella, she should be willing to pay up to 
$50 for the bet. She’d take herself to be likely to make money off the bet rather than lose 
money. But she shouldn’t be willing to pay $60 if she were only 50% certain. She’d take 
herself to be likely to lose money. Knowing at what odds Tamsin is willing to accept the bet 
can then tell us how likely she thinks it is that she’ll take her umbrella. However, typically 
whether Tamsin takes her umbrella is under her control. And so provided the money gained 
matters more to her than the inconvenience or other costs involved in taking her umbrella, 
Tamsin should be willing to pay up to $100 to take the bet. She should bet, and then simply 
decide to take her umbrella in order to win the money. This behaviour, by the usual calculus, 
corresponds to her having a credence 1 (being certain) that she’ll take her umbrella and 
having a credence 0 that she won’t.69 So if we assign credences to agents based on the odds 
at which agents accept bets (and the stakes are sufficiently high), we will be led to assign 
agents credences in their impending actions of either 1 or 0. And credences of 0 and 1, for 
the most part, rule out these options as available, given the epistemic conditions Levi and I 
argue for—agents must be ignorant if they are to non-trivially deliberate and decide. 
                                                
69 Note that if Tamsin is offered a bet on not taking her umbrella, the situation is reversed. So the credences we 
assign are not well-behaved in other ways as well.  
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However, there are a number of problems with this argument. Note that these problems 
arise independently of whether the model is used to give a deliberative account of causation. 
Firstly, at best Levi’s argument shows that sufficiently-high-stake bets prevent betting 
behaviour revealing degrees of belief. It says nothing about low-stakes betting. Offer Tamsin 
a bet that gives her $1 for taking her umbrella (and nothing otherwise), and the possibility of 
winning the $1 will not have much effect (if any) on her willingness to take her umbrella. 
Only if she is more than 50% certain she will take her umbrella should she pay more than 
50c for this bet. If so, her disposition to accept the bet under various odds will (roughly) 
reveal her degrees of belief. As the stakes diminish, betting dispositions more closely track 
degrees of belief. Secondly, even if betting behaviour turned out to be entirely inappropriate 
for tracking degrees of belief in impending decisions, this would not imply that agents lacked 
such beliefs—just that they are hard to measure. For related arguments and similar 
conclusions, see Joyce (2002, pp. 81−7) and Rabinowicz (2002).  
 
My responses to both Levi’s arguments exploit the fact that agent can be properly involved 
in several deliberations at once. Tamsin can deliberate on which bag to pack, or whether to 
accept a bet, while still deliberating on whether to take her umbrella. The decision she makes 
about the bag or the bet can affect what decision she eventually makes about the umbrella. 
But in many such cases, it will still be useful for her to predict whether she’ll take her 
umbrella, even while deliberating on whether to. One could block my responses to Levi by 
arguing that agents can’t simultaneously engage in several deliberations at once, or that, as 
theorists, we should always relativise an agent’s belief set to a particular deliberation, and 
take such belief-sets to be relatively independent of one another. But we would need 
powerful reasons to make these moves. We are often required to engage in multiple 
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deliberations, particularly when our deliberations are long and complex. And we often do use 
the same beliefs in multiple deliberations. Typically we would want a model of deliberation 
to approximate what agents actually do.70 Because I reject Levi’s arguments for ruling out 
degrees of belief, the ignorance account I suggest is more modest, requiring only that 
deliberating agents aren’t practically certain of how they will decide.  
 
3.1d Perspectival Accounts 
Huw Price has proposed a number of accounts of deliberation that are epistemic in a broad 
sense. Under these accounts, taking up the perspective of a deliberator implies having, or 
lacking, certain beliefs. These accounts might seem to explain our apparent freedom in 
epistemic terms. Under one of Price’s proposals, taking up the perspective of a deliberator 
implies viewing one’s impending actions as having no causal history, or a causal history 
independent of other relevant causal mechanisms in the system: ‘agents see their own actions 
as “uncaused,” at least in the midst of deliberation about those same actions’ (2012, p. 536). 
‘To introduce the agent is in effect to assume an independent causal history to the event A’ 
(1991, p. 169), or ‘a history that would ultimately originate in one’s own decision, freely 
made’ (Price and Menzies 1993, p. 191). Price effectively suggests a kind of Kantian 
perspectival incompatibilism. In taking up the perspective of a deliberator, I assume my 
decisions or actions are uncaused causes, that is, causally independent of (past) features of 
my psychology and environment, but causes for subsequent (future) worldly events. Price 
traces this view back to Ramsey: ‘From the situation when we are deliberating seems 
to…arise the general difference of cause and effect’ (Ramsey 1978, p. 146; quoted Price 
                                                
70 Models of decision theory also idealise in various ways. But the more they do, the less convincing they are as 
arguments against actual agents having degrees of belief in their impending decisions, and the less suitable they 
are for explaining our apparent freedom in deliberation.   
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1993, p. 254—see also ibid. pp. 260−265; 1992, p. 518).71 Taking my decision or action to be 
an uncaused cause might seem to imply taking it to be evidentially severed from past events. 
In Ramsey’s words,  
 …any possible present volition of ours is (for us) irrelevant to any past event. To 
 another (or to ourselves in the future) it can serve as a sign of the past, but to us now 
 what we do affects only the probability of the future…In a sense my present action 
 is an ultimate and the only ultimate contingency.  
(1978 [1929], p. 146)  
 
There’s an open question of whether such a view accurately depicts the phenomenology or 
the perspective of deliberating agents. But there’s a deeper problem. If such an account is to 
be used to deliver a deliberative account of causation, as Price and I intend, it presumes too 
much in the way of causation. The problem is easiest to see in the case of the temporal 
asymmetry of causation. Both Price and I aim to explain why causes come before their 
effects by appealing to deliberation. Under Price’s above proposal, being a deliberator 
requires seeing my impending acts or decisions as evidentially severed from their usual 
causes (while still being relevant for their effects). But if we ask why my decisions are 
evidentially severed from past states, and not future states, we have to import the temporal 
asymmetry of causation—that the causes of my action lie in the past, and its effects lie in the 
future. We make no progress explaining the temporal asymmetry of causation. Price could 
simply stipulate that agents take their decisions to be evidentially severed from past states (as 
Ramsey does). But this would be to import a temporal asymmetry equally as mysterious as 
the causal asymmetry we are trying to explain.  
 
                                                
71 Similar ideas are also appealed to by Hitchcock (1996) and Pearl (2000, pp. 108−109). I consider Pearl’s view 
in the next chapter (section 4.2b). For further discussion of the ‘Ramsey thesis’, see Ahmed (2014, ch. 8).  
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A similar problem occurs with a related account offered by Price. Price claims that an agent 
cannot properly take her free acts or decisions to be evidence for their usual causes, while 
deliberating about those very acts. Why? Because an agent should realise that her 
deliberation will be an ‘alternative causal explanation’ for why she decides as she does (1991, 
p. 166), one which undermines any evidential correlation that otherwise would obtain 
between her decision and its causes. Price appeals to this claim in defence of evidential 
decision theory (1986, 1991). And he goes on to suggest that it can be used to explain 
Ramsey’s thesis in ‘purely evidential’ terms, such that there is ‘simply no asymmetric modal 
notion left unaccounted for’ (1993, p. 261; see also 2007, pp. 281−2; Price and Weslake 
2009, p. 431). 
 
But unfortunately the same concerns with presuming causation and causal asymmetry apply. 
Price’s argument for undermining relies crucially on the idea that an agent’s deliberation 
provides a competing causal explanation for why she decides as she does. Unless we or the 
agent makes causal assumptions, neither of us have reason to expect such undermining. And 
if we ask why evidential relations to the past and not the future are undermined, the best we 
can do is simply rely on the fact that causes come before their effects—so that the competing 
causal explanation provided by deliberation undermines only correlations to the past. There 
are other arguments that might be used to support the Ramsey thesis and related 
perspectival accounts. But the suspicion is they will similarly rely too much on causation and 
causal asymmetry. For now, I put these perspectivalist approaches aside and move on to 
consider the relation between the two most promising types of epistemic account—
ignorance and unconstraint accounts. 
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3.2 Similar, yet Different 
Unconstraint and ignorance types of epistemic freedom share features in common. Both 
include an epistemic gap between an agent’s evidence or beliefs while deliberating and what 
she believes as a result of decision. An agent’s evidence or beliefs while deliberating do not 
compel her to make any particular decision, or to form any particular belief about what she 
will decide or do. It is for this reason that these types might seem equally suitable for 
explaining why agents appear free. In this section, I argue that these accounts are importantly 
distinct. Neither is equivalent to the other, and, moreover, they should not be combined.  
 
Price (2012, pp. 528−9) argues that ignorance and unconstraint accounts are ultimately 
different expressions of the same underlying idea. He takes these accounts to enforce the 
same kind of epistemic gap between evidence and decision—and then uses this gap in giving 
his own agent-based account of causation. Price begins with Joyce’s 2007 account, which 
characterises decisions as causally self-fulfilling beliefs. Immediately following this he 
suggests, ‘An alternative way to put this thought…is to say that there is an important sense 
in which, as she deliberates, an agent simply does not have knowledge, beliefs, or credences 
about the action in question’ (2012, p. 529, his emphasis). This is an ignorance account—
Price even quotes Rabinowicz’s summary (2002) of Levi. Finally, Price claims we get to both 
these views by considering the ‘epistemic authority’ agents have with respect to their own 
actions—their ability to trump predictive knowledge (2012, p. 529). He takes the source of 
this authority to be given by Ismael’s account of decisions as self-constituting beliefs.  
 
Price appeals to all three types of accounts of epistemic freedom—a causal account (Joyce 
2007), a self-constituting account (Ismael 2007), and an ignorance account (Levi, via 
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Rabinowicz 2002). What he seems to have in mind is the following. Under unconstraint 
accounts, even though an agent might seem to have evidence while deliberating about what 
she’ll decide, she shouldn’t take this to be evidence. Why? Because she knows she is free to 
contravene it. Like Dummett’s chief (1964), she is free to contradict or ‘bilk’ her evidence by 
deciding otherwise (Price 2012, p. 529). Her epistemic authority over her current decision 
leads to ignorance elsewhere. Ignorance accounts, like Levi’s, turn out to have their source in 
unconstraint accounts, since it is unconstraint accounts that ultimately explain an agent’s 
epistemic authority.72 
 
But unconstraint and ignorance types are importantly distinct. They imply different kinds of 
epistemic gaps. Under ignorance accounts, an agent does not have beliefs or evidence that 
settle how she will decide—this is the epistemic gap between her evidence and what she 
decides, and why she appears free. Under unconstraint accounts, an agent is epistemically 
unconstrained by her evidence, regardless of what evidence she has. This is the epistemic gap, 
and why she appears free. Unconstraint accounts hold that the evidence an agent has while 
deliberating is irrelevant to her apparent freedom. Tamsin can be reliably informed she’ll go to 
bed, believe she’ll go to bed, and yet sensibly deliberate about whether to go to bed. Under 
an ignorance account (as I argued in chapter 2, section 2.5) she cannot. Only under an 
ignorance account does prediction prevent deliberation.  
 
Velleman (1989a, pp. 151−3; 1989b, pp. 78−80) and Joyce (2002, p. 94) in fact use 
unconstraint accounts to argue against ignorance conditions like Levi’s. They’re not mistaken 
                                                
72 Some of Levi’s arguments do suggest ignorance arises because of our freedom in deliberation (1997, pp. 
76−7). But Levi does not appeal to unconstraint or epistemic authority. And as noted in regards to betting 
(section 3.1c), Levi’s arguments for this point aren’t strong.  
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to do so. Unconstraint accounts do not imply ignorance. If an agent’s apparent freedom is 
explained independently of her beliefs about what she will do, her apparent freedom gives 
her no reason to forgo these beliefs. What explains her apparent freedom is knowing her 
beliefs would be true if formed. This knowledge is independent or her beliefs about what she 
will do. If having these beliefs does not get in the way of her apparent freedom, the fact that 
she is deliberating gives her no reason to forgo them.  
 
Why might it have seemed that ignorance accounts had their source in unconstraint 
accounts? Both Levi and Price argue that an agent’s freedom in deliberation implies 
complete uncertainty of what they will decide and do—in Levi’s case, via a betting argument 
(section 3.1c), in Price’s case, by appeal to an agent’s epistemic authority over her 
decisions—of a kind taken to be implicit in Dummett (1964). Price, Dummett and Levi all 
rely on the idea that no matter what her evidence, an agent can decide how she likes. This 
makes her beliefs in her impending decisions difficult to track and might make it seem as if 
she has, or should have, no beliefs in her impending decisions or actions. But claiming an 
agent has the ability to decide in ways not constrained by her evidence is quite different from 
saying she is justified in forming beliefs unconstrained by her evidence. Neither Levi nor 
Dummett are interested in an agent’s justification. Nor are they directly interested in what 
explains an agent’s ability (or apparent ability) to decide in different ways. It is only 
unconstraint accounts that are taken to explain an agent’s (apparent) ability in terms of her 
justification. Price would be wrong to assume that Levi and Dummett appeal to an agent’s 
justification. However, I will later argue that unconstraint accounts do presuppose an agent’s 
(apparent) ability to decide in different ways (section 3.4). So in a sense it’s not surprising 
that Price would appeal to unconstraint accounts to derive ignorance accounts. But what 
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Price is ultimately relying on is an agent’s (apparent) freedom to believe in different ways—
not the fact that agents are justified in forming beliefs unconstrained by evidence.73  
 
Finally, not only are ignorance conditions not implied by unconstraint accounts, but adding 
them on top of unconstraint accounts leads to trouble. Unconstraint accounts begin with the 
idea that an agent’s evidence of what she’ll decide does not constrain her deliberation. 
Adding in ignorance conditions would mean that the fact that an agent is deliberating 
changes the import of her evidence. Even if Tamsin has been reliably told that she will 
decide to go to bed, the fact that is unconstrained by her evidence would mean she should 
no longer treat it as evidence. But the fact that an agent is unconstrained by her evidence 
does not change its import. Her evidence remains just as strong. Ignorance conditions do 
not derive from unconstraint accounts, and should not be included as further additions. 
 
If we are going to combine ignorance and unconstraint accounts, a more plausible alternative 
is to take ignorance conditions to be prior constraints on deliberation. If making a decision 
just is forming a belief, this plausibly requires the agent not to already have the relevant 
belief. If so, ignorance should be a prior condition on deliberation, under unconstraint 
accounts. This kind of hybrid view is different from a ‘pure’ ignorance account of the kind I 
defended in the last chapter. Pure ignorance accounts don’t appeal to an agent’s justification 
to form beliefs unconstrained by evidence to explain her freedom in deliberation. Hybrid 
accounts do.74 I argue below, however, that unconstraint doesn’t explain our freedom to 
                                                
73 However, even if agents have a primitive (apparent) ability to decide in different ways, this still doesn’t imply 
they are ignorant of what they will decide. This was my argument against Levi in section 3.1c.  
74 Hybrid accounts are similar to ignorance accounts that identify decisions as beliefs. As far as I know, such 
accounts have never been explicitly advocated—although see Hampshire and Hart (1958) and Pears (1968).  
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decide. What this means is that even if we adopt a hybrid account, it is ignorance that still 
does the work of explaining our apparent freedom in deliberation. 
 
3.3 The Dangers of Unconstraint 
I’ll now argue that unconstraint accounts face two serious problems when used to explain 
apparent freedom. Firstly, agents turn out to have epistemic freedom even over beliefs 
formed on the basis of evidence. Secondly, agents are not justified in forming beliefs 
unconstrained by evidence—and so such justification can’t explain apparent freedom.  
 
3.3a Freedom over Evidence-based Beliefs 
Velleman, Joyce, and Ismael identify decisions as self-fulfilling or self-constituting beliefs. 
Our license or justification to form these beliefs might explain our apparent freedom. But a 
concern immediately arises: beliefs formed on the basis of evidence can also be self-fulfilling 
or self-constituting. So we can have epistemic freedom even over evidence-based beliefs—a 
problem for explaining our apparent freedom over decisions.  
 
I’ll begin by raising this objection against Velleman’s account. Say Tamsin is deliberating 
over whether she will go to bed. Her partner tells her she will, and, based on this evidence, 
she forms the belief that she will. Velleman claims Tamsin has a standing desire to do what 
she expects. This desire gives her additional motivation to go to bed, if she believes she will. 
Stipulate that this additional motivation causes her to go to bed—without it, she would have 
stayed up. In this case, her belief formed based on evidence is self-fulfilling. Tamsin may 
know this belief is self-fulfilling, in so far as she knows her decision-like beliefs are self-
fulfilling. There may be a second belief (say a belief that she’ll take a bath) that satisfies these 
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same conditions. Under Velleman’s account, because these incompatible beliefs are self-
fulfilling and represent themselves as such, Tamsin has epistemic freedom over them, and 
will experience apparent freedom. Yet these beliefs are based on evidence.  
 
If Tamsin has epistemic freedom over evidence-based beliefs, Velleman’s account faces a 
dilemma. It either identifies the wrong beliefs as decisions, or it grants us epistemic freedom 
over beliefs that aren’t decisions—so it can’t explain the apparent freedom we experience 
particularly over decisions. Tamsin’s evidence-based belief may need to satisfy various other 
conditions to count as a decision. She may have to knowingly form it based on evidence of 
her desires. Perhaps she does. If so, Velleman’s account wrongly identifies her evidence-
based belief as a decision.75 Alternatively, Tamsin’s evidence-based belief might not count as 
a decision. But then Tamsin has epistemic freedom over beliefs that aren’t decisions. The 
overall concern is that Tamsin has epistemic freedom over evidence-based beliefs—whether 
or not they count as decisions.  
 
The problem arises not because Velleman identifies decisions as beliefs, but because he 
appeals to our license to form self-fulfilling beliefs to explain apparent freedom. This kind of 
license applies equally to evidence-based beliefs. So it does not explain why we have 
apparent freedom only over beliefs formed not based of evidence. Velleman cannot then 
avoid the problem by taking beliefs to be mere component parts of decisions. The same 
problem over license would apply. Ignorance accounts of apparent freedom avoid this 
problem, because they don’t appeal to such license to explain apparent freedom. 
 
                                                
75 Bratman (1991, pp. 123−5) discusses a similar concern with regard to known side-effects. 
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This same objection applies to Joyce’s and Ismael’s accounts, at least under one 
interpretation. Say Tamsin is deliberating about whether to go to bed and her partner tells 
her that she will decide to. Believing this prediction, she forms the belief that this is what she 
decides. As far as her beliefs in decision generally cause actions, this one will also cause her 
to act. Because it is a belief in decision formed during deliberation that causes her act, it 
counts as her decision. We can again stipulate that if she hadn’t heard the prediction, she 
would have decided to stay up. A second incompatible belief (say a belief that she decides to 
take a bath) can satisfy these same conditions. So Tamsin has epistemic freedom over 
evidence-based beliefs.  
 
But perhaps this is the wrong way to interpret Joyce and Ismael. Perhaps they don’t intend 
that any belief in decision formed during the temporal interval of deliberation counts as a 
decision. Perhaps they intend to restrict to beliefs formed on the basis of deliberation—such 
as by an agent judging that the option is among her best. Such an interpretation is suggested 
by Joyce’s appeal (2002, n. 41) to Skyrms’ deliberational dynamics (1990), which considers 
how an agent’s beliefs change in response to her judgments of expected utility. And it is 
suggested by Ismael’s appeal to what occurs at the ‘conclusion of a piece of deliberative 
reasoning’ (2012, p. 154). If we adopt this interpretation, Tamsin will not have epistemic 
freedom when she forms beliefs based merely on her partner’s prediction. Such beliefs 
would not count as decisions, and so would not be self-constituting. Tamsin will only have 
epistemic freedom if she uses the prediction as a guide for what options are best. So she will 
not generally have epistemic freedom over evidence-based beliefs, and the objection fails.76 
Note that this response is not available to Velleman. Under Velleman’s account, introducing 
                                                
76 My thanks to an anonymous referee at the Australasian Journal of Philosophy for pressing this response. 
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further conditions on what counts as a decision does not change an agent’s epistemic 
freedom. But under Joyce’s and Ismael’s accounts, further conditions can change an agent’s 
epistemic freedom. It seems Joyce and Ismael can avoid my objection, and deliver an 
account of epistemic freedom that is sensitive to how beliefs are formed. 
 
If Joyce and Ismael intend the above reading, it is an important clarification of their views. 
Joyce tells us that the constitutive relationship between decisions and beliefs about them 
‘ensures that any belief of the form “I decide to do A” adopted during deliberation will be 
self-fulfilling’ (2002, p. 97). But it turns out that not all beliefs formed while deliberating 
count. Ismael claims that epistemic freedom is unavoidable for any system ‘that is 
representing activity that includes its own’ (2007, p. 5), and that the only relevant feature is 
that the acts ‘have reflexive representational content’ (2012, p. 156). But if only beliefs 
formed in certain ways count as decisions, then it’s not merely the reflexive content of such 
acts that gives us epistemic freedom over them. It’s how we form them as well.  
 
However, a response that appeals to conditions on belief-formation faces problems of its 
own. I’ll raise two. Firstly, such responses risk making decision too normatively demanding. 
It seems we can form decisions in irrational ways that aren’t responsive to what we take our 
best options to be. But under the proposed response, we won’t be forming decisions at all 
unless we form them appropriately. This is not a concern for giving idealised models of 
deliberation—only for using such models to say what decisions actually are. Secondly, the 
initial objection may re-emerge. Idealised models of deliberation allow for cases where no 
single option is judged better than alternatives. In such cases, an agent can still decide—
perhaps judging the option to be no worse than alternatives. Imagine a case where Tamsin 
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judges that both going to bed and staying up are among her best options. She might then 
form the belief that she decides to go to bed on the basis of her partner’s prediction. If she 
does this while judging the option is among her best, it will count as her decision. So, again, 
Tamsin will have epistemic freedom over an evidence-based belief.  
 
Are there other ways that Joyce, Ismael, and Velleman might respond to the initial objection? 
They could introduce prior ignorance conditions on deliberation. This is another way in 
which ignorance accounts avoid the problem. In the last chapter, section 2.5, I argued that 
ignorance conditions should be satisfied by agents not having evidence of how they will 
decide. If agents do not have evidence of their decisions or actions while deliberating, they 
will not form beliefs based on such evidence. But unconstraint accounts aim to avoid 
ignorance conditions. They take agents to form beliefs unconstrained by evidence.77 
 
Another way defenders of unconstraint accounts might respond is by claiming that an 
agent’s epistemic freedom comes from her being unconstrained by her evidence. It doesn’t 
matter whether she then follows the evidence or not. But this response is insufficient. To see 
why, imagine an extreme case. Tom has psychological mechanisms in place that guarantee he 
only forms beliefs based on evidence, and knows this about himself. It may still be true that if 
Tom were to form a belief in an act or decision he doesn’t have evidence for, it would be 
self-fulfilling or self-constituting. He can’t form the belief, but if he did, he’d be justified in 
it. Tom would count as unconstrained by his evidence and as having the same kind of 
epistemic freedom we do. Yet we would not expect Tom to experience apparent freedom. 
We shouldn’t have freedom over evidence-based beliefs. And Tom shouldn’t have epistemic 
                                                
77 Again, one could adopt the hybrid view described above (section 3.2) and begin with ignorance conditions 
and add in unconstraint. But while such a hybrid view avoids my first objection, it doesn’t avoid a second. 
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freedom at all. The fact that unconstraint accounts get the wrong results here points to an 
underlying concern with these accounts—one I’ll turn to in section 3.5. 
 
3.3b Forming Beliefs without Justification 
There is a second even more serious concern. If unconstraint types of epistemic freedom are 
to explain our apparent freedom in deliberation, they must account for some sense in which 
we seem able to form beliefs unconstrained by evidence. Velleman attempts to do so, by 
arguing that we are epistemically licensed to form beliefs unconstrained by evidence. And both 
unconstraint accounts might seem to imply we’re epistemically justified in forming beliefs 
unconstrained by evidence—not merely justified in the beliefs once they’re formed. This 
justification could explain apparent freedom. But, I’ll argue, we’re not justified in forming 
beliefs unconstrained by evidence. So such justification can’t explain apparent freedom. 
 
Here’s how the explanation is supposed to go. Velleman, Joyce, and Ismael claim that self-
fulfilling and self-constituting beliefs are justified once formed. Once Tamsin has formed the 
belief that she’ll (decide to) go to bed, she has evidence of its truth, because she knows the 
belief is self-fulfilling (or self-constituting). This justification is meant to give her ‘license’ to 
form such beliefs now (Velleman 1989b, p. 74 and passim), imply she is not ‘“hemmed in”’ 
by her evidence (Joyce 2002, p. 98) and make her evidence of what she will do ‘irrelevant’ 
(Ismael 2012, p. 154). But these further steps are far from trivial. As Grice (1971, pp. 267−8), 
Langton (2004), and Setiya (2008, pp. 400−1) all argue, agents are not justified in forming 
beliefs in the absence of adequate grounds, even if they know their beliefs will be justified 
once formed. Nor are agents justified in ignoring their evidence. These points have been 
persuasively argued before, so I will be brief. Justification to form beliefs depends on what 
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epistemic grounds agents have—not on what evidence they would have, were they to believe 
differently and have different evidence. Before Tamsin decides, she doesn’t have grounds for 
thinking that she’ll go to bed and grounds for thinking that she’ll stay up (and similarly for 
the corresponding decisions). She is not justified in forming either belief. At most she has 
grounds for one of these. She may be justified in either belief once she forms it. But that’s a 
different matter. So the justification she has before she decides can’t explain her apparent 
freedom. Ignorance-based explanations of apparent freedom avoid this problem, because 
they don’t appeal to this justification. 
 
Consider the following case, a variant of one discussed by Langton (2004, pp. 257−8). I’ll 
present this case as a counterexample to Velleman’s account, and then consider its relevance 
for Joyce’s and Ismael’s accounts. Tamsin’s son Carlo is thinking about what present he will 
unwrap at Christmas. He has inductive evidence from previous years that any belief about 
what he’ll unwrap (within reason) will be justified once formed—when he forms the belief 
that he’ll unwrap a toy bear, he does, and so on for other gifts. Moreover, these beliefs are 
self-fulfilling—if he didn’t form the belief that he’ll unwrap a toy bear, his mother wouldn’t 
know to buy him one, and he wouldn’t unwrap one. Carlo is licensed, in Velleman’s sense, to 
form various incompatible beliefs about what he will do. These beliefs are self-fulfilling and 
Carlo has evidence they will be justified once formed. And yet it seems Carlo is not justified 
in forming these beliefs. His epistemic grounds do not license him to. So we can’t appeal to 
this justification to explain why agents experience apparent freedom in deliberation. 
 
Should we ascribe the fault to Carlo’s mistaken beliefs about Santa? No. Enlightened-Carlo, 
who has realised the role his mother plays in making his beliefs self-fulfilling still isn’t 
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justified in forming them. Does the fault lie in the fact that the relation between Carlo’s 
belief and its truth is causally mediated by Carlo’s mother buying the gift? No. The relation 
between decision and action is always causally mediated—and Velleman’s account explicitly 
builds in causal conditions from the start.  
 
Langton (2004, p. 245, passim) and Setiya (2008, pp. 401−2, passim) describe similar cases as 
involving ‘faith’ and ‘wishful thinking’, where agents go beyond their evidence in forming 
beliefs. But it’s worse. Under Velleman’s account, agents are not only licensed to go beyond 
their evidence, but to contradict and go against their evidence. Even if an agent has complete 
evidence that entirely settles what he will do, he is still justified in believing otherwise. Even 
if ‘the agent is confronted by all of the evidence about his future action, and…fully 
appreciates its evidentiary force…This complete evidence cannot require the agent to draw a 
particular conclusion about what he’ll do’ (1989a, p. 153). Nor is it only external evidence 
that agents are unconstrained by. Agents are unconstrained by even complete knowledge of 
their own motivations. Evidence of motives that ‘constitutes compelling evidence for 
expecting (an agent) to perform one action rather than another…still cannot compel the 
agent himself’ (ibid., p. 150). Given how strong unconstraint needs to be, there is even less 
reason for agents to be justified in forming beliefs unconstrained by evidence. 
 
Does Carlo’s case also create problems for Joyce’s and Ismael’s accounts? It does. Initially it 
might not seem so. After all, Carlo’s beliefs are causally self-fulfilling, not self-constituting, 
and the latter is what Joyce and Ismael appeal to. But things are not so simple. While I have 
been careful to distinguish the two types of unconstraint account, both Joyce and Ismael 
take agents to have epistemic freedom regarding both causally self-fulfilling and self-
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constituting beliefs. Even though they only take self-constituting beliefs to be relevant to our 
epistemic freedom over decisions, they employ a generic notion of ‘self-fulfilling belief’ that 
includes both. These are beliefs that ‘if the agent has them then they are true’ (Joyce 2002, p. 
95), or beliefs whose truth is ‘probabilistically dependent’ on the act of forming the belief 
(Ismael 2007, p. 6). The same kind of unconstraint that applies to self-constituting beliefs is 
meant to apply to causally self-fulfilling beliefs. Nor can I see a principled reason to restrict 
unconstraint to self-constituting beliefs. Carlo’s case is enough to trouble Joyce’s and 
Ismael’s accounts.  
 
It may seem that Joyce and Ismael avoid the worry in another way. Perhaps it doesn’t matter 
whether agents are justified in forming beliefs unconstrained by evidence. Perhaps it is 
enough that the beliefs are justified once formed, or that agents don’t do anything wrong in 
forming them. But if epistemic freedom is to explain why certain options appear available to 
be decided on, we need more. We need to identify some positive sense in which we seem 
able to form the beliefs. Velleman’s appeal to epistemic license seemed to provide this. If 
Joyce and Ismael give up this appeal, they give up Velleman’s purported explanation of 
apparent freedom. As it stands, if agents are not justified in forming decision-beliefs, we 
have no account of how agents appear free to form them.  
 
Another way defenders might respond is by arguing that our ordinary epistemic intuitions 
are out of place when it comes to self-fulfilling or self-constituting beliefs. Perhaps we are 
justified in forming these beliefs unconstrained by evidence, but forget that we are. Or 
perhaps we should revise our notion of justification to accommodate these beliefs. In 
response, note that the intuitions I’m appealing to aren’t weighty. I’m not assuming we infer 
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beliefs based on evidence, but only that our justification in forming beliefs is given by our 
general epistemic grounds, whether or not we actually infer. Nor is it a matter of neglect. 
Philosophers have considered these unusual cases and remained unconvinced. There are 
ways to convince sceptics or successfully advocate revision of our concepts. One can appeal 
to structurally similar cases outside the disputed area. But Carlo’s case raises problems for 
such appeals—structurally similar cases fall the other way. One can also appeal to theoretical 
advantage—perhaps we should accept the relevant notion of justification because it explains 
apparent freedom. But, as I will argue, there is no such advantage—once we’ve introduced 
what’s needed for unconstraint accounts of epistemic freedom, there are easier ways to 
explain apparent freedom.  
 
3.4 Underlying Trouble 
Unconstraint accounts imply that we experience apparent freedom even over evidence-based 
beliefs. And they rely on the mistaken idea that we can justifiably form beliefs unconstrained 
by evidence. In this final section, I argue for a diagnosis of what has gone wrong—
unconstraint accounts presuppose an unexplained apparent ability to form different beliefs. 
Only with this apparent ability do these accounts give us an explanation of apparent 
freedom. But this is an apparent ability that makes epistemic freedom redundant. 
 
I’ve argued that agents aren’t justified in forming beliefs unconstrained by evidence. But one 
might think that an agent’s apparent freedom is explained by the justification an agent would 
have, were she to form the belief. This would avoid my second objection. However, to appeal 
to this conditional justification, we’d need to identify a sense in which the agent takes it she 
could or might form such beliefs—minimally, a modality in which such beliefs appear possible. 
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Only with this additional modality might the justification she has once these beliefs are 
formed explain her apparent freedom now. 
 
To see why some kind of modality is required, consider an agent who knows a belief would 
be self-fulfilling, were he to form it, but who correctly takes it he cannot form the belief. 
Unconstraint accounts need to rule out such cases. Imagine Raamy, who knows that if he 
were to believe he will swim into a river teeming with crocodiles, he will indeed swim into 
the river, given how stubborn he is about acting as he believes. He is Velleman’s agent par 
excellence, strongly motivated to act as he expects. But Raamy also knows he is unable to form 
the belief. He has such an overwhelming fear of crocodiles that he can’t even imagine 
swimming into the river, let alone believe he will. The mere thought of crocodiles fills him 
with dread, so that any attempt to conceptualise, visualise, or form a belief about swimming 
into the river fails. Raamy won’t feel free to decide to swim into the river. But if it were 
merely the justification he would have were he to form the belief that explained his apparent 
freedom, he would feel free. 
 
Or consider Sunny. Sunny knows she lacks the concept eigenvalue. So she knows she is 
unable to form the belief that she will compute the eigenvalues for a simple matrix in front 
of her. When her teacher asks her to calculate the eigenvalues, she doesn’t know what she’s 
being asked. But she is familiar with matrices and adept at arithmetic. If she were to form the 
belief that she will compute the eigenvalues, this would imply her having the concept 
eigenvalue. Then she would indeed be able to compute the eigenvalues, and, being a diligent 
student, would do so. She’d be justified in the belief if she formed it. But in her present state, 
she would not appear free to decide. Like Raamy and Tom (who can only form beliefs based 
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on evidence), the mere justification she would have, were she to form the belief, would 
incorrectly attribute her apparent freedom now.  
 
I suspect unconstraint accounts of apparent freedom rule out such cases by implicitly relying 
on an additional modality in which agents are or appear free to form beliefs. What sort of 
modality might they appeal to? Could they appeal to an apparent ‘metaphysical’ freedom to 
believe in ways not causally or nomologically determined by prior states of affairs? Not 
likely. This would make apparent freedom mysterious, and take away whatever advantage 
came from appealing to ordinary beliefs. They could try an epistemic modality—the fact that 
various beliefs are compatible (or thought to be compatible) with the agent’s other beliefs. 
But such an approach places ignorance conditions on deliberation, which unconstraint 
accounts aim to avoid. 
 
Sometimes Velleman seems to appeal to the fact that some beliefs are ‘wishful’ and desire-
responsive to explain why they appear under an agent’s control (1989a, pp. 69, 127). 
Sometimes he notes the fact that agents don’t form them in response to evidence (ibid., p. 
25). And sometimes these ideas are combined: ‘we believe what we believe because we want 
to, not because the evidence would have dictated it’ (ibid., p. 162). But these appeals won’t 
explain why agents appear free to form the beliefs. Regarding evidence, precisely what is in 
question is how an agent takes it she can form beliefs unconstrained by evidence. We 
shouldn’t use an unexplained ability to do so to explain this possibility. On the desire side, 
things fare no better. Velleman claims agents can appear free to form beliefs that are not in 
keeping with their greatest desires, or what they take them to be (ibid., pp. 145, 150). So 
apparent freedom can’t be explained by desire-responsiveness.  
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Could Velleman revise his claim, and require the relevant beliefs to be desire-responsive? 
Perhaps. He could also adopt a more sophisticated condition, and require beliefs to be 
responsive to what an agent takes the expected utility of her acts to be—a possibility 
suggested by Joyce’s account. Perhaps this is what explains why she seems free to form 
various beliefs. But the problem is that if desire-responsiveness explains why she appears 
free to form these decision-beliefs, why bother with the detour via epistemic freedom? What 
does it matter if she’s justified in her decision-beliefs once she forms them? The epistemic 
part of the account no longer does any work in explaining apparent freedom (even if it 
serves other roles). We may as well explain apparent freedom by the fact that we form 
decisions in response to desires or judgments of expected utility.   
 
Finally, we might try appealing to a real or apparent primitive agent-ability. Sometimes 
Velleman claims that self-fulfilling beliefs are formed ‘spontaneously’ (1989a, p. 25), 
‘voluntarily’, or ‘at will’ (ibid., p. 66). But appealing to such primitives is not a promising 
approach. Beliefs are usually taken to be involuntary states that we simply find ourselves in. 
While it may turn out that we can form beliefs at will, we shouldn’t appeal to an unexplained 
ability to do so to explain apparent freedom. The more reasonable way of interpreting 
Velleman’s account is that the appearance of forming beliefs at will is to be explained by 
epistemic freedom—for support, see Roessler (2013, p. 43).  
 
Ismael speaks of the decision process as something ‘I implement’, which overrides previous 
evidence (2012, pp. 154−5). And she sometimes speaks of the ‘representational acts’ and 
‘activity’ of the deliberator (2007). But these descriptions give us no insight into why the 
decision process counts as something ‘I’ implement, or why forming beliefs appears as an 
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activity at all—and so why an agent might appear free to form different beliefs. Even if we 
think of deliberation as merely a changing stock of evidence, we still haven’t identified why 
such changes appear possible.  
 
I suspect Velleman, Joyce, and Ismael are relying on some combination of desire-
responsiveness and a primitive apparent psychological ability to form different beliefs. If 
agents appear able to form different beliefs (unconstrained by evidence), and yet still end up 
with justified beliefs, this might explain their apparent freedom. But even if we grant a 
primitive apparent ability, epistemic justification no longer plays a role in explaining apparent 
freedom. Epistemic freedom becomes redundant. Once agents have a primitive apparent 
ability to form different beliefs, this is just a primitive apparent ability to decide in different 
ways. No further explanation of our freedom in deliberation is required. Justification may 
still play a role in explaining why these states count as beliefs. But to explain apparent 
freedom, we have no reason to adopt an unconstraint account over an account that simply 
grants us a primitive apparent ability to decide. Ignorance accounts avoid this problem 
because they appeal to epistemic possibility and other epistemic conditions to explain how 
an agent seems free to decide in different ways.  
 
3.5 Fichtean Insights 
If I’m right, identifying decisions as beliefs does not lead to a plausible unconstraint account 
of our apparent freedom in deliberation. Even if agents can form self-fulfilling or self-
constituting beliefs unconstrained by evidence and do nothing wrong in forming them, 
epistemic features do not explain how agents seem free to form them. If identifying decisions 
as beliefs does not explain our apparent freedom in deliberation, we might expect to find 
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other accounts that also identify decisions as beliefs, but that don’t take epistemic features to 
explain apparent freedom. There are such accounts. I end this chapter by briefly considering 
the lessons we can draw from them.  
 
Some accounts that identify decisions as beliefs are found in contemporary philosophy of 
action. Hampshire and Hart (1958) take decisions to entail beliefs that are not formed on the 
basis of evidence, but on the basis of (practical) reasons. But, unlike defenders of 
unconstraint accounts, they don’t take features of these beliefs to explain our apparent 
freedom to decide. Pears (1968) comes close to taking intentions and decisions to be partly 
constituted by beliefs. But he doesn’t think we form these beliefs unconstrained by evidence, 
but based on knowledge of our desires. And he doesn’t take our justification to form these 
beliefs to explain our apparent freedom. Pears, Hampshire and Hart primarily use relations 
between decision and belief to explain our knowledge of our future actions. On none of 
their accounts do epistemic conditions explain our apparent freedom to decide.  
 
Another example of an account that identifies decisions as beliefs comes from a rather 
surprising place—the German Idealist tradition. Johann Gottlieb Fichte argues for an 
equivalence between thinking and willing in choice. His account is a particularly neat 
illustration of why identifying decisions as beliefs does not explain our apparent freedom in 
deliberation. Fichte begun his philosophical career as an interpreter of Kant, agreeing with 
much of Kant’s system. But he believed Kant’s first two critique had wrongly separated 
theoretical reason (reason about what is the case) from practical reason (for Fichte, 
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reasoning about what ought to be the case)—suggesting a disunified picture of reason.78 
Fichte attempted to provide a unified account of practical and theoretical reason, particularly 
in his Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo ([1796/99] 1992, hereafter Wnm).79  
 
There are various ways in which Fichte attempted to unify practical and theoretical reason. 
The most important for our purposes is that Fichte aimed to show that practical activities 
were equally (in some sense) theoretical activities, just looked at from a different point of 
view. Along the way, he argued that this unity between practical and theoretical reason was 
actually demonstrated in consciousness, by an equivalence in deliberation between acts of 
willing and acts of thinking of willing. Effectively, Fichte argues for an equivalence between 
decisions and beliefs in decisions, anticipating Joyce’s and Ismael’s claim that decisions are 
self-constituting beliefs. However, unlike Joyce, Ismael and Velleman, Fichte does not take 
the equivalence between decision and belief to support a reduction of decision to belief, or 
an explanation of freedom in epistemic terms. In fact, Fichte couldn’t be clearer about the 
kind of radical freedom that his account presupposed.  
 
Here’s how Fichte conceives of deliberation. Deliberation involves a kind of openness and 
uncertainty, as the ‘I’ (roughly the rational mind, or reason itself) oscillates between various 
options. When decision occurs, the oscillation ceases, and the I becomes fixed on a single 
option. ‘In an act of willing, I seize control of my wandering thoughts and restrict them to a 
single point’ (Wnm, p. 126). This is ‘a process of voluntary limitation, inasmuch as one 
                                                
78 Fichte would also be critical of the perspectivalist accounts (chapter 2, section 2.5) that separated practical 
and theoretical perspectives. 
79 The title roughly translates as ‘Theory of Scientific Knowledge after a New Method’, ‘science’ indicating all 
systematic forms of knowledge. Fichte presented this account in lectures, repeated over the winter semesters 
1796−1799, two transcripts of which have survived: Kraus and Halle (see editor’s introduction). Page 
references are to the Kraus transcript, except where noted. 
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focuses one’s will upon a single new object’ (Wnm, p. 124). Crucially, this restriction is 
equally an act of thinking and an act of willing: ‘Through the act of thinking of willing, I will; 
and because I will, I think of the act of willing’ (Wnm, Halle p. 114). Acts of thinking and 
willing appear as equivalent: ‘the act of willing is not separated within consciousness from 
the act of thinking of willing’ (Wnm Halle, p. 15). As philosophers observing the activities of 
the I we can separate the two acts, but for the I they appear as one (Wnm, pp. 182−3). 
 
Much more would need to be said in order to lay out the full workings of Fichte’s system. I 
use this brief outline to make only two points. Firstly, taking decisions and beliefs to be 
equivalent is not enough to reduce one to the other. Velleman explicitly uses an equivalence 
of belief and decision to reduce practical to theoretical reason, part of his general project of 
explaining deliberation in epistemic terms (1989a, pp. 10−11). But unless one has prior 
reason to be suspicious of decisions, even a complete functional equivalence between them 
is not enough to imply that one reduces to the other. Fichte uses an equivalence between 
decision and belief to support a unity of practical and theoretical reason, not reduction. 
 
Secondly, and more importantly for our purposes, an equivalence between decision and 
belief does not provide an unconstraint explanation of our (apparent) freedom in 
deliberation. We still need to account for a freedom to believe. Fichte for the most part 
agrees with Velleman, Joyce and Ismael that decisions are beliefs (given how things appear in 
consciousness). And he agrees that we do nothing epistemically wrong in forming such 
beliefs—he is concerned throughout with distinctly rational activities of the mind. But Fichte 
also explicitly presupposes that the I is free to act in various ways. This freedom is at work in 
all rational acts of thinking, believing and willing: ‘Your thinking is, for you, an acting’ 
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([1797/98] 1994, p. 522). Fichte indeed characterises the I as a kind of spontaneous rational 
activity, an activity not governed by mechanistic laws ([1797/98] 1994, p. 439).80 And it is 
precisely this freedom that is exercised when the I settles on a single option in deliberation. 
The movement from oscillation to settling may be thought of in practical terms (as the 
willing of an action) or theoretical terms (as thinking of a willing). But in either case, the I 
must be free to act in the relevant way.  
 
I’m not arguing that Velleman, Joyce and Ismael presuppose that agents are radically free in 
the way Fichte supposes them to be. But they must account for some sense in which agents 
are, or appear, free to form different beliefs. Fichte’s account highlights the explanatory gap 
in unconstraint accounts. And the need for a further kind of freedom undercuts the attempt 
to explain apparent freedom merely in terms of our justification to form different beliefs. If we 
grant agents a freedom to form different beliefs, and beliefs are decisions, no further 
explanation is required to explain our apparent freedom to decide in different ways.  
 
That said, there are ways in which Velleman, Joyce and Ismael do appeal to similar kinds of 
freedom as Fichte. While Velleman claims agents don’t have metaphysical freedom (1989b, p. 
73), as we saw, he thinks agents will seem free to form beliefs that go against complete 
evidence that entirely settles what they will do (1989a, pp. 150, 153). This is, at least, very 
close to an apparent metaphysical freedom. I also noted above (section 3.4) that Joyce and 
Velleman might appeal to the fact that agents form beliefs in response to their desires, or 
what they judge their best options to be, in order to explain their apparent freedom to 
                                                
80 These quotes are from the published introductions Fichte revised out of his 1796/99 lectures. Similar 
remarks are found in the lectures, where Fichte contrasts his own idealism with ‘dogmatism’, the attempt to 
explain rational activities of the mind using mechanistic laws (Wnm Halle, pp. 21−2). 
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believe. Fichte’s account suggests an additional reason for rejecting this route. Fichte uses 
our responsiveness to practical reasons to unify practical and theoretical reason in something 
practical. Responsiveness to judgments about practical norms (or desires) is, if anything, 
characteristic of practical reason. It doesn’t explain our practical freedom in theoretical or 
epistemic terms. Overall, while Fichte’s account shares important features in common with 
unconstraint accounts, it helps demonstrate why unconstraint accounts don’t explain 
apparent freedom in deliberation in epistemic or theoretical terms.  
 
Conclusion 
In chapter 2, I presented an epistemic model of deliberation based in ignorance conditions. 
An agent must be ignorant of what she will decide and do if she is to reasonably deliberate. 
And I argued that the model was enough to characterise deliberation and explain an agent’s 
apparent freedom in deliberation. This model faces attacks from various quarters. 
Competing ignorance accounts argue that agents can properly have no degrees of beliefs in 
what they will decide and do as they deliberate (Levi, Price). I’ve argued against this 
requirement. Even if such degrees of belief are hard to measure, they serve a useful function, 
and agents should not forgo them. Competing perspectival accounts argue that agents 
presume their decisions have no causal history, or are otherwise evidentially severed from 
states of affairs causally upstream (Price). But these accounts rely too closely on causal 
notions to be suitable for explaining causation and causal asymmetry. 
 
The most serious challenges to my ignorance-based model of deliberation come from 
unconstraint accounts (Velleman, Joyce, Ismael). According to these accounts, agents are 
justified in forming different beliefs in what they will do or decide unconstrained by 
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evidence. This is what explains their apparent freedom. These accounts are competitors to 
ignorance accounts (contra Price). However, they turn out not to explain our apparent 
freedom in deliberation in epistemic terms. They mistakenly imply agents have apparent 
freedom even over evidence-based beliefs. And they rely on a mistaken notion of 
justification—agents aren’t justified in forming beliefs unconstrained by evidence. 
Underlying these troubles, unconstraint accounts presuppose an apparent ability to believe in 
different ways. But, under these accounts, this just is an apparent ability to decide in different 
ways. If so, epistemic unconstraint does no work in explaining our freedom to decide. 
Altogether, if we’re to explain causation by appeal to deliberation, the epistemic model 
remains the most promising epistemic account. In the following two chapters, I turn to the 





Accounting for Causation 
…man looks at nature from his own point of view; not the point of view of a thinker, anxious to find out the 
truth about nature as it is in itself, but the point of view of a practical agent, anxious to find out how he can 
manipulate nature for the achieving of his own ends.  
R. G. Collingwood (1940, p. 310) 
 
In chapter 1, I introduced Russell’s challenge: given that causes do not feature in 
fundamental physics, and do not necessitate their effects, how should we understand 
causation? In this chapter, I answer this challenge. I use the epistemic model of deliberation 
developed in chapter 2 to construct a deliberative account of causation, according to which 
causal relations correspond to the evidential relations we use in deliberation when we decide 
on one thing in order to achieve another. I defend this account in the form of a 
biconditional: A is a cause of B if and only if an agent’s deciding on A for the sake of B in 
proper deliberation evidentially settles B. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 1, I set out three desiderata on accounts of 
causation: an account must explain why causation should matter to agents, how agents can 
apparently intervene to make use of causal relations, and how causation relates to 
fundamental laws. In sections 2 and 3 I argue that prominent interventionist and reductive 
counterfactual accounts of causation do not adequately satisfy these desiderata. In section 4 I 
develop the deliberative account of causation and argue that it satisfies these desiderata. 
Causation is useful because causal relations correspond to the evidential relations required 
for effective decision-making. Agents justifiably take it they can intervene because their 
evidence leaves open how they decide, yet their decisions evidentially settle their results. And 
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causation relates to fundamental laws because fundamental laws are required for evidential 
reasoning. In section 5, I go on to consider the metaphysical upshots of the deliberative 
account. I argue that the account need not reduce causal relations to evidential relations. But 
it does constrain first-order metaphysical accounts and can justify why the relations they pick 
out deserve to be called causal. The deliberative account can in fact be used to support a 
variety of projects, while still providing, in itself, a philosophically rich account of causation. 
In section 6, I argue that the deliberative account also avoids problems with circularity that 
have troubled other agent-based accounts.  
 
4.1 Three Desiderata on Accounts of Causation 
What do we need from an account of causation? In chapter 1 I considered a challenge from 
Russell (1912−13): when we look at how fundamental physical theories are formulated, 
causal terms don’t feature. What we have instead are dynamical equations relating whole 
states of systems across times—causal information is neither required by the theory nor 
directly identifiable from the theory. I took the important upshot of Russell’s challenge to be 
that while we might not want to eliminate causal talk altogether, we need to look somewhere 
other than predictions and derivations of fundamental physics to understand how causation 
fits into a scientific picture of the world. 
 
One influential response to Russell’s challenge has been to tie causation to counterfactual 
reasoning, effective manipulation and control. Causes are responsible for their effects, in the 
sense that if the cause hadn’t occurred, the effect would not have occurred either, and so we 
can manipulate an effect by manipulating its causes. While not all causes need be 
 120 
manipulable in this way, causal talk has its natural home in our interactions and interventions 
in the world: not in observing things happen, but in making them happen.  
 
This line of thought is found in early manipulationist accounts of causation, including those 
by R. G. Collingwood, Georg von Wright and Douglas Gasking. I began this chapter with a 
quote from Collingwood, in which he directly ties one sense of causation to taking up ‘the 
point of view of a practical agent, anxious to find out how he can manipulate nature for the 
achieving of his own ends’ (1940, p. 310). Von Wright develops this idea into a formula 
relating causation and manipulation: ‘p is a cause of relative to q, and q an effect relative to p, 
if and only if by doing p we could bring about q or by suppressing p we could remove q or 
prevent it from happening’ (1971, p. 70, my emphasis). Gasking (1955) defends a similar 
view.  
 
More recent defenders of manipulationist accounts make less use of agential notions, like 
action and ends, but still maintain the importance of causation for making practical 
decisions. Cartwright, for example, argues that causal notions are ineliminable because ‘they 
are needed to ground the distinction between effective strategies and ineffective ones’ (1979, 
p. 420). Similarly Woodward, whose account I turn to shortly, claims ‘our interest in causal 
relationships and explanation initially grows out of a highly practical interest human beings 
have in manipulation and control’ (2003, p. 10). Understanding causation in terms of 
manipulation, control and counterfactuals has presented itself as a promising route to 
answering Russell’s challenge.  
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Moreover, it seems that understanding the practical import of causation is not just one way 
to answer Russell’s challenge. Given the way we use causal information in practical and 
scientific life, an account of causation owes us an explanation of how causation plays this 
role. We use causal information in order to decide polices, behaviour and strategies—we 
work out what kind of effects our actions will have in order to decide on the right actions. 
We need to distinguish causal relationships from those that merely allow us to make good 
predictions. This is why we have the familiar refrain “correlation does not imply causation”. 
An account of causation needs to address Russell’s challenge in a way that makes sense of 
the practical import of causation. Hartry Field even describes answering this challenge as 
‘probably the central problem in the metaphysics of causation’ (2003, p. 443).  
 
With these points in mind, here is a first desideratum on accounts of causation: an account 
should make sense of how causation and knowledge of causal relations help agents achieve 
their ends. I call this the ‘pragmatic requirement’. While causation might play other roles, it 
must be relevant for agents attempting to manipulate the world. This pragmatic requirement 
is similar to Mellor’s means−end aspect of causation (1988, p. 231) and shares features in 
common with Price and Weslake’s ‘practical relevance constraint’ (2009). Note that the 
pragmatic requirement doesn’t imply we can make use of every causal relation. It requires 
causation and knowledge of causal structure to be useful in general.  
 
This first desideratum leads natural to a second: an account of causation should explain how 
causation is accessible to agents—how agents can (or justifiably take it they can) intervene in 
the world so as to manipulate causes. Causation should not be a useful but inaccessible tool. 
Whatever notion of intervention is appealed to in an account of causation should be relevant 
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for what agents can do. A counterfactual account, for example, must explain how agents can 
(or justifiably take it they can) bring about counterfactual antecedents. The desideratum is 
partly motivated by concerns about agency raised in chapter 1 (section 1.2). Given that 
fundamental laws perfectly account for the movements of everything at the fundamental 
level, how does it seem we can intervene in the world? If it were obvious how agents could 
intervene on causes, we wouldn’t need an explanation. But it’s not obvious at all. 
 
A third desideratum arises directly from Russell’s challenge: accounts of causation should 
explain how causation relates to fundamental physical laws. Russell argued that causation has 
no clear place in fundamental physics. So it seems we have two different systems for 
describing the world: one in terms of physical laws, the other in terms of causes. Given these 
systems are about the very same world, we should be able to say something clear and 
perspicuous about how they relate. At the very least, we should be able to show that law-
based and cause-based systems are compatible, such that we won’t be lead astray by using 
both kinds. This desideratum could be met by explaining causation in terms of laws, or vice 
versa—we’ll see examples of both kinds of strategy below.  
 
Overall, an account of causation should meet three desiderata. It should explain: 
1) how causation is useful to agents (the pragmatic requirement); 
2) how causation is accessible to agents; 
3) how causation relates to fundamental laws.  
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4.2 Interventionist Accounts 
I’ll now consider how some prominent accounts of causation fare with respect to the three 
desiderata. I begin with non-reductive interventionist accounts. These accounts make sense 
of causation in terms of manipulation and control—causes are a means of manipulating 
effects. These accounts are also explicitly non-reductive—they don’t aim to metaphysically 
or conceptually reduce causal relations to other relations. Defenders of this approach are at 
best agnostic on whether such reductions can be achieved, and argue causal concepts require 
neither explication nor grounding in non-causal relations. The focus is instead on exploring 
the connections between causal relations, counterfactuals and interventions. 
 
4.2a Pearl’s and Woodward’s Interventionist Accounts 
I’ll consider accounts from Judea Pearl (2000) and James Woodward (2003) and take them to 
be paradigmatic of interventionist accounts.81 We begin by representing the causal relata of a 
system using variables. The values these variables take could represent the occurrence or 
obtaining (or not) of particular events or states of affairs (Suzy’s actual throwing of the rock 
here and now). This may allow one to derive claims about singular or token-causation (see, 
for example, Woodward 2003, pp. 76−86). But more commonly the values represent generic 
states (Suzy’s throwing of a rock), which can only allow us to derive type-causation. We then 
make some causal assumptions about how different variables in the system relate to one 
another. For example, we might begin by assuming that A (a variable that takes the values 0 
or 1, depending on whether Suzy throws a rock) is a direct cause of B (a variable that takes 
values 0 or 1, depending on whether a nearby bottle smashes). We then represent this causal 
relation using a ‘structural equation’, such as: 
                                                
81 Cartwright (1979; 2003) and Spirtes, Glymore and Scheines (1993) also defend interventionist accounts, with 
slightly different technical details and metaphysical underpinnings.  
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B := A 
This equation tells us that if A were to take the value 0 (Suzy doesn’t throw a rock), B would 
also take the value 0 (the bottle doesn’t smash). If A were to take the value 1 (Suzy throws a 
rock), B would also take the value 1 (the bottle smashes). But the equation does not 
represent simply an equality between the values. The equation is asymmetric—this is why I 
have used the notation “:=”. A causally determines B, rather than the reverse. These structural 
equations capture qualitative or quantitative information about how B would change as a 
result of changes in A—although I will simplify to binary variables throughout. The 
qualitative information of the equation can also be represented using directed acyclic graphs. 
Figure 1 represents A as a direct cause of B: 
 
A   B  
Figure 1: Causal graph showing A as a direct cause of B. 
 
So far all we have is a single direct causal relation. The power of the interventionist approach 
comes when we consider more complex causal structures. Say Kyle has observed a 
correlation between C (his celebrating a birthday), D (his drinking alcohol) and E (his feeling 
euphoric). But he’s not sure whether this is due to direct causal relations between C and D 
and D and E (so that drinking causes his euphoria), or whether C is a common cause of both 
D and E (so that celebrating causes both drinking and euphoria). That is, he is not sure 
which of the following graphs (figures 2 and 3) represents the causal structure of the system. 
 
C   D   E  
Figure 2: Causal graph showing C as a direct cause of D and D as a direct cause of E. 
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  D 
C    
E 
Figure 3: Causal graph showing C as a common direct cause of D and E. 
 
In real life, we often use experiments to determine which of the figures correctly represents 
the causal structure of a system. Interventionist accounts take the causal structure of 
experimental testing to capture what it is for a direct causal relation to hold. To show how 
this works we need to introduce an intervention variable, represented by I. This is a variable 
(relative to D and E) that directly determines the value of D, through some exogenous causal 
process—a process that was not part of the original causal system. For example, Kyle might 
toss a coin toss to determine whether he drinks or not. This intervention ‘breaks’ the causal 
relation that held between C and D, so that it is now I (the coin toss) that determines the 
value of D, rather than C (his celebrating).82 The intervention is also ‘surgical’, in the sense 
that it leaves other causal relations intact.83 Figures 4 and 5 show how interventions are 





                                                
82 One can also introduce functional or probabilistic interventions, where the value of I only partially 
determines D, or determines its probability distribution—see Pearl (2000, p. 70 ff.).  
83 Pearl and Woodward have slightly different requirements on interventions. Say we introduce an intervention 
on X (relative to Y) to see whether X causes Y. Woodward allows other causal relations to be changed, but 
requires the intervention to be statistically independent of any variable Z that causes the Y and that is on a causal 
path that does not go through X (2003, p. 98). Pearl requires the intervention variable on X (with respect to Y) 
to be causally independent of variables that cause Y (that are not on a directed path between X and Y) (2000, p. 
70). Woodward’s complaint is that this condition takes qualitative causal relations between X and Y for granted 
(2003, pp. 38, 110). 
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      I  
C         /  D   E  
Figure 4: Causal graph showing an intervention on D, given the causal structure in figure 2. The 
causal relation between C and D is now broken. 
 
 
      I 
  D 
C    
 E 
Figure 5: Causal graph showing an intervention on D, given the causal structure in figure 3. 
 
Say Kyle wants to know whether he can experience euphoria more often by celebrating more 
birthdays or by drinking more often. He can use the coin-toss intervention to find out. If his 
feeling euphoric remains correlated with drinking, even when his drinking is determined by 
the coin toss, this suggests the causal structure in figure 2. He can drink to feel euphoric. But 
if his feeling euphoric is no longer correlated with drinking when he intervenes on drinking, 
this suggests the causal structure in figure 3. He can only celebrate to feel euphoric. 
 
Woodward and Pearl take experiments like Kyle’s to be ways of testing the truth of 
interventionist counterfactuals—counterfactuals about what would happen to one variable 
(E) if another variable were to be changed by an intervention (D). But it is the 
interventionist counterfactuals themselves that give us necessary and sufficient conditions on 
causal relations, and provide elucidation of what it is for D to cause E. While the actual 
experiments may be evidence for these counterfactuals, we may always get things wrong—
particularly since causal assumptions are required to determine what counts as an 
/ 
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intervention. Furthermore, interventionist counterfactuals may still be true, and we can still 
have evidence concerning them, even when the appropriate experiments cannot be done. So 
there may be causal relations even when interventions have not or cannot be performed. 
Nor do interventions need to performed by human agents—natural processes can also be 
interventions, provided they satisfy the appropriate causal conditions.  
 
These interventionist counterfactuals are ‘cause-involving counterfactuals’ because their 
meaning and evaluation is causally-laden throughout. In evaluating these counterfactuals, we 
must introduce intervention processes that are causally characterised, and keep other 
relevant causal relations intact. The causal aspects of the counterfactuals cannot be 
eliminated. It is for this reason that interventionist accounts are non-reductive: they do not 
attempt to reduce causal relations to non-causal ones or elucidate causal concepts in non-
causal terms. Nevertheless, these accounts do aim to give non-trivial necessary and sufficient 
conditions on what it is for any particular causal relation to hold, and, in Woodward’s case, 
conditions that only appeal to causal information concerning other variables. 
 
Woodward and Pearl agree for the most part on the formal aspects of their accounts. But 
they disagree on the underlying metaphysics. Pearl takes the structural equations to represent 
autonomous physical causal mechanisms. These are the primitives of his account, not the 
counterfactuals (2000, pp. 22, 37). It is partly because he commits to this underlying 
metaphysics that Pearl characterises intervention slightly differently from Woodward.84 
Woodward does not specify any primitives—not interventions, direct causal relations or 
counterfactuals. Woodward is at best agnostic on the underlying metaphysics. While he 
                                                
84 See footnote 82, p. 125. 
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argues that interventionist counterfactuals are objective, and do not depend on our abilities 
or psychology, he claims his theory is ‘modest and…commits us to no particular 
metaphysical picture of the “truth makers” for causal claims’ (2003, pp. 121−2). 
 
4.2b Evaluating Interventionist Accounts 
Various concerns have been raised with interventionist accounts.85 I will only consider how 
they fare with respect to the three desiderata above. Regarding the pragmatic requirement, 
Woodward is sensitive to the fact that an account of causation should explain why causation 
matters to agents (2003, p. 28):  
What is the point of our having a notion of causation (as opposed to, say, a notion of 
correlation) at all? What role or function does this concept play in our lives? An 
important part of the appeal of a manipulability account of causation is that it 
provides a more straightforward and plausible answer to this question than its 
competitors.  
 
Woodward takes the benefit of causal knowledge to ‘have to do with manipulation and 
control’ (2003, pp. 18−9). If causal relations are ‘potentially exploitable for purposes of 
manipulation, there is no mystery about why we should care about them’ (2003, p. 7, cf. p. 
138). Pearl makes similar claims (2000, p. 337). 
 
Woodward and Pearl claim that interventionist counterfactuals are relevant for manipulation 
and control. This might explain why we should care about interventionist-causation. But if 
this explanation is to be anything but trivial, they must give us an independent specification of 
manipulation and control, and show how causation, explicated in interventionist terms, 
latches on to these. And this is not how the explanation proceeds. Instead, what we have is a 
                                                
85 See, for example, Hall (2007), Strevens (2007), Weslake (2006) and Beebee, Hitchcock and Price (2015).  
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specification of manipulation and control in terms of interventionist counterfactuals, and the 
very same explication of causation in terms of interventionist counterfactuals. Woodward and 
Pearl simply assume that their particular explications of manipulation and control pick up on 
useful relations. But if one is worried that interventionist counterfactuals are not latching 
onto useful structure, it is no comfort to be told that the structure they latch onto is useful 
because it consists of interventionist counterfactuals. The usefulness of these interventionist 
counterfactuals is precisely what’s in question. If manipulation and control are explicated in 
exactly the same way that causation is, we don’t have a sufficient response to the pragmatic 
requirement. The concern is not that the account involves causes in the counterfactuals, and 
so doesn’t reduce causation to non-causal relations. The concern is that a justification that 
appeals to the very same causally-characterised types of manipulation and control each time 
is too small a circle to be philosophically illuminating. It gives us no independent grasp of 
why causation, understood in these particular causal terms, is useful to agents. Similar points 
are made in Weslake (2006) and Price and Weslake (2009). 
 
A similar concern arises regarding the second desideratum: explaining how agents can, or 
justifiably take it they can, intervene in the relevant sense. Interventionist accounts simply 
take it for granted that agents have (or justifiably take themselves to have) causal powers to 
intervene in the world, in the sense required to make use of interventionist counterfactuals. 
Woodward, for example, claims (2003, p. 150): 
Human beings often are (and are justified in believing that they are) in situations in 
which they can perform actions affecting some variable X meeting the conditions 
…on interventions set out above, and in which their interest is in knowing what will 
happen to some other variable Y under such an intervention. 
 
Pearl also presumes agents can intervene when he explains how children acquire causal 
 130 
knowledge: ‘a child can infer that shaking a toy can produce a rattling sound because it is the 
child’s hand, governed solely by the child’s volition, that brings about the shaking of the toy’ 
(2000, p. 253). But he doesn’t consider why the shaking of a toy or the child’s volition 
should satisfy conditions on intervention. Recall, the conditions on intervention put forward 
by Pearl and Woodward are precise and technical, designed to yield causal relations from 
statistical data and causal assumptions. Why should we think our ordinary, everyday actions, 
in pursuit of goals, are likely to satisfy these causal and statistical assumptions? Neither 
Woodward nor Pearl explains this.  
 
The closest Pearl comes to accounting for the relation between interventions and actions is 
to simply take agents to have a primitive ability to intervene in the world (2000, pp. 108−9). 
Pearl distinguishes between acts, which are conceived of ‘from the outside’ as mere events in 
the world with causal antecedents, and actions, which are conceived of ‘from the inside’ as 
options contemplated in deliberation. He claims that actions ‘can neither be predicted nor 
provide evidence since (by definition) they are pending deliberation and tum into acts once 
executed’ (2000, p. 108). Actions are ‘objects of free choice’ and ‘change the probabilities 
that acts normally obey’ (2000, p. 109).86 If agents do have a primitive ability to intervene, 
this is why ‘actions’ have the unusual evidential relations they do. But he doesn’t explain why 
actions should be characterised in this way, or how agents have (or take themselves to have) 
primitive abilities to intervene. So his account doesn’t satisfy the second desideratum.  
 
Perhaps the strongest response Woodward and Pearl can make to the pragmatic requirement 
and the second desideratum is to appeal to experimentation. It is, after all, through 
                                                
86 On this point, Pearl comes very close to Price’s perspectivalism—see chapter 3, section 3.1d.  
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experiments that we come to have evidence of interventionist counterfactuals. As far as we 
take experiments to involve instances of manipulation and control, we have reason to think 
that the counterfactuals we reason to using experiments also pick up on relations of 
manipulation and control. And so we must be able to intervene in the way required to test 
for causal claims. Here I am reversing the order of explanation in Woodward’s account 
(2003, p. 35). But this is at most a transcendental justification that the structure is to some 
degree useful and accessible. It gives us no direct insight into why this particular 
counterfactual structure is relevant. 
 
Furthermore, without a deeper understanding of what is going on in experiments, it is 
unclear why the causal claims extend from experimental situations in which agents do 
intervene, to situations in which they don’t or can’t. What reason do we have to think that 
experimentation latches onto a structure that holds throughout? While Woodward, for 
example, acknowledges that the interventionist account rests on there being an appropriate 
domain in which we can evaluate interventionist counterfactuals (2003, p. 314), he offers no 
explicit guidelines what constitutes such a domain. It might seem that Pearl answers this 
challenge because he is clearer about the metaphysical underpinnings of his theory. Perhaps 
the existence of fundamental autonomous causal mechanisms can explain how experimental 
testing leads to generally useful causal relations. Pearl claims that we expect causal relations 
to be stable because they are ‘ontological, describing objective physical constraints in our 
world’ (2000, p. 25). But, once again, since these fundamental causal mechanisms are 
specified entirely in terms of interventionist counterfactuals, we have no independent 
justification for their use. So we still don’t answer the pragmatic requirement. 
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To answer my concerns, it would help interventionist accounts if they could secure a 
connection between interventionist counterfactuals and fundamental laws. After all, 
fundamental laws are typically taken to hold universally and support counterfactuals. 
Fundamental laws could help explain how we extend causal claims across different domains. 
And they could also help explain why autonomy assumptions are justified—why the 
operation of one causal mechanism is independent of another. For example, one could 
appeal to the fact that electromagnetic force declines with distance and the spatial separation 
of various parts of a system to justify why changing the charge on one part of a system won’t 
affect the relations in another part. Woodward does appeal to fundamental laws to explain 
how we evaluate counterfactuals with physically impossible antecedents (2003, pp. 129−130). 
But perhaps fundamental laws have wider significance for interventionist accounts. This 
brings us to consider the third desideratum: relating causation to fundamental laws. 
 
Even though appealing to fundamental laws would help interventionist accounts, these 
accounts don’t do well at satisfying the third desideratum. Woodward explicitly denies that 
‘there must be a law of nature “underlying” or “backing” all true causal claims’ (2003, p. 
147). While he allows that there may be ‘underlying’ laws of nature, he takes it that this 
would be a contingent empirical discovery, and should not be part of an account of 
causation. Fundamental physical laws only feature in Woodward’s account as generalisations 
that are invariant across a wider than usual range of interventions and background 
conditions—invariant in the sense that even if background conditions change, the 
generalisation still holds. Fundamental laws are the most invariant generalisations (2003, p. 
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240).87 For example, ‘we may think of the gravitational inverse square law as codifying 
information about exactly how manipulations that change the distance between two masses 
or the magnitudes of the masses themselves will change the gravitational force they exert on 
each other’ (Woodward 2003, p. 67). This functional relation will be relatively stable even if 
other forces or bodies are introduced to the system. So it counts as a fundamental law.  
 
But this approach does not adequately relate causation to fundamental laws. Firstly, it 
doesn’t capture one of the key features of fundamental laws—their universality. The 
invariance of a relation is always taken to be relative to a particular system (2003, p. 251). If 
‘particular system’ is significant at all, fundamental laws can’t be both universal and identified 
with a single invariant generalisation. The fact that a law covers many or all such systems is 
in fact irrelevant to its being a generalisation that is highly invariant in any particular system. 
Secondly, even if fundamental laws can be adequately characterised as invariant 
generalisations, this approach doesn’t relate fundamental laws to causal relations in non-
fundamental systems. This is because all interventionist counterfactuals are relativised to a 
particular set of variables or causal mechanisms, and there is no attempt to explain how we 
can move between one system and another, or how generalisations that hold in one system 
can be used to give counterfactuals that hold in another. Even if fundamental laws could be 
characterised as invariant generalisations, this wouldn’t secure any connection between 
higher-level interventionist counterfactuals and fundamental laws.  
                                                
87 Pearl takes fundamental laws to be completely invariant, even though their relevance to any given causal 
mechanism can change (2000, p. 210). Woodard takes fundamental laws to be only relatively invariant. But it’s 
consistent with Woodward’s view that the fundamental laws are completely invariant. The examples of only 
relatively invariant ‘fundamental laws’ from general relativity and quantum mechanics that Woodward gives 
aren’t in fact candidate fundamental laws. 
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Nor does appealing to Pearl’s primitive causal mechanisms help. The problem simply 
becomes one of relating or reconciling primitive causal mechanisms with fundamental laws, 
a problem Pearl does not address, except with regard to causal asymmetry (see chapter 5, 
section 5.1a). Some of these concerns might be less pressing if interventionist accounts at 
least secured consistency between fundamental laws and causation. But they don’t. Some of 
these counterfactuals are explicitly taken to involve nomologically or physically impossible 
interventions (Woodward 2003, pp. 129−30).  
 
Overall, interventionist accounts from Pearl and Woodward don’t adequately answer the 
three desiderata on accounts of causation. They don’t give us adequate insight into why we 
should care about causation, how it’s accessible to us, and how causation relates to 
fundamental laws. Interventionist accounts are still interesting and explanatory, and do 
useful work relating various types of causal relations and counterfactuals to one another. 
These accounts succeed at many of their own aims. But they don’t provide the kind of 
philosophical justification and elucidation of causation that could answer Russell’s challenge.  
 
4.3 Reductive Counterfactual Accounts 
Reductive counterfactual accounts attempt to reduce causal relations to counterfactuals that 
can be evaluated without reference to causation. They aim to reduce causation to non-causal 
regularities (such as fundamental laws) and contingent features, using counterfactuals as a 
half-way step. So they may provide what interventionist accounts don’t—a relation between 
causation and fundamental laws and a way into the causal framework. Both interventionist 
and reductive accounts relate causation to counterfactuals. But only reductive accounts aim 
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to eliminate reference to causation altogether. Perhaps they can do better at satisfying the 
desiderata? 
 
4.3a Lewis’ Counterfactual Account 
I’ll take David Lewis’ well-developed and popular account to be paradigmatic of reductive 
counterfactual accounts (1973a; 1973b; 1979a; 1979b; 1986).88 Under Lewis’ account, c 
counterfactually depends on b if and only if were b to occur, c would occur and if b were not to 
occur, c would not occur, where b and c are two distinct particular events. Counterfactual 
dependence is sufficient for causation, but not necessary. What is necessary is a chain of 
counterfactual dependencies between events that connects the two events in question. There 
need not be direct counterfactual dependence of one event on the other. 
 
Lewis takes the causal relata to be events, a standard view influentially defended by 
Davidson (1980). In contrast, as we saw, interventionists like Woodward take the causal 
relata to be ‘variables, or more precisely…changes in the values of variables’ (2003, p. 112, 
emphasis removed). The values these variables take need not represent events. Lewis’ 
account is also token-level and concerns particular events, rather than event-types (1973a, p. 
558). Interventionist accounts are primarily type-level. My own view is closer to 
interventionist accounts on both these points. I’ll later take causation to be primarily type-
level and the relata to be states of affairs, represented by propositions. But for the moment I 
will simply evaluate Lewis’ account as a theory of causation between particular token events. 
 
                                                
88 In the next chapter I also discuss statistical-mechanical accounts that derive from Lewis’. I don’t discuss 
Lewis’ later analysis of causation in terms of influence (2000).  
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Under Lewis’ account whether b counterfactually depends on c depends on the truth of two 
counterfactuals: were b to occur, c would occur and if b were not to occur, c would not occur. 
Lewis relies on a comparative similarity ordering between possible worlds to evaluate these 
counterfactuals. A counterfactual is true (at the actual world) just in case either (1) there are 
no possible worlds in which the antecedent is true or (2) among worlds in which the 
antecedent is true, the consequent is true in at least one world closer to the actual world than 
any in which the consequent is false. By stipulation, no world is closer to the actual world 
than the actual world. So one of the counterfactuals we need to evaluate will be true or false 
merely in virtue of how the actual world is. For example, if both b and c occur, the 
counterfactual if b were to occur c would occur is trivially true. To evaluate the other 
counterfactual, we need to consider worlds where b does not occur, and determine whether c 
occurs. If a world where c does not occur is closer than any in which c does occur, the 
second counterfactual is true and c counterfactually and causally depends on b.  
 
To evaluate non-trivial counterfactuals, we need to look to the comparative similarity 
ordering between worlds. Lewis takes this ordering to be a metaphysical primitive. However, 
in response to concerns from Fine (1975) and Bennett (1974), he identifies standards by 
which similarity is to be evaluated. Two of these standards are formal stipulations: each 
world is closest to itself, and any two worlds are comparable for closeness (still allowing for 
ties) (1973a, p. 560). The remaining standards for evaluating similarity are as follows, in order 
of importance (1979a, p. 472):  
 
(1) …avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law. 
(2) …maximize the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect match of 
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particular fact prevails. 
(3) …avoid even small, localized simple violations of law. 
(4) It is of little or no importance secure approximate similarity of particular fact, even 
in matters that concern us greatly. 
 
Lewis intends these standard to pick out nearby worlds with a certain characteristic 
structure—one that hopefully allows the counterfactuals to deliver causal relations that 
correspond to our ordinary causal intuitions. For example, consider the counterfactual: if 
Nixon had pressed the button, a nuclear holocaust would have occurred. Lewis describes the 
nearby world w1 to the actual world (w0) as follows (1979a, p. 468) (see figure 6): 
Until shortly before t, w1 is exactly like w0. The two match perfectly in every detail of 
particular fact, however minute. Shortly before t, however, the spatio-temporal 
region of perfect match comes to an end as w1 and w0 begin to diverge. The 
deterministic laws of w0 are violated at w1 in some simple, localized, inconspicuous 
way. A tiny miracle takes place. Perhaps a few extra neurons fire in some corner of 
Nixon’s brain. As a result of this, Nixon presses the button. With no further miracles 
events take their lawful course and the two worlds w1 and w0 go their separate ways. 
The holocaust takes place. From that point on, at least so far as the surface of this 
planet is concerned, the two worlds are not even approximately similar in matters of 
particular fact.  
 
More generally, the counterfactual antecedent is satisfied at w1 because a small miracle (a 
localised violation of the laws of w0) occurs just prior to time t, the time of the antecedent. 
Other than at this small miracle, the actual laws hold at all times in w1. The events at w1 are 
exactly the same as at w0 prior to the miracle, securing a large area of perfect spatio-temporal 





             w1 




   
        w0   
    time 
Figure 6: The differences between the actual world (w0) and a nearby counterfactual world (w1), given 
Lewis’ standards of similarity. The worlds match perfectly until just prior to time t, when a small 
miracle (*) takes place, leading to the satisfaction of the antecedent (not-b) and massive divergences 
thereafter.   
 
If the standards of similarity pick out worlds with this structure, Lewis’ account may be able 
to distinguish between cases where correlations are due to effects of a common cause (figure 
3, p. 125), or due to a direct causal relation (figure 2, p. 124). A perfect spatio-temporal 
match prior to the miracle means that the causes of b will be kept intact in the counterfactual 
world, while the effects of b may well be changed. If the causes of b are kept intact, as well as 
the laws (other than at the miracle), we may also be able to keep other effects of a common 
cause intact. These other effects will then not depend counterfactually on whether b occurs. c 
will only depend counterfactually on b, if b causes c. Or at least that is the hope. 
 
Lewis’ account shares feature in common with interventionist accounts: in evaluating 
whether b causes c, we consider what will happen in counterfactuals where b does not occur 
and see if this is correlated with changes in whether c occurs. But rather than considering an 
* 
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intervention that is itself a causal process, we have a small miracle that brings about b or not-
b. And rather than relying on direct causal relations to evaluate counterfactuals, Lewis relies 
on explicit standards, including keeping the fundamental laws (mostly) fixed.  
 
4.3b Evaluating Lewis’ Account 
A number of problems have been raised with Lewis’ account. Adam Elga (2001) argues that 
Lewis’ standards can’t deliver nearby worlds with the asymmetric temporal structure Lewis 
intends. I consider these concerns in the next chapter (section 5.1b). Concerns are more 
commonly raised about cases of late pre-emption, where it seems there is causation but no 
chain of counterfactual dependence. The classic example is Billy and Suzy throwing rocks 
(Hall 2004). Suzy throws a rock and it smashes the bottle. Billy also throws a rock, but his 
rock arrives after Suzy’s—too late to smash the bottle. If Suzy’s rock hadn’t shattered the 
bottle, Billy’s would have. So the bottle smashing doesn’t counterfactually depend on Suzy’s 
throw. Yet it seems Suzy’s throw is a cause of the bottle smashing. Moreover, unlike in early 
cases of pre-emption, there is no chain of counterfactual dependence between events 
connecting Suzy’s throw with the bottle smashing. For any event on the chain connecting 
Suzy’s throw with the bottle smashing, if that event had not occurred, the bottle still would 
have smashed, due to Billy’s rock.  
 
Paul and Hall (2013, ch. 3) give a useful overview of late pre-emption cases and the trouble 
they cause for counterfactual accounts. This trouble shouldn’t be too surprising. As we saw 
with Russell’s challenge, nothing less than information about every part of system is enough 
(given the laws) to guarantee an effect. Counterfactual accounts like Lewis’ inherit this 
feature, insofar as they hold the laws fixed (except at the occurrence of the miracle). Changes 
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anywhere in the system can contribute to whether an effect occurs. But if our intuitive 
judgments about causation are local (as Russell took them to be), we think changes at a 
distance from the putative cause (such as Billy’s throw) shouldn’t alter whether an event like 
Suzy’s throw counts as a cause. And so we will get a clash between our (local) intuitive and 
(global) counterfactual judgments.  
 
While my aim isn’t to defend Lewis’ account, my own account faces a similar concern, 
because I will also rely on counterfactuals. I won’t give a full response to the problem, but 
point towards what I take to be the right approach: take our intuitive local causal judgments 
to be only defeasible guides to causation. We should explain why our local causal judgments 
work as well as they do, but not attempt to recover the full structure of our intuitive causal 
reasoning. For example, we might explain why we intuitively and reasonably judge Suzy’s 
throw to be a cause of the bottle shattering by reference to the fact that our environment 
doesn’t typically contain competing rock throwers like Billy. Given our typical environments, 
we can explain why we have intuition that Suzy’s throw is a cause. But this isn’t a reason to 
reject a global counterfactual account that implies Suzy’s throw is not a cause (in the unusual 
circumstances where Billy is around). This strategy shares features in common with Pearl 
(2000, chs. 9−10), Hitchcock (2007), and the ‘de facto dependence account’ discussed by 
Paul and Hall (2013, p. 170). But, unlike some of these accounts, I don’t aim to give a 
correct account of what conditions are required for particular causal claims to hold. I take it 
the most we should aim for is an explanation of why make the causal judgments we do in 
particular cases. I am sympathetic to suggestions by Hitchcock (2007, p. 512) and Woodward 
(2003, p. 85), that the patterns of counterfactual dependence are what are most central to 
causation, not particular causal judgments.  
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Leaving pre-emption cases aside, it’s time to consider how Lewis’ account fares with respect 
to the three desiderata. By analysing causation and counterfactuals partly in terms of laws, 
Lewis’s account does better than interventionist accounts on the third desideratum: relating 
causation to fundamental laws. Fundamental laws are directly relevant for evaluating the 
counterfactuals that determine causal relations. Laws are kept intact at all points in the 
nearest counterfactual world, except at the time of the miracle.  These miracles are a source 
of problems, however. For example, Lewis is led to accept that we are able to do things such 
that, if we were to do them, a generality that is a law would not be a law (1979b, p. 115). 
While he denies that this counts as being able to break the laws, this is partly a verbal 
stipulation. We would do better on both these points if the method of evaluating 
counterfactuals did not require miracles.  
 
Are Lewisian miracles merely an optional part of the formalism? No. Miracles are closely tied 
to Lewis’ rejection of ‘backtracking counterfactuals’: counterfactuals where, if the antecedent 
had been different, events causally upstream of the antecedent would have been different. 
Excluding backtracking counterfactuals is what allows counterfactual dependence to track 
causal dependence, under Lewis’ account. For example, consider a case where low air 
pressure is a cause of a low barometer reading and a storm. Lewis rejects the relevant 
backtracking counterfactual, where the pressure depends on the reading of the barometer. 
Why?  
…[because] When something must give way to permit a higher reading [of the 
barometer], we find it less of a departure from actuality to hold the pressure fixed 
and sacrifice the accuracy, rather than vice versa. It is not hard to see why. The 
barometer, being more localized and more delicate than the weather, is more 
vulnerable to slight departures from actuality.  
(1973a, pp. 564−5) 
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Lewis recommends breaking the actual laws and introducing a small miracle that makes the 
barometer unreliable as an indicator of the pressure.89 The alternative is to hold fixed the 
laws and the correct functioning of the barometer—and have a backtracking counterfactual, 
as in Bennett (1984). But then we’d have counterfactual dependence, without causal 
dependence. Miracles are introduced in order to rule out backtracking counterfactuals. And 
so miracles (or something like them) are essential to the formalism. While neo-Lewisian 
accounts of causation aim to avoid violations of the fundamental laws, they share the same 
rejection of back-tracking counterfactuals. 
 
Given we have miracles, can we use them to make sense of an agent’s (apparent) ability to 
intervene—and answer the second desideratum? The prospects don’t look promising. 
Woodward’s and Pearl’s interventions were causal processes. Given agents might control 
such causal processes, there is some hope of connecting interventions to the activities or 
choices of agents. But Lewis’ miracles are not actual occurrences. They are events that, were 
they actual, the laws would not be what they are. Nor are they events that we can bring 
about. Lewis takes our abilities to be tied to what we can cause to be the case (1979b). If he 
didn’t make this restriction, our ability to bring about miracles would seem to imply that we 
can break the laws—a bad result, for Lewis.  
 
We could attempt to understand an agent’s apparent ability to intervene in terms of a power 
to bring about the counterfactual antecedents, and take the miracles to be an artefact of the 
formalism. But the problem with this move is that Lewis’ account gives us no guidance for 
why we take it we can bring about these antecedents. Overall, the account doesn’t help us 
                                                
89 Lewis’ argument for this point is hard to make out and to reconcile with his standards for similarity (1979a). 
Requiring simply small departure overall would lead one to keep the future relatively intact. 
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understand why causation is accessible agents, leaving it mysterious why we take ourselves to 
be able to intervene in they way required to make use of causal relations.  
 
Lewis’ account also has trouble meeting the first desideratum—the pragmatic requirement to 
explain why causation should matter. Lewis claims that his account captures our intuitive 
judgements about particular cases of causation and counterfactual dependence. But it 
remains mysterious why a counterfactual account that operates in Lewis’ terms should be 
useful to us. Why for example, does exact similarity matter so much, but approximate 
similarity not at all? Why hold the laws fixed, except for a small miracle? These apparently 
arbitrary-looking criteria leave it mysterious why a causal relation formulated in these terms 
tracks something we should care about—even if it delivers the right intuitive results. Bennett 
(1984), Horwich (1987, p. 172) and Woodward (2003, p. 137) raise similar concerns.90  
 
These concerns are all the more pressing given that Lewis, at least in early work, emphasises 
the context sensitivity of counterfactuals and claims he is only giving one particular set of 
standards for their evaluation that may or may not be relevant in a given context (1973a, p. 
565 n. 10). There’s no attempt to say, for example, that a man who claims that if he had 
stepped out his window, he wouldn’t have fallen to the ground, is doing anything other than 
using eccentric standards. But given the important roles counterfactuals and causal relations 
are meant to play in scientific and everyday decision-making and reasoning, the standards 
employed need to be justified.  
 
                                                
90 Lewis’ failure to explain the usefulness of his criteria is particular a concern if we adopt causal decision 
theory, as Lewis does. Why should causation, understood in these terms, matter to rational decision-making? 
See Eells (1982, ch. 4) and Horwich (1987, ch. 11) for similar objections.  
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In some early work, Lewis seems to appeal to the intuitive plausibility of the standards: he 
talks of minimising ‘departures from actuality’ (1973a, p. 566) and of correctly tracking our 
‘opinions about comparative similarity’ (1973b, p. 95). But he is later explicit that the 
similarity standards should not be defended on these grounds, but are instead reverse-
engineered so as to pick out counterfactuals that deliver the right results: ‘we must use what 
we know about counterfactuals to find out about the appropriate similarity relation—not the 
other way around’ (1979a, pp. 466−7). Perhaps then the standards can be justified by what 
counterfactuals they pick out?  
 
Here the account fares no better. It’s unclear why the counterfactuals these standards pick 
out are the right ones: in particular, why ruling out back-tracking counterfactuals is 
warranted. On the face of it, it seems like changes to the present may well be 
counterfactually correlated with changes causally upstream. Lewis is explicit that his 
standards are tailored to rule out backtrackers (1986, postscript B to 1973a). But if the 
standards of similarity are justified because they rule out backtracking counterfactuals, we do 
no better than on an a priori strategy in understanding why ruling out backtracking is 
warranted. So we can’t straightforwardly appeal to the counterfactuals to justify why the 
standards pick out a useful relation. We have too little understanding of why these 
counterfactuals are the right ones. Similarly if we justify the standards in terms of the causal 
judgments they lead to—we have too little deep understanding of why our intuitive causal 
judgements are useful.  
 
Overall, while Lewis’ account is more successful than interventionists in securing a 
connection between fundamental laws and causation, it has significant problems accounting 
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for intervention and answering the pragmatic requirement. This is not to say that Lewis’ 
account cannot reduce causation and counterfactual dependence. But, as with interventionist 
accounts, the accounts leaves interesting explanatory questions unanswered. We should 
consider what other kinds of philosophical elucidations of causation are available.  
 
4.4 A Deliberative Account of Causation 
In the remainder of the chapter, I put forward and defend a deliberative account of 
causation. This account is based, from the beginning, on what will be useful to deliberating 
agents. I’ll argue that causal relations correspond to the evidential relations agents need when 
they decide on one thing in order to achieve another. Roughly, if deciding on a state of 
affairs of a given type, A, for the sake of a state of affairs of another type, B, is a good reason 
for believing that a state of affairs of type B will obtain, then A is a cause of B. More 
precisely, I’ll defend the following biconditional, relating particular states of affairs picked 
out by types: 
 
Evidential Biconditional: A is a (type-level) cause of B if and only if an agent deciding on a 
state of affairs of type A in ‘proper deliberation’ for the sake of a state of affairs of     
type B would be good evidence of (a state of affairs of type) B obtaining. 
 
This account of causation does well on the desiderata above: it explains why causation 
should matter to agents, how agents take it they can intervene, and it relates causation to 
fundamental laws. Because knowledge of causal structure is needed for good decision-
making, we have a clear account of why causal relations matter.  
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Huw Price defends a related agent-based account, also arguing that causation should be 
understood by reference to agency (1991, 1992a, 1992b, and elsewhere). After presenting my 
account, I’ll compare it to Price’s. To prefigure, the main differences will be that my account 
employs a different model of deliberation, produces more objective causal relations, and is 
directly relevant for first-order metaphysical accounts.   
 
4.4a From Deliberation to Causation 
In chapter 2, I put forward four necessary and non-redundant conditions on an agent taking 
an option to be available in deliberation. Where a is a state of affairs represented by a 
proposition, an agent takes a to be available to decide on in deliberation if and only if:  
 
(a) her deciding on a is a serious epistemic possibility for her;  
(b) she is practically certain that if she decides on a, then a;  
(e) she takes several options to be available; 
(f) she takes her apparently-available options to be incompatible.  
 
As noted, condition b involves a conditional. This may be a conditional belief, but a belief in 
a material conditional will suffice. These conditions were part of the epistemic model of 
deliberation. In chapter 2, I argued that this model explains why an agent takes different 
options to be available to decide on. I will now develop this model into a deliberative 
account of causation.  
 
A first simplifying step is to combine conditions e and f into a single condition (g) on taking 
an option to be an available alternative, by definition, one of several apparently incompatible 
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options.91 Deliberation is then necessarily between options that are taken to be alternatives. 
An agent takes an option to be an available alternative in deliberation if and only if: 
 
(g) she takes at least one other (apparently) incompatible option to be available.  
 
A second step is to make the conditions more normatively demanding. We need to concern 
ourselves not merely with what agents take to be the case, but what they should take to the be 
case, based on good epistemic reasoning. This is one of the crucial moves that will make 
causation suitably objective. For the purposes of this account, I will assume a broadly 
evidentialist account of epistemic reasons. Under this account, whether an agent has reasons 
for a belief is settled by what evidence she has at the time, or, more generally, her epistemic 
grounds. (If one is uncomfortable at the term ‘evidence’ being used as an agent’s epistemic 
grounds for her belief, the reader is welcome to substitute the latter.)  
 
We also need a notion of ‘good evidence’. This is evidence that is, in general, sufficient to 
justify an agent being practically certain of a state of affairs. While the account could be 
extended to cover lesser degrees of evidential support, the broader philosophical issues will 
be clearer if we deal only with evidence that justifies certainty.92 For the purposes of this 
account, I adopt the following account of evidence. Firstly, I begin by taking the evidential 
relata to be states of affairs represented by propositions, rather than objects or events. This 
is keeping with the epistemic conditions on deliberation. Secondly, these sates of affairs need 
not be mental states, like having a belief or having knowledge. Evidence is the kind of thing 
                                                
91 This adjustment will simplify the derivations to come, but it also weakens the conditions slightly, since every 
option need not be incompatible with all others.  
92 Extending the account using a more general notion of evidential support fits nicely with a probability-raising 
approaches to causation, where A counts as a cause of B only if A raises the probability of B. A corresponding 
condition on intention might be that intending A requires taking one’s intention to raise the probability of A. 
For details of this approach see Price (1991; 2012) and Mellor (1988). 
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to which others can have access—it has a public character. While mental states can count as 
evidence, they count as evidence equally for everyone, not just for the agent who is in the 
mental state. Thirdly, an agent’s evidence is not relative to her background beliefs. For 
example, clouds count as evidence of rain for Tamsin even if she has no idea that these are 
rain-promising clouds. An agent may have evidence without believing or knowing she has 
evidence, or take herself to have evidence when she does not. Some of these failures may be 
based on the agent lacking or having false background beliefs. While we do have internalist 
concepts of evidence where evidence is relativised to the background beliefs of an agent, it is 
enough for my purposes that we have a concept that is external and non-relativized (and 
public) in the way I require. Fourthly, whether an agent has evidence can depend on what 
observations she has made—such as whether Tamsin has observed the clouds. Finally, the 
primary function of evidence is to justify belief. To this extent, evidence is normative, even if 
one can specify what evidential relations there are without appealing to norms.93 Note that I 
haven’t presumed evidence is always of prior states of affairs. This is crucial if the 
deliberative account is to explain the temporal asymmetry of causation, rather than 
presuppose it.  
 
With this notion of evidence, changing the above epistemic conditions on deliberation into 
evidential conditions suggests the following three necessary and sufficient evidential 
conditions on what I call ‘proper deliberation’. I will add one further condition later. An 
agent takes an option to be an available alternative in proper deliberation if and only if:  
 
(h) her evidence does not settle her not deciding on a; 
                                                
93 It may seem evidence should be understood in terms of what is a reliable indicator of what, and so is a causal 
notion involving reliability. I address this concern in section 6. 
 149 
(i) her deciding on a is good evidence of a; 
(j) her evidence leaves open her deciding on at least one other incompatible option. 
 
For example, say Tamsin is deliberating on taking her umbrella in order to stay dry. 
According to the conditions, if her deliberation is proper, her evidence can’t already settle 
whether she will take her umbrella (or some other incompatible option). Yet her deciding to 
take her umbrella must be good evidence that she in fact will. Proper deliberation combines 
the epistemic model of deliberation with the requirement that an agent’s beliefs are in line 
with her evidence. It marks out deliberations where agents are not only deliberatively 
reasonable, but also epistemic reasonable. As I argued in chapters 2 and 3, agents don’t 
violate epistemic norms when they fail to have beliefs in deliberation about what they will 
do. So their evidence must leave open what they will do and how they will decide. Note that 
condition j refers to what options are actually incompatible. As in chapter 2, options can be 
incompatible for a variety of reasons—they may logically incompatible, or not jointly 
realisable for physical, technological or other reasons.  
 
These conditions explain three features of deliberation. Firstly, they explain how the 
apparent openness of deliberation is justified. It is not simply that agents are uncertain of how 
they will decide; their evidence leaves open how they will decide. Secondly, the conditions 
explain why agents are justified in taking their decisions to be relevant for how the world 
goes. Their decisions are good evidence for their outcomes—it is not just that agents think 
they are. Combining these two features explains a third: why agents are justified in taking 
multiple incompatible states of affairs to be available to decide on. Their evidence leaves 
open several decisions, and these decisions are good evidence for incompatible states of 
affairs. This is how the deliberative account I go on to develop answers the second 
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desideratum on accounts of causation: causal relations are ‘accessible’ to agents because 
agents are justified in taking incompatible states of affairs to be available to decide on. 
So far these conditions capture how a decision is evidence for its result. The next step is to 
consider what’s required for a decision to count as a cause of its result. Why might an 
evidential relation imply a causal relation? Consider condition i above: an agent properly 
deliberates when her deciding on a is good evidence of a. When all is going well, we expect 
this condition to hold for deliberating agents. Tamsin’s deciding to take her umbrella should 
actually be good evidence she will, if she deliberates on taking it. While Tamsin may be 
prevented from taking her umbrella, she can’t have good reason to suspect this, if she is to 
properly deliberate. Furthermore, we expect condition i to hold typically because an agent’s 
deciding causes her to act as she’s decided. So it shouldn’t be surprising that a causal relation 
holds only if this evidential relation holds—even though I’ve explicated and defended the 
epistemic model of deliberation without appeal to causation.94 
 
What about causal relations involving states of affairs that aren’t decisions? I’ll now argue that 
evidential conditions can capture these too. Above I argued for an important pragmatic 
requirement on accounts of causation—accounts should explain why causation matters to 
agents. Here’s how we can satisfy this requirement. Agents need to know and care about 
whether their decision are actually good evidence of the outcomes they seek. If Tamsin is 
deliberating about whether to take her umbrella for the sake of staying dry, she needs to 
know and care about whether her deciding will actually be good evidence of her staying dry. 
If it is, she’ll have made an appropriate decision. My claim is that a causal relation obtains 
between her taking her umbrella and her staying dry, just in case her decision to take her 
                                                
94 What about when a decision is evidence of a state it doesn’t cause? I’ll consider this problem briefly below, 
but my main treatment comes in chapter 5, section 5.3.  
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umbrella (for the sake of staying dry, in proper deliberation) is good evidence that she’ll stay 
dry. If so, we have a straightforward account of why causal relations should matter—they 
matter to good decision-making.  
 
As a first pass at capturing general causal relations, we might try the following condition. 
Where A, deciding A, and B are independent states of affairs of specified types, such that 
none is a constitutive part of any another, a state of affairs of type A is a type-level cause of a 
state of affairs of type B, if and only if: 
(k) an agent deciding on A (in proper deliberation) is good evidence of B.  
 
Tamsin’s taking her umbrella is a cause of her staying dry, for example, if and only if her 
deciding to take her umbrella, in a proper deliberation, is good evidence of her staying dry.  
 
Note that I am using an explicitly type-based characterisation of the evidential relata. As with 
interventionist accounts, the deliberative account is primarily concerned with general type-
based regularities (smoking causes cancer) rather than with specific token instances (my 
friend’s smoking caused his cancer). While there may be token-level causation, this is to be 
accounted for in terms of type-level causation.95 The deliberative account is type-level 
because evidential relations derive from kinds of states (there being footprints) being general 
indicators of other kinds of states (there being someone at the window). While these 
evidential relations relate particular states of affairs (those footprints are evidence that 
Thimo was at the window), these hold because of general correlations (say between 
footprints of a certain size and someone of a certain height). Because both type-level causes 
                                                
95 For examples of how token-level causation may be derived from type-level causation, see Woodward (2003, 
p. 74ff.) and Pearl (2000 ch. 10). 
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and evidence work at a general level, the first relatum might be present without the 
second—a type-level cause may be present without its effect, or a piece of evidence may 
good evidence for an outcome, but the outcome not occur. And in both cases the second 
relatum may occur, by luck or chance, even if the first is not present. 
 
What about the causal relata? In chapter 2, I took options in deliberation to be states of 
affairs represented by propositions. We decide on the way things are—states of affairs, 
picked out propositionally. Continuous with this, I take the causal relata also to be particular 
states of affairs of given types. But as far as I can tell, nothing in the evidential biconditional 
itself mandates this view. Like Woodward, I don’t take the general form of my account to 
commit one to a precise view of the underlying nature of the causal relata.96 One could take 
it that we deliberate on facts, events, or actions, and take causation to similarly relate facts, 
events or actions. What’s important is that the options we decide on in deliberation take the 
same form as casual relata (or that they are easily convertible into each other). But for the 
sake of a simpler presentation, I will assume that the causal relata are particular states of 
affairs of given types, represented by propositions. 
 
But condition k above still isn’t quite right. Sometimes decisions are good evidence of states 
they don’t cause, even when deliberation is proper. This is because deciding is often good 
evidence that the agent will take the means to their ends. For example, say Tamsin is properly 
deliberating on taking her umbrella, and must get to her umbrella by walking through the 
hall. If so, her deciding to take her umbrella is good evidence of her walking through the 
hall. But her taking her umbrella doesn’t cause her to walk through the hall. 
                                                
96 I’m also sympathetic to Field’s suggestion (2003, n. 6), that the difference between event-based views (Lewis 
1973a; 1979b) and fact-based views (Bennett 1988; Mellor 1995) is largely terminological.  
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To deal with these cases, we need to appeal to a feature of instrumental reasoning, and take 
it that agents decide on one state ‘for the sake of’ another (Anscombe 1957, section 26).97 
Causal relations will only be implied when the cause is decided on ‘for the sake’ of the effect. 
For example, Tamsin’s taking her umbrella counts as a cause of her staying dry if and only if 
her deciding to take her umbrella for the sake of staying dry (in proper deliberation) is good 
evidence of her staying dry. If Tamsin doesn’t decide to take her umbrella for the sake of 
walking through the hall, then even if her deciding is also good evidence of her walking 
through the hall, the condition no longer implies her taking her umbrella causes her walking 
through the hall. With this suggestion, A is a type-level cause of B, if and only if: 
 
(l) an agent deciding A for the sake of B (in proper deliberation) is good evidence of B.  
 
There may be cases where we’re tempted to say Tamsin does decide to take her umbrella for 
the sake of walking through the hall (perhaps she feels she needs the exercise). But in this 
case, Tamsin only decides in this way in order to get around irregularities and deficiencies in 
her abilities or motivations. If she really was just interested in the exercise, she should just 
decide to walk through the hall, and leave the umbrella out of it. Thinking about the 
umbrella is helping her to overcome weakness of will. Perhaps the additional goal of the 
umbrella helps her focus less on the exercise involved in getting it. While we do sometimes 
use decisions and deliberations in this way, causal relations shouldn’t be tied to this aspect of 
                                                
97 A notion of ‘basic action’ can do similar work. Basic actions are those performed ‘directly’—like waving an 
arm or moving a finger. They are standardly defined as actions that aren’t done by doing other things—as I 
might signal a ship by waving my arms, or press a button by moving a finger (McCann, 1975). The claim would 
be that A is only a cause of B if A is a basic action. But while much about basic action is controversial, the 
concept of basic action is widely taken to be bound up with concepts from instrumental reasoning (see 
McCann 1975; Lavin 2013 and references therein). So we don’t avoid appealing concepts from instrumental 
reasoning by appealing to basic actions. 
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deliberation. They’re tied to the instrumental side, when we reasonably decide on one thing 
in order to achieve another.98  
 
Another concern with this appeal to instrumental reasoning is that it imports too much 
causal structure, threatening to make the purported explanation of causation circular. It 
might seem that we properly decide on A for the sake of B only because A is a cause of B. In 
reply, note that not all forms of ‘for the sake of’ are causal—there is a more generic notion 
to appeal to. Annike might decide to go boating for the sake of spending a pleasant 
afternoon, or for the sake of some decision being made. In neither of these cases is there a 
direct causal relation involved—rather the boating constitutes a pleasant afternoon, and the 
decision to go boating constitutes a decision. The account does not imply such relations are 
causal, since the states of affairs are not independent of one another. But these examples 
demonstrate that there is a more generic notion of ‘for the sake of’ to appeal to. 
 
I mentioned above that there was to be one further condition on proper deliberation. Now 
that we’ve introduced a notion of ‘for the sake of’, we can include it. An agent properly 
deliberates on A for the sake of B only if: 
 
(m) her evidence does not settle B. 
 
If Tamsin is deliberating about whether to take her umbrella for the sake of staying dry, her 
evidence can’t already settle her staying dry. She can’t, for example, have already heard a 
                                                
98 Why does instrumental reasoning have this structure? Attempting to answer this question would surely 
require a dissertation in itself. But I suspect it’s partly tied to the fact that our decisions are better evidence for 
certain states of affairs (those ‘closer’ at hand) and less good evidence for other (more ‘distant’) states of affairs. 
Considering this feature in full would require dealing with probabilistic evidence—something I’ve abstracted 
from in presenting the deliberative account. 
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weather report that the day will be sunny and dry. Why is this condition plausible? Given 
that Tamsin must be uncertain of her decision in order to properly deliberate, if she is 
certain of B, she must be certain of B independently of whether she decides on A. And if she 
is certain of B regardless of whether she decides on A, then there is no point deliberating 
and deciding on A for the sake of B. The obtaining of B is already settled, independently of 
her decision.99  
 
There’s one additional step needed to give the deliberative account of causation. So far I’ve 
only considered cases where there actually is an agent properly deliberating. But causal 
relations obtain even when agents aren’t deliberating, aren’t properly deliberating, or aren’t 
around at all. How can we work out the causal relations in these cases? The solution is to 
introduce counterfactuals, and appeal to the evidential conditions that would hold in proper 
deliberation. I’ll say more in the next section about how to evaluate such counterfactuals. 
With this addition, the evidential biconditional on causation is as follows, where A, deciding A, 
and B are independent types of states of affairs, represented by propositions.  
 
Evidential Biconditional: A is a (type-level) cause of B if and only if an agent deciding on a 
state of affairs of type A in ‘proper deliberation’, for the sake of a state of affairs of type 
B would be good evidence of (a state of affairs of type) B obtaining. 
 
According to the evidential biconditional, causal relations are directly related to what 
evidential relations would hold, were an agent to be properly deliberating. According to the 
                                                
99 An alternative approach is to require that A only causes B if deciding on A is good evidence for B, and not 
deciding on A is not good evidence for B. This alternative is preferable for generalising the deliberative account 
to deal with probabilistic causation. But condition m is independently plausible, and appealing to it will later 
help highlight how the evidential relations aren’t simply relative to the deliberator’s perspective. 
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deliberative account, such a biconditional is sufficient to give us a rich and illuminating 
account of causation, in ways I’ll detail in the remainder of the chapter.  
 
4.4b A Worked Example 
In this section, I’ll show how the evidential biconditional works by using it to distinguish 
between two different causal structures. But, before I do, let me note a problem that seems 
to arise with use of counterfactuals. It might seem that evaluating decision-counterfactuals 
will require an account of counterfactuals: perhaps Pearl or Woodward’s interventionist 
account or Lewis’ reductive account. If so, the deliberative account will not provide an 
independent account of causation.  
 
While I won’t offer an explicit account of how to evaluate these decision-counterfactuals, I 
will offer some techniques that suggest how we can evaluate them without assuming an 
independent account of causation. In section 4.4d, I’ll consider how fundamental laws play a 
role in evidential reasoning and in evaluating counterfactuals. In this section, I introduce a 
principle for evaluating decision-counterfactuals that deals with cases where, in the actual 
world, an agent is prevented from properly deliberating by having too much evidence. I’ll 
then use the principle to show how the deliberative account can distinguish between two 
causal structures. In chapter 5, I provide a more general explanation of why the account gets 
the right result in common cause cases. But, for now, the principle is useful for showing how 





Principle for Evaluating Evidential Counterfactuals: Agents retain the evidence they have of 
particular states of affairs obtaining, as far as is consistent with proper deliberation.  
 
According to the principle, if an agent can’t properly deliberate, because she has evidence 
that settles how she’ll decide, and we want to determine causal structure, we do the 
following. We remove the minimal amount of evidence required for deliberation to be 
proper, and break what evidential relations we must, all while keeping as much evidence as 
we can of particular states occurring. We then use the evidential relations that remain to 
determine the causal structure. Why might this principle be plausible? This principle reflects 
the fact that deliberation can become more complicated, so that an agent’s evidence while 
deliberating does not determine what decision she makes. If so, if deliberation is proper, her 
decision is no longer evidence for states she has independent evidence of while deliberating. 
So evidential correlations will be broken, rather than agents giving up evidence of particular 
states. 
 
To see how this principle works, I’ll use it to distinguish between two causal structures, 
where the causal structures are already known. Doing so is counter to the spirit of the 
approach, since eventually we want to use deliberative account to work out the causal 
structure. But already knowing the causal structures will be useful for seeing how the 
principle works. Consider an example I introduced above. Kyle has noticed that after 
celebrating birthdays (C), he tends to feel euphoric (E). But he’s not sure whether this is 
because celebrating directly causes his euphoria (a common cause structure, figure 3, p. 125), 
or because his celebrating causes him to drink (D) and drinking causes his euphoria (figure 2, 
p. 124). He’s not sure whether D is a cause of E.  
 158 
The deliberative account can distinguish the two cases. To determine whether D is a cause 
of E, we need to consider an agent who can properly deliberate and decide on D, and see if 
his deciding on D for the sake of E is good evidence of E. But say Kyle is not in a position 
to properly deliberate on D because he has too much evidence. He knows that he drinks 
every birthday he celebrates (and not otherwise). So merely knowing it’s a birthday, settles 
his drinking. This is where the principle for evaluating counterfactuals comes in. It tells us 
what evidential correlations we need to break, to have a case of proper deliberation. The 
principle tells us that Kyle should keep his evidence that he’s celebrating a birthday (C). But 
C should no longer be good evidence of D. This connection has to be broken if Kyle is to 
properly deliberate on D. Were Kyle to be properly deliberating, he would be certain he’s 
celebrating a birthday, but justifiably uncertain about whether he’ll drink or not. In this 
counterfactual case, is his deciding to drink (for the sake of feeling euphoric) good evidence 
of his feeling euphoric? If it is, D is a cause of E, suggesting the causal structure of the 
original case is as represented in figure 2 (p. 124). The causal structure in the counterfactual 
case can be represented as follows (figure 7): 
 
C         /  D   E  
Figure 7: The causal structure that would obtain, were Kyle to be properly deliberating, given the 
causal structure in figure 2.  
 
 
However, if Kyle’s drinking is no longer good evidence of feeling euphoric when he properly 
deliberates, this suggests the causal structure in figure 3 (p. 125). Kyle’s deciding on drinking 
(and drinking) is only correlated with euphoria when his celebrating settles his drinking. So if 
the evidential relation between C and D is broken, as it must be if Kyle is to properly 
 159 
deliberate on D, deciding on D is no longer evidence of E. In this case, D is not a cause of 
E. The causal structure in the counterfactual case can be represented as follows (figure 8):  
 
  D 
C    
 E 
Figure 8: The causal structure that would obtain, were Kyle to be properly deliberating, given the 
causal structure in figure 3. 
 
What allow the deliberative account to distinguish between the causal structures in figures 2 
and 3 is the principle above and the fact that Kyle has evidence of C, the putative common 
cause. This evidence prevents his properly deliberating on D while C is evidence for D. In 
many cases agents will have evidence of common causes. In these cases, the evidential 
biconditional will correctly track the causal structure. But one may be worried that agents 
won’t always have evidence of the common cause that prevents proper deliberation. This 
means an agent’s deliberation can still satisfy the evidential constraints, and yet, it seems, his 
decisions may be evidence of the common causes. So-called ‘Newcomb cases’ are examples 
of this type. Since these concerns are closely bound up with temporal asymmetry of 
causation, I give my full treatment of them in chapter 5 (section 5.3).  
 
4.4c The Objectivity of Causation 
Before I evaluate the deliberative account using the three desiderata on accounts of 
causation, let me consider an objection that may already trouble the reader: the account 
won’t deliver causal relations that are suitably objective. This kind of concern is commonly 
raised against agent-based accounts. Woodward (2003, p. 118 ff.), for example, claims that an 
/ 
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agent-based account will burden us with an unnaturally subjective account of causation and 
imply a worrying form of mind-dependence. There are two ways in which the deliberative 
account secures the objectivity of causation. Firstly, the deliberative account is explicitly 
counterfactual—A is a cause of B if and only if, were an agent to decide A for the sake of B 
(in proper deliberation), A would be good evidence for B. Agents need not ever actually be in 
a position to deliberate on A. For this reason, causal relations do not depend on our practical 
or technological capacities to actually bring about A. Secondly, as stated, the account is 
concerned with the evidential relations that hold between a deliberating agent’s decisions and 
other states of affairs, no matter who is evaluating the evidence. While the epistemic state of the 
deliberating agent plays an important role in picking which evidential relations are relevant, 
these are not evidential relations that hold merely from the agent’s perspective—they are 
evidential relations that third-parties can observe and use.  
 
The use of these more objective evidential relations is one way in which my account differs 
from Price’s. Price defends a related agency theory of causation (1991; 1992a; 1992b; (with 
Menzies) 1993; 1996; 2007; (with Weslake) 2009; 2012; forthcoming). He argues that it is 
only when we take up the point of view of a deliberating agent, with its peculiar epistemic 
features, that causation appears in our world-view. Causal regularities are those correlations 
that hold ‘from the free agent’s distinctive point of view’ (1991, p. 173) and that are ‘assessed 
from the agent’s distinctive epistemic perspective’ (2012, p. 494). The idea is that the 
deliberating agent has a peculiar epistemic stance on the world, because she takes her 
decisions to be probabilistically independent of everything except their effects. So if we look 
at things from her perspective, there aren’t probabilistic relations between her decisions now 
and their causes. The concept CAUSATION is in this sense ‘perspectival’. In early work, 
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Menzies and Price (1993) characterise this as a ‘response-dependent’ account of causation. In 
the same way that the concept RED depends on our responses to red objects, the concept 
CAUSATION depends on our agential engagements as agents. While in later work Price 
(forthcoming) distances himself from this original response-dependent formulation, he 
continues to maintain that understanding the role CAUSATION plays in our lives requires 
acknowledging its perspectival character.  
 
But while I agree with Price that deliberation is crucial to understanding causation, this is not 
because the evidential connections are assessed only from the deliberator’s perspective, or 
only hold for her: they are the kind of evidential relations that anyone can use. They are, in 
this important sense, objective. While I don’t go as far as Mellor (1988) in taking causal 
relations to track fundamental temporally asymmetric probabilities, causal relations are more 
objective than Price supposes them to be. It is for this reason that I take my agent-based 
account to have important metaphysical consequences, while Price’s does not. I take up 
these metaphysical and perspectival issues further in section 4.5.  
 
4.4d Evaluating the Account 
How does the evidential model of causation fare with respect to the three desiderata on 
accounts of causation? Regarding the second desideratum, explaining how causation is 
accessible to agents, the account does well. Without invoking primitive agent abilities, or 
explicitly causal notions, the account explains why agents are justified in taking incompatible 
options to be available to decide on in deliberation. They are justified because their decisions 
are good evidence for their results, and their evidence leaves open incompatible options.  
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Regarding the first desideratum, the pragmatic requirement to explain how causation is 
useful to agents, the account also fares well. Causation is useful to agents because it tracks 
the evidential relations agents use when deciding on one thing in order to achieve another. 
Because evidential reasoning is useful in such contexts, causation is too. Even theorists like 
Woodward who are inimical to deliberative approaches accept that correspondence with 
evidential relations (what would happen were an agent to act in a certain way) allows an 
account to straightforwardly satisfy the pragmatic requirement (2003, p. 31).  
 
To see how the account fares with respect to the third desideratum, relating causation to 
fundamental laws, we need to return to a related concern: how do we go about evaluating 
the counterfactuals appealed to by the deliberative account? I introduced a principle above 
to deal with cases where an agent has too much evidence to properly deliberate, and we 
already know the causal structure. But what about cases where an agent has too little? What 
if an agent can’t properly deliberate because her decisions wouldn’t be evidence for the 
relevant states? And what about cases where we don’t already know the causal structure? Are 
there more general guidelines for what evidence an agent would have, were she to properly 
deliberate? For example, say a molecule of hydrogen gas moving in such and such a way 
causes the movement of some other. This seems compatible with thinking that no actual 
agent ever had, or could have, the right kind of evidence so as to properly deliberate on how 
a particular hydrogen molecule moves. How do we then tell what evidential relations there 
would be in proper deliberation, without appealing to causal relations? Or how do we know 
that volcanoes erupting (von Wright 1971) or earthquakes occurring (Menzies and Price 
1993) are the causes of their effects, if no agent was ever in a position to properly deliberate 
on volcanoes erupting or earthquakes occurring?   
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We need to be careful about the nature of the concern here. The concern isn’t that actual 
agents lack the required evidence. Recall, nothing in the deliberative account requires agents 
to actually be in a position to properly deliberate, in order for states of affairs to count as 
causes. The crucial requirement is that were an agent to properly deliberate, an evidential 
relation would hold. Furthermore, the concern isn’t that the account appeals to 
counterfactual evidence. There isn’t anything unusual in talking of what evidential relations 
would hold, even if the relevant states never or could never obtain. For example, it may be 
true that were an asteroid to appear in a particular quadrant of the sky this would be evidence 
that it would impact the earth—even if no asteroid ever appears there, or even if no 
asteroids could appear there (due to the orbits of the other planets, for example). The concern 
is that we need some guidelines for evaluating such evidential counterfactuals.  
 
We might simply claim we have easy access to facts about what would be evidence for what, 
were an agent to deliberate, by simply generalising from cases where we do deliberate, to 
cases where we do not and cannot. This is one of the responses made by von Wright (1971, 
p. 72) and the response preferred by Price (forthcoming). But even if such counterfactuals 
do turn out to have reasonably well-defined truth-values, we shouldn’t help ourselves to 
them too easily. Otherwise it’s unclear why we couldn’t simply help ourselves to 
interventionist counterfactuals to begin with (as Woodward does) or other cause-involving 
counterfactuals. We need to know why generalising from the actual to the impossible is 
easier along agency lines (using deliberation), rather than along interventionist lines (using 
causal relations). Price (forthcoming) in fact presents his defence as a tu quoque to 
Woodward’s objections (2003, p. 125): Woodward must himself rely on generalising from 
cases where we do intervene to cases where we do not and cannot. But while an agency 
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account may do no worse than Woodward’s on this point, this defence is insufficient. 
Evaluating these evidential counterfactuals remains a challenge.  
 
One way to address this challenge is to see what might license the generalising moves from 
cases of actual deliberation. Although this is not his preferred response, Price (forthcoming) 
distinguishes two ways this generalising might be licensed: either directly from counterfactuals 
that hold in one system to counterfactuals that hold in another using inference principles of 
science (such as symmetry principles) or indirectly going via similarities in non-causal and non-
counterfactual features of the systems. I am sceptical that we have inference procedures that 
are licensed directly and move us between the complex counterfactuals that hold in 
individual systems. Rather, there are physical symmetries in the fundamental laws and the 
systems that explain how we infer from counterfactuals in one system to counterfactuals in 
another. Even if we do use symmetries in counterfactual reasoning, and don’t infer by 
appealing to fundamental laws, our ability to make the higher-level inferences is justified 
ultimately in terms of there being symmetries at the fundamental level. Even if we make the 
inferences directly, they are licensed indirectly. Spatial, temporal, and other symmetries in the 
fundamental laws are what explain why higher-level symmetry-based inferences between 
systems are licensed. If so, evidential counterfactuals should be related to fundamental laws. 
There are now two reasons for the deliberative account to relate causation to fundamental 
laws: Russell’s initial challenge and because fundamental laws underwrite evidential 
counterfactuals. 
  
If fundamental laws are used in the evaluation of evidential counterfactuals, then we can use 
the universality of fundamental laws, combined with physical similarities between different 
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systems, to evaluate counterfactuals where agents have insufficient evidence to properly 
deliberate. For example, consider the colliding hydrogen gas molecules again. In kinetic 
molecular theory, we assume that gas particles collide elastically, conserving total kinetic 
energy. By idealising, we can then model the behaviour of the gas particles using more 
familiar everyday objects that also collide (approximately) elastically—like billiard balls. And 
agents do have experience of intervening on the motions of billiard balls. Because of physical 
similarities between systems of gas molecules and systems of billiard balls, and the 
universality of the fundamental laws that govern their behaviour (roughly Newton’s second 
law), we can consider what evidential relations would hold, were an agent to properly 
deliberate on the motion of a gas molecule.  
 
Is there a more straightforward way to derive evidential counterfactuals from fundamental 
laws? One approach would be to directly derive evidential counterfactuals from fundamental 
laws and contingent states. We’ll see elements of this approach in the next chapter. But while 
such a derivation might be in principle available, it is not a story I expect can be told in detail 
anytime soon. And until such a story is on offer, the suspicion from non-reductivists like 
Woodward and Pearl will be that any such explanation must go via causal relations—so we 
won’t have an independent account of causation. I don’t have an account of what contingent 
features should be held fixed when evaluating evidential counterfactuals and working out 
what evidential relations will hold in counterfactual cases. I suspect this will be a highly 
context-dependent affair. It’s more important for my purposes that fundamental laws are 
held fixed. This is enough to relate causation, under the deliberative account, to fundamental 
laws, and to give us some guide to evaluating evidential counterfactuals. What I’ll argue now 
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is that the evidential features of universal laws suggest they should be held fixed when 
evaluating evidential counterfactuals.100  
 
Fundamental laws are, amongst other things, pervasive exceptionless regularities, precisely 
the kind of relations that we would expect to be good for evidential reasoning (aside from 
whatever modal features they have). One way of bringing out this fact is to look to Humean 
analyses of lawhood, such as Lewis’ Best Systems Account. Under Lewis’ account, 
fundamental laws are axioms of a system that best summarises information about what 
events occur, and does so in a way that balances strength (how much information about an 
event can be inferred) and simplicity (how many and how complicated the axioms are) 
(1973b, pp. 73−4; 1983, pp. 365−8; 1986a). Whether or not one accepts Lewis’ account as a 
reductive analysis of lawhood, it has generally been accepted as identifying epistemological 
features of fundamental laws at our world—when concerns are raised, they are raised on 
other grounds (Carroll 1994; Roberts 2008). If fundamental laws are universal exceptionless 
regularities, this is a reason for holding them fixed when evaluating evidential 
counterfactuals. They are regularities we reasonably expect to hold across different systems 
in the actual world.  
 
Any account of causation that makes use of fundamental laws in evaluating counterfactuals 
in a way that is meant to be philosophically edifying owes an account of why laws should be 
held fixed. As I’ve argued, answering the pragmatic requirements requires justifying why the 
standards appealed to are the right ones for giving useful causal relations. The deliberative 
account can appeal directly to the important epistemic role of fundamental laws in order to 
                                                
100 Although of course not when we reason evidentially about what the fundamental laws might be.  
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explain why laws should be held fixed. And so it secures a strong connection between 
evidential counterfactuals, causation and fundamental laws, satisfying the third desideratum.  
 
If the deliberative account can appeal to fundamental laws as part of explaining why certain 
evidential counterfactuals hold, this suggests the following explanatory ordering—the layer 
cake picture: 
      
4) Causal judgements 
3) Causal relations and 
counterfactuals 
2) Evidential relations and 
counterfactuals 
 1) Fundamental laws and   
contingent states 
Figure 9: The layer cake picture, showing the explanatory order that the deliberative account of 
causation supports.  
 
At layer 1 there are fundamental laws and contingent states of affairs. No causal or 
counterfactual relations appear at this level, beyond what may be implicit in fundamental 
laws. These laws and states of affairs are then used to account for the kinds of evidential 
relations that hold, or would hold in counterfactual cases (layer 2). These evidential relations 
capture how localised states of affairs are good evidence for others. The evidential 
counterfactuals are roughly analogous to Price and Weslake’s ‘hypothetical conditionals’ 
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(2009, p. 437) and mirror the kind of inferential uses of causal networks explored in Pearl 
(2000, chapter 2). They operate in both temporal directions. These evidential counterfactuals 
are then used to account for causal counterfactuals, using the evidential biconditional (layer 
3). Causal relations correspond to the evidential relations that would hold for properly 
deliberating agents. We don’t just begin with cause-involving counterfactuals, as on the 
interventionist account, or move from fundamental laws to causal counterfactuals directly, as 
one Lewis’ account. There are further steps between causal counterfactuals and particular 
causal judgments (layer 4), such as ‘the striking of the match caused it to light’. Recall, the 
evidential model is type-level—a further step is required to give token-level causal claims. In 
addition, the deliberative account does not mark a distinction between causes and causal 
conditions. Distinguishing these requires introducing further pragmatic considerations, such 
as relevance, which I have not explored here. And, as noted with regards to Suzy’s rock-
throwing, I don’t take delivering causal judgments to be crucial work for an account of 
causation.   
 
This layer cake picture fits with a reductionist program that accounts for causal claims and 
counterfactuals in terms of evidential relations and counterfactuals, and which reduces these 
to fundamental laws. But a more conciliatory approach suggests that the important 
connections here are explanatory and justificatory, rather than metaphysically reductive. This 
is the approach I recommend in the following section.  
 
4.5 Metaphysical and Explanatory Upshots  
If we accept the evidential biconditional and the deliberative account as providing necessary 
and sufficient conditions on causation, what follows for the metaphysics of causation? I will 
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argue that the evidential biconditional is compatible with a range of metaphysical views. It 
also acts as an important constraint on first-order metaphysical accounts, one particularly 
relevant for reductive realist accounts.  
 
As mentioned, Price defends a related agent-based account. But he takes his account not to 
have important metaphysical upshots. Price most commonly presents his account as a 
‘perspectival’ account of the concept CAUSATION: understanding the concept requires 
appealing to the evidential relations that hold from the deliberator’s point of view (2007, p. 
254). Causation is ‘conceptually dependent on human capacities and responses’ (with 
Menzies 1993, p. 192 n. 12). While this might suggest a metaphysical thesis about the nature 
of causation, a kind of response-dependence account that I consider below, more often Price 
eschews talk of metaphysics altogether (2007, p. 255). If we take Price to be giving a 
conceptual account, there are still a number of forms the conceptual dependence might take. 
Price might be giving an ‘analysis of [the concept] causation’ (1991, p. 159), conditions for 
understanding the concept (1993, p. 201), an account of the function of the concept in our 
lives, or a genealogy of how we acquire the concept, either as individuals or as a species 
(1992a, p. 514).101 Another option is to take the account to give an epistemology of 
causation—how we come to know the concept applies—as in Mellor (1988). More recently, 
Price is most interested in giving a genealogy and functional account of the concept, which 
explains the role of causal concepts and how we came by them. Price is explicit that ‘the 
agency theory…should be seen as what I have sometimes called philosophical anthropology: 
the task of explaining why creatures in our situation come to speak and think in certain 
                                                
101 Price isn’t explicit about how the functional and genealogical stories relate, but presumably each is meant to 
inform the other. Price is also not clear how much of the genealogy should be a scientific account of how the 
concept arises, and how much is a conceptual genealogy in the style of Bernard Williams (2002). For another 
example of the genealogy he has in mind, see Price (1988).  
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ways’—‘we are not concerned with the project of providing a reductive analysis of the 
concept of causation, but rather with the anthropological project of explaining its genealogy 
and use’ (forthcoming, emphasis in original).  
 
But while I have no objection to using the deliberative account to give a conceptual 
genealogy in Price’s style, this leaves other options, particularly metaphysical and reductivist 
options, underexplored. By tying a deliberative approach too closely to philosophical 
anthropology, we miss the relevance of deliberation and evidential relations for more realist 
approaches. In particular, non-perspectival first-order accounts can still use evidential 
features of causation to explain why we should care about the relations they pick out as 
causal. Price and Weslake are mistaken to claim that realists about causation have no 
response to the pragmatic requirement beyond ‘a blunt appeal to intuition’ (2009, p. 428).102 
In addition, by focussing on the pragmatic requirement alone, Price and Weslake miss the 
possibility that other requirements may be important in giving an account of causation. 
Satisfying other desiderata may be consistent with satisfying the pragmatic requirement well 
enough. One particularly important desideratum, I have argued, is connecting causation to 
fundamental laws. One of the advantages of reductive approaches it that they help satisfy 
this desideratum.  
 
As far as there is a metaphysical account of causation to be found in Price’s work, it is a 
‘response-dependent’ one: ‘causal relations are…mind (or more particularly agent) 
dependent, just as secondary qualities are sensory agent dependent’ (1991, p. 173). Causal 
relations depend on us. But because we’re unaware of this dependence, we naturally project 
                                                
102 In other places Price accepts that certain realists (who takes the perspectival account to be part of the role-
fixing for the concept) can help themselves to his account of the concept’s usefulness (2007, p. 287 n. 28).  
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onto the world relations that are partly determined by our own contingent perspectives, and 
take causation to be an objective feature of the world (1991, p. 173; 2007, p. 254). A 
response-dependent account of causation, combined with this projectivist semantics, might 
appear to have the best of both worlds—capturing the apparent objectivity of our causal 
language and while still explaining the relevance of causation for us. 
 
But a deliberative account of causation is compatible with other metaphysical approaches. 
Figure 10 depicts some of these. Laying out these options helps reveal the flexibility of the 
deliberative account, and the wide variety of metaphysical positions it can support. Note that 
we might also adopt the accounts below as accounts of the concept CAUSATION—for the most 
part, I will take this option to be implicit in what follows.  
 
Are causal relations identified with (or reduced to) the role or realiser  
of being evidential relations of use to deliberating agents? 
 
    realiser   role 
 
 
 Realism      Response-Dependence  
  Evidential relations are…   Causation is… 
 
  causal  non-causal not further   relativised non-relativised 




Non-reductivism   Reductivism   Primitivism  Relativism Projectivism 
 (1)        (2)        (3)         (4)            (5)  
Figure 10: Metaphysical positions one can adopt towards causation, if one accepts the evidential 
biconditional as giving necessary and sufficient conditions on causation. 
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Picking up on a distinction in the response-dependence literature, causation may be 
identified with its evidential role (to give response-dependence), or it may be identified with 
what realises this role in the actual world (to give realism). In conceptual terms, the concept 
may be analysed in terms of its role, and so refer non-rigidly, picking out different realisers at 
different worlds. Or it may be analysed as the realiser, and so rigidly refer to whatever 
satisfies the role at our world, picking out the same realiser at different possible worlds. 
While all the positions in figure 10 agree on the extension of the concept causation in the 
actual world, they may disagree on its extension at other possible worlds. 
 
On the right hand side of figure 10 there are two response-dependent views that directly 
relate causation to agency. What I’ll call a projectivist view (5) rigidifies on our perspective as 
agents: causal relations are what would be the appropriate evidential relations for us, were we 
in the relevant possible world. A relativist view (4) does not rigidify on our perspective. 
Instead, causal relations are the appropriate evidential relations for agents in the relevant possible 
worlds. There are other options, but these are good representatives of response-dependent 
views. These views are interesting philosophically, and provide resources for identifying 
causal relations at possible worlds that have quite different metaphysical or nomic structures 
from our own. But they provide few resources for connecting causation to fundamental laws 
and so won’t by themselves satisfy the third desiderata on accounts of causation. 
 
On the left hand side of figure 10 there are three realist views. These identify causal relations 
as what realises the evidential role for actual agents in the actual world. Causal relations at 
other possible worlds can then be identified without considering their relevance for agents. 
According to these realists, while appealing to deliberating agents may play some role in 
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picking out causal relations, causal relations exist and have their character independently of 
agents.  
 
Non-reductivist views (1) take the realisers to be causal relations. These views do not attempt to 
reduce causal relations to anything else via the evidential biconditional. If interventionists 
like Woodward accepted the evidential biconditional, they would fall into this camp, since 
the realisers of the biconditional are simply more causal relations. Views that take evidential 
relations to be given by causal dispositions or causal propensities also fall into this camp 
(Mellor 1988). While such views can be defended using the evidential biconditional, they 
don’t do well at relating causation to fundamental laws or explaining the temporal 
asymmetry of causation (as I’ll argue in chapter 5).   
 
Reductivist views (2) reduce causal relations to evidential relations (and counterfactuals) and in 
turn reduce evidential relations to non-causal relations. If they accepted the evidential 
biconditional, Lewis and neo-Lewisians would fall into this camp. Evidential relations would 
then be an intermediate stage in the reduction of causation to non-causal relations. Taking 
this approach means we don’t rule out backtracking counterfactuals by fiat, as Lewis does. In 
chapter 5, I’ll further explore how the deliberative account can support reductivist accounts.   
 
Primitivist views (3) take the causal relations to be evidential relations, but don’t reduce 
evidential relations further. I have labelled these views ‘primitivist’ since they may take 
evidential relations to be metaphysical primitives. Some theorists who fall in this camp may 
also be sceptical or agnostic about metaphysical reduction. Views that take objective chance 
or non-causal propensities or dispositions as primitives also fall into this camp, if these 
 174 
capture objective evidential relations. Some subjectivist views about evidential relations also 
belong here, such as view that relativise evidential relations to the agents at a world— 
producing a relativized causal relation. Further work would have to be done to relate 
causation to fundamental laws on any of these primitivist accounts. Perhaps one could 
reduce fundamental laws to evidential relations, but this is not an approach I will explore.  
 
The evidential biconditional is compatible with all these metaphysical accounts and plays 
several roles with respect to them. Firstly, the biconditional acts as a constraint—whatever 
relation is to count as causation must satisfy the evidential biconditional for agents in the 
actual world. Secondly, the biconditional can be used to justify why a given account picks out 
a relation that deserves to be called causal. The evidential biconditional can play this role, 
moreover, even if one rejects it as giving precise necessary and sufficient conditions on 
causation. One may, for example, deny the biconditional is sufficient by requiring causation 
to be spatiotemporally continuous (Salmon 1984), transmit marks (Salmon 1984) or transfer 
conserved quantities (Dowe 1992a). In these cases, the evidential biconditional may still be 
important for explaining why causation is useful to agents in normal deliberative contexts. 
Accounts may differ in the extension of causation for other reasons, and also still be broadly 
justified by this evidential route. The pragmatic requirement requires causation to be useful 
in general. This is compatible with it giving ‘bad advice’ in particular instances—whether bad 
advice is determined evidentially or by other means. This point is particular relevant when 
we move to counterfactual situations. Accounts may disagree over what situations or with 
what degree of generality the norms of causation must deliver the ‘right’ results, and yet be 
well justified by this deliberative route.  
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Thirdly, the evidential biconditional can also elucidate the conceptual connection between 
causation and evidence—no matter what metaphysics of causation one adopts. The 
biconditional might not capture all aspects of our ordinary notion of causation. Our ordinary 
notion may, for example, build in a commitment to causes and effects being 
spatiotemporally continuous. But scientifically-informed philosophical reflection on 
causation, of the type many have pursued, may lead us to revise this commitment or at least 
to develop a new and more philosophically developed concept of causation. 
 
The evidential biconditional can play these roles for all the above metaphysical approaches—
including reductive accounts. But while response-dependent and even interventionist views 
have been considered as instantiations of the evidential model before, realist views like 
reductivism have not been similarly explored. Part of the reason seems to be scepticism over 
causation being a local fundamental relation (Price 1991, p. 160). But this attitude fails to 
distinguish reductive from other realist views. Not all reductive views take causation to be 
local, and they deny causation is fundamental.  
 
A particularly appealing reductive option is to take causation to be a non-local relation that 
reduces to laws and contingent features—the same features that explain features of 
deliberating agents. If we’re interested in relating causation to fundamental laws, this type of 
reductive account is particularly useful. In the next chapter, I’ll consider in further detail how 
statistical-mechanical accounts of causation of this form are compatible with the deliberative 
approach. Note that one can also adopt much of the structure of such a reductive view, 
without committing to laws being metaphysically more fundamental than causation. 
Reductive views can be a way of connecting relations, without implying metaphysical 
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asymmetry. My own view is that metaphysical reductions are explanatory, and that 
explanation does not require dependence of the explanandum on the explanans: 
explanations unify aspects of the world. It is in this sense that I am most interested in 
reductive accounts.  
 
Given that reductive accounts are likely to have the most trouble meeting the pragmatic 
requirement, it is particularly important that they can appeal to the evidential biconditional to 
justify their accounts. As we saw above, one of the main concerns with Lewis’ view was that 
his conditions on causation appeared ad hoc and unilluminating. If a defender of a reductive 
view can explain why their analysis picks up on the evidential relations of use to deliberating 
agents, they can justify their account. Altogether, while a range of metaphysical views are 
compatible with the evidential biconditional, it is particularly important for reductive 
accounts. 
 
4.6 Concerns with Circularity 
I end this chapter by considering a major source of scepticism regarding agent-based 
accounts of causation: problems to do with circularity. Hasuman argues that an account that 
uses terms like ‘manipulation’ and ‘agency’ will be unilluminating and viciously circular, since 
these terms are themselves causal (1997; see also Woodward 2003, pp. 123ff). In this section, 
I’ll argue that the deliberative account remains substantive and illuminating, despite these 
concerns. This is due in part to the particular roles the evidential biconditional plays under 
the deliberative account. 
 
Consider the first role of the evidential biconditional: providing a constraint on first-order 
metaphysical accounts. Circularity concerns do not affect whether the evidential 
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biconditional can play this role—constraints can be circular, and still function as constraints. 
Circularity concerns also do not directly affect the kind of philosophical anthropology Price 
pursues—one can still give an illuminating account of how we acquire a concept or what role 
it plays, even if we have to use to the concept. Explaining how people came by the concept 
PEOPLE, for example, may involve referring to people, without making the explanation 
unilluminating. But circularity concerns do bear on two other roles the evidential 
biconditional might play—providing conceptual insight into causation, and a justification 
that reductivists can appeal to. It is to these circularity-based concerns I now turn.  
 
One concern regarding circularity was first raised in chapter 2. It seems that if characterising 
deliberation requires appealing to causal concepts, we can’t appeal to deliberation to give a 
non-circular account of causation. This concern was met by characterising deliberation in 
epistemic terms. Because it is based in a epistemic model, the deliberative account remains 
illuminating. In addition, if the deliberative account is right, and we develop causal concepts 
to suit deliberation, it is no surprise that aspects of deliberation have come to seem causal as 
well. Finally, note that this concern regarding circularity would be more pressing, were one 
to defend a response-dependent account of causation, in which deliberation is 
metaphysically or conceptually more basic than causation. But I am not defending a 
response-dependent account. It is enough for my purposes that deliberation can be well 
characterised in epistemic terms.  
 
My use of an epistemic model of deliberation is another way in which my account differs 
from Price’s. I have been careful not to characterise deliberation in causal terms, even when 
considering how deliberation appears to agents ‘from the inside’. For example, I have not 
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followed Price in making informal statements of the view like the following: ‘A is a cause of 
a distinct event B just in case bringing about A would be an effective means by which a free 
agent could bring about B’ (Menzies and Price 1993, p. 193, their emphasis). Nor have I 
required that agents ‘see their own actions as “uncaused,” at least in the midst of 
deliberation’ (Price 2012, p. 536), or that agents think of their deliberation as ‘issuing in 
rather depending on the ensuing actions’ (Price and Weslake 2009, n. 25). Nor are agents 
required to treat their actions as ultimate contingencies. Even within the agent’s point of 
view, we should avoid using causal concepts to characterise deliberation, or more serious 
circularity concerns arise.103  
 
In chapter 3, I also argued against epistemic accounts of deliberation due to Velleman, Joyce 
and Ismael. I didn’t reject them because they used causal notions. But it’s worth noting that 
these approaches are also unsuitable for defending a deliberative account of causation—a 
move Price suggests (2012, p. 529−30). Velleman characterises decisions in terms of their 
causal properties—they are ‘self-fulfilling beliefs’ (1989a, 1989b). Joyce is a causal decision 
theorist who argues that requirements on rational deliberation cannot be characterised purely 
in evidential terms—for example, agents must have a causal ability to decide on options 
(2002, p. 88). Even Ismael, I argued, relies on an unexplained apparent ability on the part of 
the deliberator. Until we see how to characterise this ability in non-causal terms, the 
suspicion will be that all these accounts rely directly on causal features of deliberation. 
 
Price does not use an epistemic characterisation of deliberation to defend his account from 
the charge of circularity. Instead he appeals to our direct experience of agency: ‘we do not 
                                                
103 Hitchcock (1996) also appeals to the perspectival character of deliberation to defend a probabilistic account 
of causation. My concerns with Price’s account of deliberation carry over to Hitchcock’s.  
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need an explication of agency in terms of causality. Agency is something of which we all 
have direct experience’ (1991, p. 173). Concepts like ‘bringing about’ can be introduced by 
ostension, since ‘we all have direct personal experience of doing one thing and thence 
achieving another’ (Menzies & Price 1993, pp. 194−5). But while we may have such direct 
experiences, this doesn’t show that causal concepts are not bound up with them. Practical 
deliberation, under Price’s account, may still depend on agents using causal concepts. An 
epistemic characterisation of deliberation does better, by helping account for causation 
without directly appealing to causal notions.  
 
A second concern with circularity relates to the pragmatic requirement itself. I required 
accounts to explain how causation or causal knowledge is useful to agents, and USEFULNESS 
seems to be a causal concept—a useful relation is one that helps us achieve our ends. In one 
sense, this circularity is benign. The pragmatic requirement is a general constraint on 
accounts of causation. Because it is not part of any account, it does nothing to trivialise 
accounts that satisfy it. This source of circularity can also be seen as a positive feature, to the 
degree that it may account for some of the indeterminacy in our concept of causation—
different accounts of causation may satisfy the pragmatic requirement equally well, by their 
own criteria for usefulness. But an account will do better if it answers the pragmatic 
requirement by doing more than simply presuming that the causal relation it posits is useful, 
by the standards of that causal relation (as Woodward does). The epistemic account satisfies 
this further goal, because it appeals to the usefulness of evidential relations, rather than the 
usefulness of causal relations.  
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A third concern with circularity has to do with evidential relations. It seems that accounting 
for why a certain state of affairs counts as evidence for another may require appealing to 
causation. This concern puts pressure on primitivist accounts that take evidential relations as 
fundamental, and on response-dependent accounts that appeal to evidential relations as part 
of reduction or analysis. But my main concern here is that it also puts pressure on whether 
the evidential biconditional can be conceptually illuminating. In reply, note that even if we 
can and should give causal explanations for evidential relations, this is not enough to show 
that appealing to evidential relations delivers a trivial or uninteresting account of causation. 
We expect almost any observed regularity to be amenable to causal explanation—this has 
become a presupposition of much of science. But this does not mean that evidential 
relations cannot be understood independently of causation. Originally I introduced evidential 
reasoning by appealing to epistemic norms, and responsible belief-forming processes. We do 
have a sufficiently firm grasp of evidential support independently of explicitly causal 
concepts. In addition, there are accounts of objective chance that deliver evidential relations 
without appealing to causation—Lewis’ Best Systems Account (1994) and related statistical-
mechanical accounts (Loewer 2001).  
 
Finally, a fourth concern with circularity relates to the move from evidential reasoning in 
general to the kind of evidential reasoning of use to deliberating agents. The concern is that 
we must appeal to causes to explain why certain evidential relations are undermined by 
deliberation—particularly evidential relations towards the past. For example, we might argue 
that deliberation undermines certain correlations because it must satisfy Woodward’s or 
Pearl’s causal conditions on being an intervention. Or we might argue that we can’t decide on 
past states of affairs, because the causes of decisions (our beliefs and desires) interrupt the 
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causal correlations that otherwise obtain between our actions and past states of affairs (a 
view I consider in chapter 5, section 5.3d). In chapter 5, I’ll avoid this concern by explaining 
undermining in non-causal terms.  
 
Overall, circularity isn’t a concern for the deliberative account offering an interesting 
conceptual elucidation, or a justification of accounts. We have a sufficiently independent 
grasp of the relevant evidential and deliberative notions, such that the evidential 
biconditional remains substantive and illuminating. These concerns do put pressure on 
response-dependent accounts of causation that take deliberation to be more fundamental 
than causation. But I haven’t argued for such an account. My project has been to relate 
causation, deliberative and evidence in a way that explains why causal relations matter.  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I’ve argued that prominent accounts do not adequately fulfil key desiderata 
on accounts of causation. While interventionist accounts from Woodward and Pearl attempt 
to connect causation to our needs as agents, they do so only in a trivial manner. And these 
accounts don’t relate causation to fundamental laws. Lewis’ reductivist account does better at 
relating causation to laws, but at the cost of using standards that appear ad hoc and 
unmotivated. We should instead adopt a deliberative account that takes causal relations to 
correspond to the evidential relations we use when we decide on one thing in order to 
achieve another. This deliberative account gives necessary and sufficient conditions on 
causation, elucidates a developed concept of causation, constrains metaphysical accounts, 
explains why causation should matter to us, and helps relate causation to fundamental laws. 
And it does so while avoiding circularity concerns, and delivering causal relations that are 
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suitably objective. In the next chapter, I go on to consider how the account can also explain 





…no one chooses to have sacked Troy; for no one deliberates about the past, but about what is future and 
capable of being otherwise. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (VI, 2) 
 
When we deliberate about what to do, we deliberate on future states of affairs—we think 
about what we’re going to do later today, tomorrow, or next week. We don’t deliberate on 
past states of affairs in the same way. While we might regret what we did and think about 
whether we should have done otherwise, we don’t deliberate on what is to be the case 
yesterday or last week. We don’t hold the past open to choice Practical deliberation is 
temporally asymmetric. Call this the deliberative asymmetry.  
 
Causation is also temporally asymmetric. In everyday life and in science, causes come prior 
in time to their effects. The causes of a train collision or an unhappy meal lie in prior states 
of affairs, not future ones. We might not want to rule out backwards causation a priori, 
particularly at the microlevel. But for macroscopic states of affairs of the type we ordinarily 
observe, causation does exhibit a marked temporal asymmetry: causes come before their 
effects. Call this the causal asymmetry.  
 
In this chapter I’ll argue that these temporal asymmetries of causation and deliberation are 
related—but not in the way one might expect. Typical approaches explain the deliberative 
asymmetry in terms of causal asymmetry: we deliberate on the future because our deliberation 
and decisions can only affect the future. In this chapter, I take a different approach. I’ll argue 
 184 
that causes come prior to their effects because our deliberations are always oriented towards 
the future. Because we deliberate before we decide, we can only make use of evidential 
relations directed to the future. So we deliberate only on the future. And given that causes 
pick up on the evidential connections we use in deliberation (chapter 4), causes come prior 
in time to their effects.  
 
Explaining causal asymmetry in this way relies on giving a non-causal explanation of why we 
deliberate before we decide. The epistemic model of deliberation (chapter 2) combined with 
an epistemic asymmetry does this work. The epistemic asymmetry I’ll appeal to is the fact 
that we have records of the past, particularly in the form of memories, but no records of the 
future. This epistemic asymmetry has itself been explained in terms of the low-entropy initial 
condition of the universe. My explanation of causal asymmetry therefore relies ultimately on 
a low-entropy boundary condition—a similar posit to the one statistical-mechanical accounts 
use to explain causal asymmetry. But even though the deliberative account uses resources 
from statistical-mechanical accounts to explain causal asymmetry, this doesn’t prevent the 
deliberative account doing important explanatory work. In fact, I’ll argue, what is right in 
statistical-mechanical accounts should be understood in evidential and deliberative terms.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 1, I argue that there’s a problem explaining the 
temporal asymmetry of causation, which neither interventionist accounts nor Lewis’ account 
successfully addresses. In section 2, I consider statistical-mechanical explanations of causal 
asymmetry. I argue that these also fail, but insofar as they are successful, their success relies 
on agential and evidential features. In section 3, I use the deliberative account of causation to 
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explain causal asymmetry. Finally, in section 4, I use the epistemic model and an epistemic 
asymmetry to explain why we deliberate before we decide.  
 
5.1 The Temporal Asymmetry of Causation 
In ordinary cases we encounter, causes come prior in time to their effects. There might be 
possible worlds where causes follow their effects, such as when time travellers emerge from 
their machines before entering them. And there might be backwards causation in the actual 
world on the microscale—such as in quantum mechanical phenomena—or in situations we 
don’t ordinarily encounter—such as Newcomb’s problem (considered section 5.3d). But 
when we restrict ourselves to ordinary macroscopic situations in the actual world, causation 
is temporally asymmetric.  
 
The temporal asymmetry of causation is stronger than two related features of causation. 
Firstly, that causation is not symmetric—that a is the cause of b does not imply that b is the 
cause of a (unlike the sibling relation). Secondly, that causation is asymmetric—a is the cause 
of b implies b is not the cause of a (unlike the liking relation). The temporal asymmetry of 
causation requires causation to be asymmetric, and therefore not symmetric. But temporal 
asymmetry also requires temporal orientation: if a causes b, a is temporally prior to b. The 
temporal asymmetry of causation is the only asymmetry of causation I will be discussing in 
this chapter, so I will often refer to it simply as ‘causal asymmetry’. There may be other ways 
of defining the temporal asymmetry of causation. I deliberately leave this definition broad in 
order to avoid presupposing a particular explanation of causal asymmetry. 
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5.1a Initial Attempts 
Some straightforward attempts to explain causal asymmetry fail. Because these attempts have 
been persuasively criticised before, I discuss them only briefly—for further details see 
Horwich (1987), Price (1996), Field (2003) and Loewer (2012).  
 
As a first attempt, one might explain causal asymmetry by appealing to an asymmetry in the 
fundamental laws—for example, that laws produce future states of the world out of previous 
states. Maudlin defends such a view, tracing this asymmetry back to an intrinsic asymmetry 
in time itself, of a type that ‘underwrites claims about one state ‘coming out of’ or ‘being 
produced from’ another’ (2007, p. 110). The problem with this suggestion is that we have no 
straightforward evidence that laws have an asymmetry of the required kind. As Maudlin is 
well aware, if we look to the mathematical form laws take in fundamental physics, laws are 
not temporally asymmetric in the way they determine events. They’re typically time-reversal 
symmetric. Newtonian laws, for example, function equally well in both temporal directions; 
they necessitate the state of a system at another time, given the state of the system at any 
other time. As Russell notes, ‘the future “determines” the past in exactly the same sense in 
which the past “determines” the future’ (1912, p. 15). While there are versions of quantum 
mechanics that employ temporally asymmetric laws, it is notoriously difficult to apply causal 
concepts to such theories at the microscale. And there is no reason to think the asymmetry 
would scale up to a macroscopic causal asymmetry that is sufficiently general—quantum 
mechanics is required to recover much of Newtonian mechanics at ordinary length and 
energy scales. Similar arguments apply to other violations of temporal symmetry, such as in 
neutral K-meson decay (pace Dowe 1992b). These violations are too rare to explain the 
pervasive causal asymmetry we observe. 
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To defend the claim that the fundamental laws are temporally asymmetric, Maudlin is led to 
claim a metaphysical asymmetry in the laws that is not based in how these laws are 
formulated in physics. But even if we accept a metaphysical asymmetry, an explanation of 
causal asymmetry will still have to go via physical (not metaphysical) features of the world—
and so still faces the same problem of reconciling the asymmetry of causation with the 
apparent physical symmetry of laws. A metaphysical asymmetry alone, unconnected to actual 
physical occurrences is not enough. To see why, imagine a time-reversed metaphysics, where 
the future ‘produces’ the past. If such metaphysical laws make no difference to actual 
physical occurrences, so that we still have what looks to be forwards causation in this world, 
then our original metaphysical asymmetry can’t have been enough to explain causal 
asymmetry. Unless changing the metaphysical laws makes a difference to actual physical 
occurrences, metaphysical asymmetry can’t explain a physical asymmetry like causation.  
 
The temporal symmetry of the fundamental laws might instead lead one to think that 
causation is also temporally symmetric, directed equally towards the past and future. Can one 
then avoid having to explain causal asymmetry? Effectively, no. We would still need to 
explain why it seems causation is asymmetric and why we apply causal concepts 
asymmetrically in ordinary and scientific cases. So we would still face an equivalent 
explanatory challenge. Moreover, if we presume CAUSATION is a useful concept, whatever 
resources we use to explain why we employ the concept asymmetrically can equally be used 
to explain why causation itself is temporally asymmetric. 
 
Another attempt takes the asymmetry of causation to be analytic, such that it is part of the 
concept CAUSATION that ‘a is a cause of b’ implies ‘a comes before b’. Hume takes roughly 
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this line, claiming that the idea of causation derives in part from the idea of temporal 
‘priority’ (1739, Book I). But this simply shifts the explanatory burden. We would then need 
to explain why we use the concept CAUASTION (in which causes precede their effects) rather 
than the concept CAUASTION* (in which effects precede their causes). Taking the asymmetry 
of causation to be a matter of convention does not resolve the puzzle.  
 
Perhaps we could take the asymmetry of causation to be a primitive feature—something 
discovered empirically but not further reducible or explainable. This is effectively the 
approach taken by Woodward (2003) and Pearl (2000). Woodward requires some direct 
causes to be taken for granted when working out other causal relations, and does not 
attempt to explain why causes come before their effects. He instead adopts an anti-
reductionist stance that denies we should explain causal relations in general, beyond relating 
them to counterfactuals concerning other causal relations. By proceeding entirely at the 
causal level, his account does not explain the temporal asymmetry of causation. 
 
Pearl’s position is more complicated. When deriving causal models from statistical data, he 
thinks we can often assume causes come prior to their effects (2000, p. 56). But he also 
explains causal asymmetry by appealing either to a temporal asymmetry of agency (2000, 
p.111), or to the fact that we take certain variables to be exogenous (independent) and others 
endogenous (dependent) (2000, pp. 349−50). These are agent-based explanations. I’ll 
consider them below. Pearl also notes that, if we characterise causation using probabilistic 
relations, causal direction depends on which variables we use to model a system—see also 
Field (2003). Pearl suggests evolution may explain why we select variables such that the 
causal order aligns with temporal order—predictions of future events being more useful than 
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explanations of past events (2000, p. 59; Pearl and Verma 1991). But unless we assume 
primitive asymmetries in explanation and prediction, this will not help us account for causal 
asymmetry. We have to simply assume we can’t explain the future or predict the past.  
 
5.1b Lewis’ Account 
Reductionist accounts of causation are better placed to explain causal asymmetry. Since they 
reduce causation to regularities and contingent features, they can rely on asymmetries in 
these to explain causal asymmetry. David Lewis, in particular, attempts to derive causal 
asymmetry from an asymmetry of ‘traces’ (1979a). Although unsuccessful, his account 
provides a useful model for how a successful explanation might go.  
 
Under Lewis’ account, two events are causally related just in case there is a chain of 
counterfactual dependencies between them (see chapter 4, section 4.3a). So any causal 
asymmetry must rest on a counterfactual asymmetry: that the past does not depend 
counterfactually on the present, but the future does. Lewis attempts to derive this 
counterfactual asymmetry from an asymmetry of miracles (1979a, p. 473−4). According to 
Lewis, when we evaluate counterfactuals, we introduce a small violation of the actual laws (a 
miracle) that allows the counterfactual antecedent to be satisfied without further violations 
of the laws. Lewis argues that it takes vastly fewer miracles to satisfy an antecedent if we 
introduce a miracle before the antecedent, compared to introducing a miracle afterwards. If we 
use standards for evaluating counterfactual that require us to minimise the number of 
miracles, while securing the largest possible region of perfect match between worlds, we will 
posit miracles before the antecedent and not after. This means events before the miracle will 
remain exactly the same in counterfactual worlds, while events after may be massively 
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different (see figure 6, p. 138). So, the future depends counterfactually on the present, while 
that past (before the miracle) does not.  
 
Lewis derives this asymmetry of miracles from what he calls an asymmetry of 
overdetermination: the fact that events leave traces in the future, but not the past. For example, 
say, in the actual world, Nixon stands before a button. If he were to press this dread button, 
nuclear war would ensue. Thankfully, he does not press it. Nixon’s not pressing the button 
leaves many records or ‘traces’ in the future: Nixon’s memories and sense of relief, no signal 
in the wire, no buildings destroyed, no lives lost. Take it that any of these traces is enough, 
combined with the laws, to determine that Nixon does not press the button. If so, Lewis 
argues, introducing miracles after the antecedent would require using a large number of 
miracles to remove all these traces and produce a world which evolves backwards into one in 
which Nixon does press the button: ‘how could one small, localized, simple miracle possibly 
do all that needs doing?…I put it to you that it can’t be done!’ (1979a, p. 473). Because 
events leave many traces in the future, but not the past, miracles are always better placed 
before the antecedent, and not after. So events before the miracle don’t differ from the actual 
world, and the past does not depend counterfactually on the present.  
 
But there’s a problem: there is no asymmetry of overdetermination of the type Lewis posits. 
The following argument is inspired by Elga (2001) and Albert (1994), whose arguments I 
consider shortly. While events do leave traces in the future, these traces are not enough, 
individually or together, given the laws, to determine past events. As we saw in Russell’s 
critique of causation (chapter 1), nothing less than information concerning every part of a 
system determines whether an event at another time occurs, given the laws. Unless we 
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specify information about the location and velocity of every particle in the system, we cannot 
guarantee a world in which Nixon does or does not press the button. Simply keeping traces 
intact does not mean the past is kept intact—other parts of the system can always undermine 
any particular trace’s reliability. So we don’t need to introduce further miracles to obliterate 
all the traces of Nixon’s not having pressed the button—a single miracle after the antecedent 
might well be enough to lead to the satisfaction of the antecedent. If so, Lewis’ account 
won’t explain counterfactual asymmetry.  
 
So far my argument has been directed against Lewis’ reasons for thinking his account will 
deliver counterfactual asymmetry. But we haven’t yet shown that his explanation of 
counterfactual asymmetry actually fails. We haven’t seen a case in which his algorithm for 
evaluating counterfactuals implies counterfactual dependence of the past on the present. 
And it might seem that his account could still recover a probabilistic version of 
counterfactual asymmetry. Perhaps traces render the occurrence of a previous event probable, 
even if they are not enough to determine it. Perhaps the past probably doesn’t depend on the 
future. However, as Elga (2001) argues, following Albert (1994), Lewis’ account doesn’t lead 
to a probabilistic version of counterfactual asymmetry. And we can produce actual cases 
where Lewis’ account does fail to deliver counterfactual asymmetry. In demonstrating how, 
I’ll appeal to results from statistical mechanics, results that lead to a more promising 
explanation of causal asymmetry.  
 
Begin by distinguishing between the macrostate of a system and its microstate. The 
macrostate of a system is characterised by its macroscopic properties such as temperature, 
pressure and volume. The microstate of a system is given by the exact configuration of its 
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microconstituents—the locations of all the atoms, or other particles, and their momenta. 
Typically a macrostate is compatible with many different microstates. We can represent 
microstates by points in phase space—a continuous space containing 6 dimensions for every 
particle in the system (one for each direction of position and momentum). Macrostates are 
then represented by volumes of phase space. Employ a statistical postulate that takes 
probabilities of volumes of phase space, at a particular instant, to be uniform over the 
standard Lebesgue measure. This implies, roughly, that for any two equally sized volumes of 
phase space that are compatible with the macrostate a system, the system is as likely to be in 
one as the other. If we were working with a finite number of microstates, this would be 
equivalent to taking all the microstates to be equally probable. Using this statistical-
mechanical framework, we can then derive the probable behaviour of an appropriately 
isolated system in a given macrostate. We consider the volume of microstates compatible 
with the macrostate, and apply the probability measure over this volume. We evolve the 
microstates according to the dynamical laws—to simplify, take these to be Newtonian. We 
then end up with a probability measure over final macrostates of the system. So we can 
identify the probable macro-behaviour of the system. 
 
The advantage of this statistical-mechanical framework is that it gives us well-defined 
probabilities for how a macroscopically characterised system will evolve. These probabilities 
are also scientifically respectable, because they play an important role in statistical-
mechanical explanations; they are used to explain the second law of thermodynamics—why 
systems at non-maximal entropy evolve to higher entropy. The Boltzmannian entropy of a 
system is given by the measure of microstates compatible with its macrostate. Macrostates 
with larger measures of compatible microstates are higher entropy, and those with a smaller 
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measure of compatible microstates are lower entropy. It turns out that the overwhelmingly 
large measure of microstates compatible with a macrostate of an isolated system at non-
maximal entropy evolves into states of higher entropy. And this explains why the entropy of 
isolated an isolated system at non-maximal entropy increases over time. 
 
Given we have these well-defined statistical-mechanical probabilities, perhaps they can be 
used to recover a probabilistic version of Lewis’ counterfactual asymmetry? Perhaps when a 
counterfactual antecedent is satisfied, the past will probably not change. Perhaps the 
macroscopic traces that exist in the actual world are enough to make the past events they 
record probable. If so, introducing miracles before the antecedent may still be preferable to 
introducing miracles afterwards, and we may have good probabilistic reasons to keep the 
past intact in counterfactuals.   
 
Adam Elga (2001), following David Albert (1994), argues that even this probabilistic 
asymmetry of overdetermination does not hold. Consider a world that is macroscopically 
identical to the actual world at times after a small miracle, and so contains almost all the 
macroscopic traces of an event in the actual world. For example, take the macrostate M2 at 
t2, which contains all the traces of Nixon having pressed the dread button at t1. If we evolve 
the vast majority of microstates compatible with M2 back in time, we don’t end up in a 
macrostate in which Nixon presses the button. We instead end up in a world in which 
Nixon, his aides, the nuclear machinery and the rest of the Earth at t2 have evolved in an 
apparently miraculous and conspiratorial way from a more disordered and higher entropy 
state at t1. The evolution of the actual world going backwards in time is very fragile—small 




histories from our own. Traces do not even probabilistically overdetermine events in the 
past.  
w2              
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Figure 11: A counterexample to Lewis’ explanation of causal asymmetry. The actual world (w0) 
compared to a nearby possible world (w2). The worlds match perfectly at all times after t2, at which a 
small miracle (*) takes place, leading backwards in time to the satisfaction of the antecedent (not-b) at 
t1 and massive divergences earlier.   
 
Because of this, we can easily satisfy at least some antecedents by introducing miracles 
afterwards. Say, in the actual world, Nixon does press the button. Counterfactual 
antecedents like ‘it not being the case that Nixon pressed the button’ (not-b) can easily be 
obtained by introducing a miracle at t2 (see figure 11). This miracle, whether it moves us to a 
different microstate within the same macrostate at t2, or changes the macrostate in some 
small way, will likely be part of worlds where Nixon and his aides at t2 have evolved in some 
conspiratorial way from a much higher entropy state. These are worlds where it is not the 
case that Nixon presses the button, satisfying the antecedent. But the state of the world at 
times after the miracle will still be exactly the same. So we have a case where introducing a 
miracle after the antecedent satisfies Lewis’ conditions just as well as introducing a miracle 
*
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before. So the past does depend counterfactually on the present, and Lewis’ explanation of 
causal asymmetry fails. 
 
The problem with Lewis’ explanation is that Lewis only considered worlds that are 
macroscopically normal: worlds in which macroscopic traces of the past are reliable, and 
where particles don’t conspire to produce traces in the future. But the dynamical laws are not 
enough to guarantee worlds like this. Once we learn what does account for the normal 
macroscopic behaviour of the world, we’ll have the resources to consider more successful 
statistical-mechanical explanations of causal asymmetry. 
 
5.2 Statistical-Mechanical Accounts of Causal Asymmetry 
Statistical-mechanical accounts of causation are variations of Lewis’. These accounts also 
reduce causation to counterfactual dependence, evaluate counterfactuals using small changes 
from the actual world and appeal to an asymmetry of overdetermination. But they offer an 
account of how this asymmetry of overdetermination arises, appealing to entropy—and so 
are able to counter Elga’s objection to Lewis. They also use more scientifically motivated 
methods for evaluating counterfactuals, rather than Lewis’ primitive similarity relation. A 
guiding idea of these statistical-mechanical accounts is that casual asymmetry is to be 
explained in scientific terms—by looking to the methods and resources that are used to 
account for other physical asymmetries, such as the asymmetry of entropy. As Barry Loewer 
puts it, we get ‘an explanation in terms of physics—a scientific explanation—of why we can 
affect the future but not the past’ (2007, p. 320, his emphasis). Albert (2000, 2014, 2015), 
Loewer (2007, 2012) and previously Kutach (2002, 2007) all defend accounts of this form.  
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But despite these improvements, problems remain with these statistical-mechanical accounts. 
I’ll argue, firstly, that these accounts don’t adequately justify their methods of evaluating 
counterfactuals—and, insofar as they do, they rely problematically on notions of primitive 
control. Secondly, these accounts only rule out backwards causation if they introduce further 
epistemic and pragmatic requirements on causal relations—they don’t deliver a purely 
scientific explanation of causal asymmetry, as they seemed to promise. Thirdly, even these 
additional requirements are not enough to deal with an important class of 
counterexamples—cases in which agents directly control records of the past. Through 
considering these objections, I’ll argue that what is right about statistical-mechanical 
accounts should be understood in evidential and deliberative terms—terms that allow us to 
give a more straightforward account of causal asymmetry.  
 
5.2a Statistical-Mechanical Counterfactuals 
Statistical-mechanical accounts of causal asymmetry improve on Lewis’ in significant ways. 
Firstly, they avoid Elga’s objection. The source of Elga’s objection was that when we evolve 
counterfactual worlds backwards in time, we end up in much higher entropy states. These 
are worlds that evolve conspiratorially forwards in time and so include ‘fake’ traces. 
Statistical-mechanical accounts avoid this problem by stipulating that counterfactual 
universes begin in low entropy. The entropy at the start of the universe must be low enough 
such that it increases all the way to the present—in accord with what we expect from the 
second law of thermodynamics. Call such a low-entropy initial state a ‘Past State’. Statistical-
mechanical accounts also constrain counterfactual worlds to begin in the particular low-
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entropy macrostate that the actual universe begun in.104 Albert calls this constraint the ‘Past 
Hypothesis’ (2000, p. 96).  
 
Adding in either the Past Hypothesis or a Past State as a constraint on counterfactual worlds 
might seem ad hoc. But these constraints are well motivated in science, and are used in 
scientific explanations of physical phenomena. Boltzmann famously appeals to similar low-
entropy states to explain the second law of thermodynamics (Sklar 1993, ch. 10; Horwich 
1987; Reichenbach 1956). Later followers in this Boltzmannian program appeal more 
directly to either a Past State or the Past Hypothesis to explain the second law (Feynman 
1965; Albert 2000, 2015; Price 2002; Callender 2004; Greene 2004; Penrose 2005; Loewer 
2007, 2012; Carroll 2010). The general form of this explanation is as follows.  
 
Begin with phase space, the probability distribution over the standard measure (the 
‘statistical postulate’) and the dynamical laws of Newtonian mechanics. As before, we can 
derive the fact that the entropy of an isolated system is likely to increase towards a maximum 
towards the future. This is because the overwhelmingly large measure of the phase space 
compatible with a non-maximal entropy macrostate lies on trajectories that increase in 
entropy towards the future. But because Newtonian laws are symmetric, this reasoning 
works equally well in both temporal directions—so it seems like we should infer that systems 
also begun in higher entropy states. We end up in worlds like Elga’s, where particles 
apparently conspire to produce lower entropy states. If so, we haven’t explained the second 
law, but have instead derived the law that the entropy of isolated systems will increase in both 
temporal directions. The solution is to stipulate that the universe begun at low entropy. This 
                                                
104 We will need to amend these claims if the concept of entropy does not apply at the very start of the 
universe, or if the universe has no beginning—see Albert (2000, p. 85) and Earman (2006, p. 412). 
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rules out these conspiratorial worlds. While the actual world will then look conspiratorial 
evolved backwards, this is just what the actual world is like. While objections are raised to 
this Boltzmannian explanation (Leeds 2003; Winsberg 2004; Earman 2006), my task is not to 
defend its details here. The general form of the explanation is well-accepted and scientifically 
plausible—philosophical accounts based on it are worth taking seriously.  
 
Statistical-mechanical accounts improve on Lewis’ in a second significant way—by refining 
the method for evaluating counterfactuals. I’ll present Albert’s method (2000, ch. 6, 2014, 
2015, ch. 2), noting where Loewer’s and Kutach’s accounts differ. To evaluate a 
counterfactual, take the location of the actual world in phase space at the time of the 
antecedent, and consider the closest world (as measured in phase space at that time) that 
satisfies the following: 
 
1. The antecedent of the counterfactual is satisfied, 
2. The Past Hypothesis is true, 
3. The world’s macrohistory, given its macrostate and the Past Hypothesis, is assigned a 
reasonable probability by the statistical postulate. 
 
Take the microstate of this world at the time of the antecedent and evolve it forwards and 
backwards in time using the fundamental dynamical laws. The counterfactual is true if and 
only if its consequent is satisfied.  
 
Here’s an example. Say, in the actual world, I’m in my apartment holding a glass of water. 
Consider the counterfactual: if I were to tip my hand, water would spill from the glass. To 
evaluate this counterfactual, we consider all the worlds in which I tip my hand (condition 1). 
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We reject the conspiratorial worlds which begun in high entropy states (condition 2). We 
also reject those that include very unlikely conspiratorial behaviour at other times, and so 
have unlikely macrohistories (condition 3). Most of the remaining worlds are still quite 
different from the actual—in some of them I’m still holding my glass, but perhaps the water 
has turned to ice, or I’m in prison, or on a pacific island, or all my neighbours are elephants. 
To minimise these apparently irrelevant changes, we pick the nearest world in phase space to 
the actual world at the present time—the world that involves the least differences in particle 
positions and momenta. So we pick a world where I’m still in my apartment, and the glass 
still contains liquid water. When we evolve this state forwards in time using the laws, gravity 
does its usual work and water spills out. So the counterfactual is true. Albert’s initial claim is 
that lots of future-directed counterfactual like this come out true, but hardly any past-
directed counterfactuals. More on why in a moment.  
 
Loewer (2007, 2012) employs a similar method. But rather than picking a single nearby world 
with statistically normal behaviour, he takes a probability measure (the statistical postulate) over a 
volume of nearby worlds—worlds in which the only macroscopic change from the actual is 
the counterfactual antecedent, but microscopic changes are permitted.105 We then evolve 
these worlds and see on what measure of them the consequent is satisfied. On Loewer’s 
account, counterfactuals will typically have probabilistic consequents. If I were to tip the 
glass, it is merely very probable that water would spill out, not certain.106  
 
                                                
105 On Loewer’s account, simultaneous macroscopic causation is ruled out by fiat, since the macrostate of the 
world in the present outside the antecedent is held fixed. I raise concerns with this restriction below. 
106 Kutach (2002) explores a similar proposal, using a probability measure over worlds where the microstate 
outside a given region R containing the antecedent and other states is held fixed (2002, 2007). But he doesn’t 
state how R is to be specified or defend the proposal in full. Nor do the variations between Kutach’s account 
and Loewer’s affect my arguments. For this reason, I only consider Loewer’s account below. 
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Why would we expect such results? Albert and Loewer rely crucially on the claim that the 
Past Hypothesis produces an asymmetry of overdetermination. Both methods restrict 
changes to the present (the time of the antecedent). Because of this, counterfactual worlds 
will include lots of traces of the actual past—in the Nixon example, the signal in the wire, 
memories and so forth. We saw above that these traces plus the dynamical laws were not 
enough to guarantee that the past occurred as it did—we were lead to infer to much higher 
entropy states in the past. But, Albert and Loewer claim, the traces plus the dynamical laws 
plus the Past Hypothesis and the statistical postulate are enough to guarantee past events (or 
at least make them very likely). By adding in the Past Hypothesis, we pick up on an actual 
asymmetry of overdetermination. More precisely, Albert and Loewer’s accounts rely on the 
Past Hypothesis explaining an asymmetry of ‘records’—why we have records of the past, but 
not the future (Albert 2000 ch. 6; 2014).107 A record, in Albert’s technical sense, is a state of a 
system at one time that is reliably correlated with the state of a system (itself or another) at 
another time, given the dynamical laws, the Past Hypothesis and the statistical postulate. A 
photograph, for example, might be a record of what I looked like 5 years ago. My memories 
of not having tipped water onto the floor might be a record of my not having done so. 
These records allow us to make reliable inferences about what has happened at another time, 
without knowing the state of the system of interest now. Without knowing what I look like 
now, you can still use a photograph to infer what I looked like 5 years ago. Records work in 
this way because the Past Hypothesis effectively provides a constraint on the initial states of 
recording devices. Given I know the present state of the record, when reasoning to the past, 
I reason to a state that lies at a time between two constrained states. This provides me with 
much more information, compared to when I reason to states further in the future. Towards 
                                                
107 For criticisms of Albert’s explanation of the epistemic asymmetry, see Leeds (2003), Frisch (2007), Weslake 
(2014). I consider some of these criticisms below.  
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the future, the state I’m reasoning to does not lie between the two constrained states.  
 
If the Past Hypothesis explains why we have records of the past and not the future, and if 
we use the same kind of procedure to infer using records as in evaluating counterfactuals, we 
will get an asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. Because local states of the present are 
records, they remain reliably correlated with local states of the past when we evaluate 
counterfactuals using the dynamical laws, the Past Hypothesis and the statistical postulate. 
By keeping most of the present intact, including records, we prevent much of the past from 
changing. But there is no similar guarantee about the future. We don’t have records of the 
future. So future changes are not constrained in the same way. Changes needed to satisfy 
counterfactual antecedents may well bring about large-scale changes in the future. So we 
have counterfactual asymmetry.108  
 
However, statistical-mechanical accounts must also adopt restrictions on the counterfactuals 
they consider if they are to explain counterfactual asymmetry. Firstly, they must restrict the 
counterfactual consequents. This is particularly clear on Albert’s method. Albert’s method 
involves picking out a single counterfactual world. Because a counterfactual world 
necessarily has a different microstate from the actual world in the present, it necessarily has a 
different past and future microhistory. So necessarily the past depends counterfactually on 
the present, if we allow for microscopic consequents. On Loewer’s account, we get other 
unusual results if we allow for microscopic consequents—irrelevant macroscopic changes 
will make it very unlikely that the past microstate was as it actually was. 
 
                                                
108 Neither Albert nor Loewer commit to a particular view about how counterfactual relations relate to causal 
relations. But they both have something broadly Lewisian in mind. 
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To avoid these concerns, Albert restricts the counterfactual consequents to local 
macroscopic states of affairs. These are elsewhere characterised as those that concern a 
‘relatively small and unisolated subsystem of the world (Napoleon, say, or Woody Guthrie, or 
Greece), and which can be expressed in a relatively simple, natural, straightforward, everyday 
sort of language’ (2000, p. 122 n. 11, his emphasis). Loewer allows for microscopic 
consequents, but argues that counterfactual dependence of past microstates will not amount 
to ‘control’ because we can’t know about the particular micro-correlations that obtain (2007, 
p. 318). Macrostates are a ‘natural limit on the extent of accessible information’ (2007, p. 317 
n. 40). So even if we don’t strictly get an asymmetry of counterfactual dependence, we can 
still recover an asymmetry of control. I’ll say more about the criteria for control below. Under 
both accounts, if the tilt of my hand is only correlated with changes in the configuration of 
air molecules 100 feet above my head, this does not amount to a suitable form of 
counterfactual dependence to endanger the explanation of causal asymmetry.  
 
Albert and Loewer must also restrict the counterfactual antecedents. If they don’t, large-scale 
antecedents may be counterfactually correlated with macroscopic changes in the past, and we 
won’t get counterfactual asymmetry. For example, if the antecedent were ‘New York is in the 
centre of Australia’, the counterfactual worlds picked out would need to have very different 
past histories from our own, and we would have significant macroscopic dependence of the 
past on the present.109 Albert restricts the antecedents using a ‘fiction of agency’: a ‘primitive 
and un-argued-for and not-to-be-further-analyzed conception’ of what features are to be 
thought of as falling under our ‘direct and unproblematical and unmediated control’ (2000, p. 128, 
                                                
109 A similar concern faces Lewis’ account, concerning counterfactual dependence during the ‘transition 
period’—the time between the miracle and the antecedent. Lewis’ own response is to accept such dependence, 
but argue it won’t take any particular form (1979, p. 463). I’m not convinced by Lewis’ response, but take it 
there are stronger reasons for rejecting his account.  
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his emphasis). This ‘black-box’ conception can be filled out in various ways—to give us 
direct control of our limbs, for example, or our tendons or the electrical nerve impulses in 
our brains. Albert claims that under any reasonable conception, our direct control will be 
localised to a very small area of the universe. Loewer restricts the antecedents to decisions, 
actions, or a combination (2007, pp. 316−7; 2012, p. 127). He takes decisions to be 
microscopic states in the brain that are correlated with motions of an agent’s body in the 
future. The decisions ‘open’ to an agent while deliberating are those compatible with the 
macrostate of her brain. As a simplifying assumption, the open decisions are taken to be 
equally probable, relative to the macrostate of her brain and the environment ‘prior to, and 
at the moment of, making the decision’ (2007, p. 317).110 Loewer employs a ‘myth of agency’, 
in which an agent has ‘immediate control’ over a range of decision: ‘the supposed ability…to 
freely choose one among alternative decisions independently of anything else in the universe’ 
(2012, p. 127). This is an ability agents lack if determinism is true.  
 
Under both accounts, as explicated so far, by restricting the counterfactual antecedents to 
features that are under our apparent direct control and by restricting the consequents to 
readily characterisable macroscopic features, we get counterfactual asymmetry. The future 
counterfactually depends on the present, but the past does not. And if causation requires 
counterfactual dependence, we have an explanation for causal asymmetry.  
 
5.2b Relying on Agency 
To evaluate these statistical-mechanical accounts, I’ll consider how they fare with respect to 
the three desiderata on accounts of causation introduced in chapter 4 (section 4.1). These 
                                                
110 By taking decisions to be only probabilistically relevant for future states of affairs, Loewer effectively builds in 
an asymmetry by hand. I use this as an objection to Loewer’s account below, section 5.2e.  
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accounts do well, but, I’ll argue, only by relying on agential features. Despite their scientific 
aspirations, these accounts do not provide a more objective alternative to agent-based 
approaches.111  
 
Begin with the third desideratum—relating causation to fundamental laws. Here statistical-
mechanical accounts improve on Lewis’. Recall that Lewis’ method requires violating the 
actual laws (at our world) within the counterfactual world: a small miracle takes place. 
Statistical-mechanical accounts require no such violations. The dynamical laws are kept intact 
within counterfactual worlds. So there is an even closer relation between causation and 
fundamental laws. 
 
Regarding the first desideratum, explaining why causation is useful, these accounts improve 
on Lewis’. Firstly, they avoid Lewis’ appeal to a primitive notion of similarity with its 
apparently ad hoc standards. They appeal instead to distance in phase space, a statistical 
postulate and the Past Hypothesis—posits that are used in scientific explanations. So we 
seem to have a more scientifically respectable way of measuring departures from actuality, 
one that seems better placed to account for the usefulness of causation.  
 
What about the restrictions introduced on the counterfactual antecedents and 
consequents—are they similarly well-motivated and objective? Statistical-mechanical 
accounts restrict the consequents to features that can be characterised macroscopically in 
relatively simple everyday language. While this restriction is somewhat vague, it is reasonable. 
This restriction requires us to pick out consequents of the type that feature in higher-level 
                                                
111 For other concerns with statistical-mechanical accounts of causation, see Sklar (1993), Price and Weslake 
(2009), Frisch (2010), Winsberg (2004) and Earman (2006). 
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sciences and stable macroscopic laws. If we’re to explain an asymmetry in macroscopic 
causation, such a restriction is reasonable.  
 
Statistical-mechanical accounts also restrict the antecedents to decisions or actions (Loewer), 
or to a small area over which we have ‘direct control’ (Albert). These restrictions are far 
more problematic and revisionary, and are more radical departures from Lewis’ account. We 
effectively give up Lewis’ project of accounting for a causal asymmetry in objective agent-
neutral terms, since agential terms are required to restrict the antecedents. Recall, this 
restriction is crucial for deriving counterfactual asymmetry, because it helps keep records in 
the present intact. Scientifically motivated posits alone do not account for why causation is 
temporally asymmetric.  
 
Could we replace the restriction with something less agential, and perhaps just restrict the 
antecedents to relatively small, localised areas? There are two problems with this suggestion. 
Firstly, we would need some motivation for it. Intuitively, causation does not just capture a 
relation that holds between small states of the universe, but between large and spread out 
states. Appealing to the limited powers of agents gave us a reason for such a restriction. 
Without this appeal, the restriction becomes ad hoc. Secondly, we would run into additional 
problems satisfying the second desideratum: explaining why causation is accessible to agents. 
Loewer’s ‘myth of agency’ and Albert’s ‘fiction of agency’, while somewhat vague and 
simplified, do at least gesture at a connection between an agent’s abilities and causal 
relations. This feature is lost if the antecedents are restricted using non-agential terms.   
   
What about the second desideratum: explaining how agents can, or take it they can, 
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intervene in the relevant sense? Even with an agent-based restriction on counterfactual 
antecedents, these accounts don’t fully satisfy this desideratum. Neither Albert nor Loewer 
explains how agents come by the ‘fiction’ or ‘myth’ of agency, or why such a fiction is 
reasonable. Albert does not even specify the scope or content of this fiction—it remains an 
unanalysed primitive. While Loewer suggests that free decisions should be modelled as 
microstates in the brain compatible with the brain’s macrostate (and probabilistically 
independent of previous macrostates in the brain and environment), he provides no 
justification for this suggestion. If we are to understand how agents can intervene, we need 
to do better. Understanding the notion of intervention involved is particularly a concern 
given that statistical-mechanical accounts are counterfactual accounts: causal relations are 
explicated by reference to counterfactual worlds that never come to be. They face the prima 
facie challenge of accounting for why these unactualised counterfactual worlds are relevant to 
what we control in the actual world. 
 
5.2c Relying on Evidential Features 
Statistical-mechanical accounts go some way to accounting for why causation is useful and 
accessible to agents—but only by directly appealing to agential features. What I will argue 
now is that they must appeal to epistemic and evidential features as well. Firstly, they need to 
appeal to evidential features in order to justify why the method for evaluating counterfactual 
is appropriate—and so why causation is useful to agents. Secondly, they need to rely on 
evidential features to explain why the method delivers an asymmetry of counterfactual 
dependence. Altogether, what is right in these statistical-mechanical accounts should be understood in 
evidential and agent-based terms. 
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I argued in the last chapter (section 4.3b) that even if a counterfactual account captures the 
extension of our causal concept, this does not give us a philosophic justification for why we 
should evaluate counterfactuals in those terms. How might Loewer and Albert justify 
evaluating counterfactuals in statistical-mechanical terms? In particular, how might they 
justify holding the Past Hypothesis and dynamical laws fixed, and using the statistical 
postulate? Loewer claims that the Past Hypothesis and the statistical postulate are lawlike 
under a Lewisian conception of laws (2007, pp. 304−306). But this isn’t sufficient 
justification. Under a Lewisian conception, laws derive from the best systematisations of the 
actual events that occur in our world. Given they’re just ways of summarising information 
about actual events, it’s unclear, prima facie, why we should expect them to be held fixed 
when evaluating counterfactuals about non-actual events. Lewis himself allows for violations 
of the actual laws in counterfactual worlds. Nor can we straightforwardly appeal to the fact 
that the method picks out what is ‘objectively more likely’ to happen (Loewer 2007, p. 323). 
The reasonableness of the method is precisely what’s in question.  
 
But while neither Albert nor Loewer fully justify why their methods for evaluating 
counterfactuals are appropriate (beyond noting their scientific credentials) they do say a few 
things that are suggestive. Albert claims his method of evaluating counterfactuals captures 
our ‘normal procedures of inference’ (2000, p. 129). So when we ask why we have this 
particular method for evaluating counterfactuals, we have a direct answer—it is because it 
captures the structure of how we ordinarily make inferences in the actual world. This justifies 
why we should keep the dynamical laws and the Past Hypothesis fixed when evaluating 
counterfactuals. Albert in fact goes a little further, and takes these statistical-mechanical 
features to be ‘part and parcel of what we mean when we speak of that world as being “like 
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ours”’ (2000, p .129). While Loewer doesn’t appeal to epistemic features in justifying his 
counterfactual method, he also takes the method to provide a scientific explanation of 
reliable inferences (2012, pp. 126−7). I claim it is precisely insofar as a counterfactual 
method picks up on good inferential reasoning that we are justified in using it in giving an 
account of causation.  
 
Evidential relations also feature in explaining how the methods deliver a counterfactual 
asymmetry. Albert and Loewer claim that the Past Hypothesis, the dynamical laws and the 
statistical postulate explain an asymmetry of records—why we have records of the past and 
not the future. If we then evaluate counterfactuals using the same method we use when 
inferring with records, keeping the present records intact in counterfactual worlds means the 
past will be kept intact as well. Because the future is not constrained by present records, we 
then have counterfactual asymmetry. What’s important to note is that the whole success of 
this explanation hinges on three epistemic features: there being an asymmetry of records 
(that remains intact in counterfactual worlds), records being kept mostly intact in 
counterfactual worlds, and the method for evaluating counterfactual having the same 
structure as inferring using records. Provided we keep most of the records intact, and we 
‘infer’ in counterfactual worlds according to the same method we ordinarily use, an 
asymmetry of records straightforwardly delivers an asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. 
The success of the statistical-mechanical explanation depends on it being an instance of this 
general pattern—and it is an explanatory pattern we can see without even mentioning 
statistical-mechanical features such as the Past Hypothesis.  
 
The key claim I want to make is that statistical-mechanical explanations of counterfactual 
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asymmetry should be understood at this more general epistemic level. It is because of an epistemic 
asymmetry, and because the method for evaluating counterfactuals follows the same 
structure as our ordinary inferential reasoning, that statistical-mechanical accounts deliver 
counterfactual asymmetry. This gives us the right level of explanation, and the right way to 
understand the success of statistical-mechanical explanations (insofar as they are successful). 
 
Moreover, keeping things at this general level allows us to bracket some concerns about the 
statistical-mechanical explanation of the epistemic asymmetry. Frisch (2007) and Weslake 
(2014) concede that the Past Hypothesis (or simply a low-entropy Past State) plays an 
important role in explaining why there is epistemic asymmetry, and is perhaps necessary for 
records. But they doubt it is sufficient.112 If the Past Hypothesis is necessary but not 
sufficient for records of the past, and there is no Future Hypothesis, we still have a partial 
explanation for why we have records of the past and not the future—past records are 
possible, future records are not. But what we don’t have are sufficient features to guarantee 
the past is kept intact when evaluating counterfactuals using statistical-mechanical methods. 
And these missing features would need to be included if the methods were to deliver 
counterfactual asymmetry. 
 
This concern can be pressed as follows. Albert is explicit that the Past Hypothesis involves 
not merely a low-entropy state, but the particular past macrostate of the early universe (2000, 
p. 96). What explains why our inferences towards the past are explained or justified isn’t 
simply that the universe’s entropy has been increasing. Nor is it the fact that isolated 
                                                
112 Leeds (2003) and Earman (2006) doubt both its necessity and sufficiency. I leave aside concerns about how 
we come to know the Past Hypothesis. Albert’s explanation may be offered as an externalist justification of 
what makes our inferences reliable, without us being able to infer by those same means (pace Frisch 2007). 
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subsystems of the universe, including recording devices, increase in entropy. Albert rejects 
Reichenbach’s explanation of the epistemic asymmetry (2000, pp. 123−4). Instead, Albert 
explains the asymmetry of records as follows (2000 ch. 6; 2015, ch. 2). All we could possibly 
expect to know about the future could be inferred by appealing to the dynamical laws and our 
knowledge of the past and present (2000, p. 114).113 Yet we take ourselves to know vastly 
more about the past than could be inferred from the laws and what we know of the present 
and the future (2000, p. 122). ‘Retrodiction’ of this form would give us wildly inaccurate 
results, leading us to infer to conspiratorial worlds that begin in higher entropy states. The 
Past Hypothesis rules out such conspiratorial worlds. It also allows us to reason from two 
macroscopically characterised states at different times to a time in between. If inferences of 
this form are more powerful, the Past Hypothesis seems well placed to explain and justify 
how we reason to the past. As Albert puts it, we need something in addition to the laws to 
underwrite our reliable reasoning towards the past, something that ‘must be prior in time to 
everything of which we can potentially ever have a record, which is to say that it can be 
nothing other than the initial macrocondition of the universe as a whole’ (2000, p. 118).  
 
But Albert’s argument isn’t enough to show that the Past Hypothesis is sufficient (or even 
necessary) to explain reliable reasoning towards the past. All it shows is that something more 
is required than the dynamical laws and statistical postulate. To say something more is 
needed is not to say that the initial macrocondition of the universe is what’s needed. The 
Past Hypothesis may be one way of ruling out the conspiratorial cases—but there might be 
other cases that need ruling out, meaning the Past Hypothesis is not sufficient (Frisch 2007, 
                                                
113 More precisely, ‘prediction’ derives the future state of a system from the dynamical equations of motion and 
the statistical postulate applied to the ‘world’s present directly surveyable condition’ (2000, pp. 96, 114). This 
directly surveyable condition includes the current macrostate of the world, plus any micro-features of the brain 
of the observer that are ‘directly accessible’ through introspection. 
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Weslake 2014). And we might not need the whole Past Hypothesis at all—more local 
entropic restrictions of the type suggested by Reichenbach may do the work, meaning the 
Past Hypothesis is not necessary. While some restriction on past macrostates is required, it’s 
yet to be shown that the Past Hypothesis is what’s required. And without showing this, we 
don’t know whether these statistical-mechanical counterfactuals are enough, or what’s 
required, to deliver reliable inferential reasoning.  
 
I don’t take myself to have shown that the Past Hypothesis cannot account for how we infer 
using records. And I will later appeal to a low-entropy condition to explain an asymmetry of 
records (section 5.4c). But we are right to be concerned that the structure of our reasoning 
hasn’t been explained. And until it is, we can’t simply take on the statistical-mechanical 
explanation of epistemic asymmetry and adopt it as a method for evaluating counterfactuals. 
We lack adequate justification for thinking the method will lead to the right results. Instead, 
we should think of these statistical-mechanical accounts as instantiations of the deliberative 
account. As far as statistical-mechanical accounts are successful, their success relies on their 
tracking evidential relations, those, I will argue, of use to deliberating agents. They do not 
provide competing accounts of causal asymmetry.  
 
5.2d From Counterfactual Dependence to Control 
Statistical-mechanical accounts of causation rely on agential and evidential features—they 
restrict the antecedents using explicitly agential terms, and rely on evidential features to 
explain counterfactual asymmetry. In this section, I show that even these features are not 
enough to rule out all forms of backwards counterfactual dependence. Albert and Loewer 
end up also restricting the counterfactuals to those agents can know about and use for gain, 
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appealing to a pragmatic notion of ‘control’. Only by relying in these further ways on agential 
and epistemic features can these accounts hope to deliver causal asymmetry. For these 
additional reasons, statistical-mechanical accounts are not more objective alternatives to 
agent-based accounts. 
 
Recall, statistical-mechanical accounts rely on keeping records of the past intact when 
evaluating counterfactuals. It is because we keep the present intact, and the present contains 
records of the past, that the past is kept intact in counterfactuals. But what about when there 
aren’t records of past events? Elga (2001) and Kutach (2002) raise the following 
counterexample.114 Say there is a large-scale event in the past, the sinking of Atlantis, for 
which there are no records in the present. This means that small changes in the present, such 
as the movement of my finger, may well be correlated with whether Atlantis exists, under 
statistical-mechanical accounts. Without records, the past is extremely fragile with respect to 
small changes in the present. Given we control small changes in the present, statistical-
mechanical accounts imply we control past macroscopic events.  
 
Albert (2014; 2015 ch. 2) and Loewer (2012, p. 128) respond to this case by introducing 
further conditions on what counts as the right kind of counterfactual dependence. They 
argue that not all forms of counterfactual dependence constitute control. Control requires 
counterfactual dependence we can know about. We can’t know about the microscopic 
correlations between the movement of my finger now and the sinking of Atlantis. And there 
are no macroscopic correlations to be known—if there were, there would be records in the 
present. So we can’t know about the counterfactual dependence of the past on the present, 
                                                
114 The case is based on ideas in Elga (2001), and is cited as Elga’s in Loewer (2007, pp. 318−9; 2012, p. 128).  
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and we don’t control the past. 
 
Loewer also offers an additional response to this case. Because his method requires decisions 
to be probabilistically independent of previous macroscopic states, the probability of 
Atlantis’ sinking cannot be changed by a decision in the present. Decisions can ‘neither 
destroy nor create records’ (2007, p. 318), and so cannot alter the probability of events like 
Atlantis’ sinking. But this response relies crucially on an asymmetric characterisation of 
decision: that decisions are probabilistically independent of past, but not future, macrostates. 
If causal asymmetry is to be derived rather than presupposed, Albert and Loewer’s above 
response is to be preferred. We need to explicitly include a knowledge condition on control. 
 
Frisch (2010) also raises a counterexample. He considers a case where the unique record of 
an event in the present is under an agent’s direct control. Say I am playing a piano piece, and 
come to a point in the music where I can decide whether to play the first or second 
ending—the decision being under my direct control. Stipulate that I have no conscious 
memory of what music I have played and there are no external records present. But I am a 
reliable pianist. Whatever decision I make counts as a record of what music I have played. So 
by having control of my decision in the present and my decision being a unique record, I 
have control over what music I have played in the past. So even with a restriction to control, 
statistical-mechanical accounts do not explain counterfactual asymmetry. 
 
In earlier work, Albert dismisses such cases. He claims records of the past are ‘manifestly not 
things that can by any stretch of the imagination be thought of as among the features of the 
present condition of the world that fall under our direct and unmediated and unproblematical 
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control’ (2000, p. 130, his emphasis). But in cases where decisions are reliable responses to the 
past, they do count as records. Loewer’s 2007 account explicitly rules out such 
counterexamples. But it does so by ruling out correlations between decisions and past 
macrostates a priori. This is an asymmetric assumption we are not entitled to if we’re to 
explain causal asymmetry. Albert (2014) later responds to Frisch’s case by adding another 
condition on control. He argues that even if the agent knows she can influence the past, she 
cannot use this influence to gain any further benefit, beyond what she secures through 
influencing the present. If I want to finish playing sooner, for example, I could influence the 
past so that I began the piece earlier. But I could just as easily decide to play the second 
ending and finish playing. The past event only influences the future via a feature I already 
have direct control over. So Frisch’s is not a case of effective control.  
 
But this response fails. Albert only considers additional benefits in the future, and this 
introduces an unexplained asymmetry. If we consider benefits in the past as well, influencing 
the past in the Frisch case may give me additional rewards. For example, if I started playing 
earlier, I may have spent less time bored at the piano. Influencing the past is essential for 
securing this gain. For Albert’s response to work, this asymmetry in what benefits we 
consider must be explained in a non-circular fashion. And even if this can be done, I’ll give a 
further case below against which this response is ineffective.115 
 
A better response is also available. To effectively control the past, it is not enough to know 
that in some cases, or in general, my decision is correlated with past events. To effectively 
                                                
115 Albert later revises his response, arguing that the control of the past we have in the Frisch case is not 
suitably robust (2015, ch. 2). In cases where we attempt to exploit the correlation to gain a reward, the 
correlation is screened off by the decision to gain the reward. This response agrees with my own 
(forthcoming1). In this chapter, I go more deeply into why this screening off occurs.   
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control the past, I must have some way of checking whether I have controlled it, in relatively 
similar cases when I attempt to do so. I cannot do this in the Frisch case. There is no time at 
which I know both my decision and my past playing by independent means. Because my 
decision in the present is the only record of the event, I cannot determine whether I have 
actually controlled the past in this or similar cases. And so this is not control I can know 
about. Overall, statistical-mechanical accounts can respond to counterexamples like Frisch’s 
and Elga’s—but only by introducing further epistemic conditions on what counts as a 
suitable form of counterfactual dependence—effective control.  
 
5.2e Time, Flies and Control 
The counterexamples above can be dealt with. If we restrict ourselves to counterfactual 
dependence we can know of and use, it seems statistical-mechanical accounts may explain 
counterfactual asymmetry. But there is a third counterexample that can’t be dealt with by the 
conditions introduced so far. I provide further details and defence of this counterexample 
elsewhere (forthcoming1), where I use it as an argument against Albert’s explanation. Here I 
only briefly present the case, because I am less interested in whether one can respond to it, 
and more interested in the form that these responses must take. The case must be responded 
to in epistemic and agential terms.  
 
The counterexample is as follows. In the actual world, a fly flies in front of my face at t1, and 
two seconds later at t2 I swat it away. Then consider the counterfactual: if I had not swatted 
at t2, the fly would have been somewhere else at t1. If this counterfactual is true, and I can 
knowingly exploit this counterfactual dependence, I can control the past. Stipulate that I’m 
an exceedingly reliable fly-swatter, well-trained to swat away flies whenever they appear. This 
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reliability may even be well-recorded. If so, my decision to swat is a record of the fly’s 
location. Take it there are no other records of the fly’s location in the present, except the fly 
itself and a tiny recording device that tracks its location. Under statistical-mechanical 
accounts, it seems I can control the fly’s location. I directly control my decision, and because 
my decision is reliably correlated with the fly’s location, I control the fly. Because the other 
records of the fly’s location are small, they can be easily changed in counterfactual worlds, so 
as to keep the various recording devices accurate and the evolution of the world sufficiently 
probable.  
 
What produces the counterfactual dependence of the past on my decision is the fact that my 
decision is a record of the past. But the crucial difference between this case and Frisch’s is that 
in this case there are other records as well of the past as well. And it is these other records 
that allow me to know about my control of the past. In this fly case, the recording device can 
be used to check whether I do successfully control the location of the fly on occasions when 
I attempt to do so. (The device even allows me to be rewarded further in the future when I 
do so). So none of the above responses to counterexamples will work here. We seem to have 
a case where I can effectively control the past.  
 
One might respond to the fly case by adopting a different method for evaluating 
counterfactuals. Loewer, for example, avoids the fly case by stipulating that there cannot be 
correlations between an agent’s present decisions and macrostates in the past or present 
environment (2007, p. 317). This means that records like the device or the fly cannot depend 
counterfactually on an agent’s decisions. But Loewer’s stipulation is problematic for two 
reasons. Firstly, it rules out simultaneous counterfactual dependence a priori. Insofar as the 
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temporal direction of causation is taken to be contingent and deserving of explanation, 
simultaneous causation should be similarly contingent. Price and Weslake (2009, p. 426) and 
Frisch (2010, p. 29) raise similar concerns. Secondly, an agent’s decisions are often correlated 
with past and present macroscopic states in the environment—such as when my decision to 
buy a chocolate ice cream is correlated with the presence of an ice cream van. Someone 
might infer to the presence of the van by learning of my decision. If the counterfactual 
method is justified because it picks up on good inferential reasoning, it should allow for such 
correlations. And if we do rule out such correlations, we should justify why this restriction is 
appropriate.  
 
My suggested response is to instead appeal to the same kind of epistemic and agential 
features that were used in response to other counterexamples. Responding in epistemic 
terms means we can keep the inferential justification for why statistical-mechanical methods 
are appropriate for evaluating counterfactuals. But it means we will also have a response to 
the counterexample that is available to defend a deliberative account. I’ll give my preferred 
response to the fly case in the next section. 
 
Having considered statistical-mechanical counterfactual accounts, and the counterexamples 
they face, we’ve seen that these accounts rely crucially on epistemic and agential features 
throughout. These accounts begin with primitive notions of direct control or myths of 
agency. They appeal to epistemic relations to justify why the method of evaluating 
counterfactual is appropriate and to explain counterfactual asymmetry. And they rely on 
further epistemic and agential requirements in order to distinguish ‘effective control’ from 
mere counterfactual dependence. By the end, we have moved quite far from Lewis’ 
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aspiration to explain counterfactual and causal asymmetry in objective terms that make no 
reference to agents. Although statistical-mechanical accounts begin in science, and secure 
important connections between temporal symmetries, fundamental laws and causation, they 
must appeal to evidential and agential features. So it seems we may be able to explain causal 
asymmetry entirely in evidential and agential terms. It is to such an account I now turn.  
 
5.3 An Evidential Explanation of Causal Asymmetry 
According to the deliberative account of causation, causal relations correspond to evidential 
relations. Initially it might seem that such an account won’t be able to explain causal 
asymmetry. Evidence, as I’ve defined it, generally licenses inferences equally well towards the 
past and future. Rain in the afternoon is evidence of clouds in the morning as well as 
puddles in the evening. So it seems the account will lead to causation that runs both 
directions as well. In this section, I argue that the deliberative account can explain causal 
asymmetry. I’ll argue that decisions aren’t evidence for past states of affairs when we decide 
for the sake of the past in proper deliberation. If causal relations are the evidential relations we 
use in proper deliberation, there won’t be causal relations towards the past. So we can 
explain causal asymmetry in evidential and agential terms.  
 
5.3a In Which Evidential Relations towards the Past are Undermined 
Causation is temporally asymmetric if and only if A being a cause of B implies A is prior to 
B. This latter is logically equivalent to A’s not being prior to B implying A is not a cause of B. 
To show that causation is asymmetric under the deliberative account, we need to show that 
this condition is met, given the evidential biconditional defended in chapter 4:  
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Evidential Biconditional: A is a cause of B if and only if an agent deciding A 
(in proper deliberation) for the sake of B would be good evidence for B. 
 
According to the evidential biconditional, A is not a cause of B if and only if an agent’s 
deciding A for the sake of B would not be good evidence for B. So, substituting in the above, 
causation is asymmetric if and only if A’s not being prior to B implies an agent’s deciding A 
for the sake of B would not be good evidence for B. In other words, causal asymmetry is 
explained if the following conditional can be shown to hold:  
 
Causal Asymmetry Conditional: if A is not prior to B, then an agent’s deciding A                         
for the sake of B (in proper deliberation) would not be good evidence for B. 
 
My strategy will be first to argue this conditional is plausible. In ordinary cases, we don’t take 
the relevant decisions on A to be evidence for B. Following this, I will explain why this 
conditional holds. To begin, consider the following case.  
 
Every morning at 8:30 am, Tamsin stops by her umbrella stand on her way out. Some days 
she takes her umbrella. Some days she leaves without it. On days when she takes her 
umbrella, there tend to be storm clouds in the sky earlier, at 8:00 am. On days when she 
doesn’t take her umbrella, there tends not to be. Her flatmate Tod has observed her 
behaviour, and infers the following: Tamsin deciding to take her umbrella is good evidence 
of earlier storm clouds, and her not taking her umbrella is good evidence of their absence. 
And so on days when Tod is in a hurry, and has no time to look at the weather himself, he 
uses Tamsin’s behaviour to determine whether there were storm clouds. However, this 
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morning he finds Tamsin hesitating before the umbrella stand. Tod’s in a hurry and 
impatient to know what decision Tamsin will make. The following exchange occurs. 
 
Tod: Well, were there storm clouds or not? 
Tamsin: I’m just deciding whether to take my umbrella. 
Tod: I know, but your deciding to take your umbrella is good evidence of whether there 
were storm clouds.  
Tamsin: Oh, that’s easy then. I’ll not take my umbrella. I don’t much feel like rain. 
 
What’s gone wrong? Tamsin has chosen poorly. While Tamsin’s not taking her umbrella is 
ordinarily good evidence that there were no storm clouds, her decision not to take the 
umbrella on this occasions is not good evidence there weren’t. Somehow the correlation 
between her decision and the prior state has been ‘undermined’. Note that this undermining 
does not occur merely for Tamsin, or from Tamsin’s point of view. Tod should also ignore 
Tamsin’s behaviour on this occasion, if he’s interested in knowing whether there were 
clouds—Tamsin’s decision is not good evidence of the weather, even for Tod. 
 
Why might this undermining occur? Plausibly Tamsin’s decision to take her umbrella is 
usually correlated with earlier storm clouds because she observes the weather—either directly, 
by looking, or indirectly, such as by hearing a weather report. Say Tamsin has observed the 
weather. Then her evidence already settles whether or not there were clouds. According to 
the conditions I’ve argued for, Tamsin then can’t properly deliberate on taking her umbrella 
for the sake of there not being clouds. Proper deliberation requires her evidence to leave open 
what decision she makes, and whether the state she’s deciding for the sake of obtains 
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(section 4.4a). Alternatively, say Tamsin hasn’t observed the weather. Then she can properly 
deliberate. But in this case, we have no reason to expect a correlation between Tamsin’s 
decision and the clouds. The reliability of the evidential connection between her decision 
and the clouds depends on her having evidence of the clouds. Without this evidence, Tamsin 
would be merely lucky if her decision was correlated with there having been clouds.  
 
However we specify the case, Tamsin’s deciding to take her umbrella in proper deliberation 
isn’t evidence of clouds. Either her deliberation is not proper or her decision is not evidence. 
So the evidential biconditional doesn’t imply a causal relation between her taking her 
umbrella and previous storm clouds. Tamsin’s case exemplifies the kind of undermining 
implied by proper deliberation that is needed to explain causal asymmetry. If we can show 
that evidential relations between an agent’s decisions in proper deliberation and states of 
affairs in the past or present are always undermined in this way, we can explain causal 
asymmetry.116 And we can also explain why agents deliberate on the future and not the past. 
If decisions must be good evidence of the states they are decisions for, as I have argued, this 
undermining prevents agents properly deliberating on the past. 
  
5.3b Why Evidential Relations are Undermined 
I will now argue that Tamsin’s case generalises: if A comes after or is simultaneous with B, 
an agent’s deciding A for the sake of B (in proper deliberation) would not be good evidence 
for B. To generalise Tamsin’s case, I’ll consider what might account for this undermining.  
 
                                                
116 This explanation will also rule out spurious correlations as causal, but these are not my main concern.  
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Could evidential undermining be accepted as a brute fact? This is unsatisfactory for two 
reasons. Firstly, a brute fact view gives us no guide to when we should expect undermining 
to occur. Secondly, a brute fact view would not enough to explain causal asymmetry. It 
needs to be the case that undermining occurs in counterfactual cases as well—if A comes 
after B, an agent’s deciding A for the sake of B would not be good evidence for B. Unless we 
know what this undermining depends on, we can’t determine whether it would also occur in 
counterfactual cases.  
 
Here’s how to explain undermining. Tamsin’s case involves an evidential correlation that 
goes via her observing the clouds. We only expect Tamsin’s decision to be correlated with 
the weather when this correlation is mediated by her observation, and when the evidence 
from this observation constitutes part of her deliberation. I claim that this mediation is 
characteristic of evidential correlations between decisions and states of affairs in the past—
they are always mediated by other states of affairs that form part of deliberation.117 This gives 
us a principled reason for thinking Tamsin’s case generalises. If correlations between 
decisions and the pasts are always mediated by deliberative states, then if such states are 
absent, we should not expect the correlation to hold. If such states are present, they make 
deliberation on the past improper—and so no causal relations are implied.  
 
If Tamsin’s case generalises, the evidential biconditional rules out backwards causation. An 
agent’s deliberation is proper only if her evidence leaves open whether the state she’s 
deciding for the sake of occurs. If evidential relations towards the past are always mediated 
by observations or other evidence of the past, these make deliberation on the past improper. 
                                                
117 I late discuss exceptions to this, such as in traditional Newcomb cases. 
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When an agent’s deliberation is proper, this must be because she has no mediating evidence. 
But in this case there is no reason to suspect an evidential correlation between her deciding 
and the past state. This is the correlation we need for causation. So backwards causation is 
ruled out. 
 
Note, similar reasoning motivates the principle I introduce in chapter 4 (section 4.4c) for 
evaluating what evidence an agent would have, were she to properly deliberate. If 
correlations between decisions and past states are always mediated by evidence, this is 
something structural about our deliberation that we should hold fixed in counterfactual 
cases. And so it motivates a general principle for keeping such evidence fixed when 
evaluating counterfactuals. 
 
5.3c An Appeal to Evidential Decision Theory 
If correlations between decisions and past states are always mediated by observations or 
other evidence, the deliberative account can explain causal asymmetry. But there are problem 
cases. The fly case and the Frisch case above might seem to involve instinctual actions, 
performed in response to unconscious cues. Perhaps while they are deliberating these agents 
don’t have evidence of the past states of affairs they are responding to. Other problem cases 
arise in debates in decision theory between causal and evidential decision theorists. These 
theorists disagree on whether an agent should choose the option that is evidence for a 
favoured outcome (evidential decision theory) or causes a favoured outcome (causal decision 
theory). Causal decision theorists attempt to show that evidential relations alone don’t settle 
what decision an agent should make. While proponents of either view don’t typically defend 
an agent-based account of causation, it seems that if evidential decision theory is in trouble, 
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so is the deliberative account. Here is a classic problem case raised against evidential decision 
theory.118  
 
Gina is deliberating about whether to smoke. She knows there is an evidential correlation 
between smoking and cancer—statistics show that the incidence of cancer among those who 
smoke is much higher than in the general population. But she knows this is not because 
smoking causes cancer, but because a particular gene is a common cause of both smoking 
and cancer, as shown in figure 12. Gina would like to try smoking, but would like to avoid 
getting cancer much more. She is not sure whether she has the gene that causes cancer—she 
has taken no tests, and has no independent evidence.  
 
   
G    
 
Figure 12: Causal graph showing a gene (G) as a common cause of smoking (S) and cancer (C). 
 
Causal decision theorists argue that evidential decision theory gives the wrong advice to 
Gina. It seems that Gina’s not smoking is excellent evidence of her not having the gene, 
both in terms of the objective evidential relations in the system, as well as in terms of the 
subjective evidential relations (Gina’s beliefs) that evidential decision theory appeals to. If 
Gina’s not smoking is (subjectively) good evidence of her not having the gene, evidential 
decision theory will recommend she doesn’t smoke—this is the action that is evidence of a 
favourable outcome (not having the gene and so not getting cancer, rather than getting 
                                                
118 In this section I discuss only realistic Newcomb cases, known as ‘medical Newcomb cases’—see Nozick 
(1969, pp. 125−30), Skyrms (1980, pp. 128ff.), Lewis (1981, p. 9ff.), Eells (1981, p. 298ff.) and Jeffrey (1981). I 




cancer). But, it seems it would be irrational for Gina to avoid smoking for this reason. She 
either has the gene or she doesn’t. She knows that nothing about her smoking now can 
affect that. So she should smoke if she prefers to. Even if her smoking is subjective (or 
objective) evidence of having the gene, she should not decide based on this correlation.  
 
Gina’s case also creates trouble for the deliberative account of causation. Gina doesn’t seem 
to have objective evidence that already settles whether she has the gene. The correlation 
between the gene and her smoking is not brought about because Gina observes whether she 
has the gene by some independent means and then decides to smoke. So it seems Gina can 
properly deliberate on smoking even while there is a correlation between the gene and 
smoking. So the deliberative account of causation will imply that her not smoking is a cause 
of her not having the gene—contrary to the setup of the case.  
 
In responding to such cases, evidential decision theorists have effectively attempted to show 
that evidential relations between past states and acts are always mediated by other states that 
form part of deliberation. The defence they give is known as the ‘tickle defence’, a term from 
Lewis (1981).119 For example, say the correlation between having the gene and smoking is 
mediated by a desire to smoke. Gina’s belief that she has this desire and her belief in the 
desire’s correlation with the gene together give her (subjective) evidence that she has the 
gene. This evidence is independent of what decision she makes, and so it ‘screens off’ the 
evidential relevance of her act for the past state. No matter what she decides at this point, 
she shouldn’t take her smoking to be correlated with the gene. So she may as well smoke if 
                                                
119 This response is considered in Nozick’s original presentation (1969), and appealed to by Eells (1981; 1982; 
1984), Jeffrey (1981), Horgan ([1981]), Price (1986; 1991; 1993) and Horwich (1987, ch. 11). Concerns with this 
response are raised by Skyrms (1980), Lewis (1981), Jackson and Pargetter (1985), Sobel (1994), Papineau 
(2001) and Joyce (2007). I consider some of these concerns below.  
 226 
she wants to. If an agent always has the relevant beliefs concerning such mediating states, the 
evidential relevance of her decision for past states will always be screened off—and what act 
she decides on is no longer evidence for the past state. And so if agents decide on acts that 
are subjective evidence for favourable outcomes, they will not be led astray.  
 
This tickle defence helps generalise the response I gave to Tamsin’s case above and show 
how the evidential biconditional does not imply backwards causation. An agent’s 
deliberation is proper only when she lacks (objective) evidence of the state she’s deciding for 
the sake of. If evidential relations towards the past are mediated by beliefs, desires, or other 
states, these mediating states provide evidence of the past state and make deliberation on the 
past improper. When an agent’s deliberation is proper, this must be because she has no 
mediating evidence. But in this case there is no reason to suspect an (objective) evidential 
correlation between her decision (or act) and the past state (see figure 13). So backwards 
causation is not implied.  
 
   




   




Figure 13: The evidence Gina has while properly or improperly deliberating on smoking (S) for the 
sake of not having the gene (G), given the causal structure in figure 12. Gina’s deliberation is 
improper if she has evidence of a mediating state (MS) that settles whether she has the gene and will 
get cancer (C)—even if it does not settle her smoking. Her deliberation is proper only if she lacks 









This response is also effective against the fly and Frisch cases. Either the agents have 
evidence that settles how they decide, or there is no reason to expect a correlation.  
 
By appealing to evidential decision theory to defend an agent-based account of causation, I 
follow Price’s lead (1991, 1993, 2012). But there are important differences between our 
approaches. Firstly, Price’s account of causation is concerned with the credences an agent 
must have to correctly apply the concept CAUSATION. For this reason, he envisages a very 
close connection between his account of causation and evidential decision theory—both deal 
in subjective probabilities and evidential relations. My deliberative account appeals to more 
objective relations. In the next section, I argue that this is an advantage for the deliberative 
account. Secondly, Price uses a version of the tickle defence to defend evidential decision 
theory. For reasons outlined in the next section, I do not. Thirdly, Price (2012) explains why 
evidential correlations are undermined by appealing either to causal notions (1986) or to 
primitive asymmetric abilities on the part of the agent. In section 5.4, I explain undermining 
without appealing to these.  
 
5.3d Problems for Evidential Undermining 
A number of objections have been raised against the tickle defence of evidential decision 
theory. I consider six. Rather than respond in full, my strategy will be to show that what’s 
needed to defend the deliberative account of causation is significantly less than what’s needed 
to defend evidential decision theory. As far as evidential decision theory remains plausible, 
so does the deliberative account. 
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Firstly, what if not all correlations between acts and past states go via deliberative states? 
What if Gina has an addictive tendency, and smokes regardless of her beliefs and desires? 
This may be, but this is not the evidential relation the deliberative account appeals to. For a 
relation between A and B to be causal, it must be the agent’s deciding on A that remains 
correlated with B, not A itself. We needn’t join Eells (1981) in assuming common causes 
necessarily change actions by changing beliefs and desires.120 Similarly, we needn’t assume that 
all decisions are of the form ‘A for the sake of B’. But it is only when decisions are of this 
form that the deliberative account implies causal relations.   
 
Secondly, what if the mediating state only provides some evidence of the past, because there 
is only a partial correlation between the act and the past state? In this case, deliberation is 
still proper. But still the mediating state provides as much evidence for the past as the act 
does—so the evidential relevance of the act or decision for the past is still screened off.121  
 
Thirdly, what if the correlation between the decision and past state holds, regardless of 
whether any particular mediating state occurs during deliberation? If so, there will be no 
screening off and the past state will continue to be correlated with the action and decision, 
implying backwards causation. This is what occurs in traditional Newcomb cases, where an 
infallible predictor has arranged states in the past to match what decisions he predicted the 
agent will make (Nozick 1969). In this case, the correlation between the decision and the 
past state survives whatever particular beliefs or desires the decision maker has about 
                                                
120 This objection is not obviously fatal to evidential decision theory either, if decision theory concerns what 
deliberating agents should do. If Gina is deliberating, she should already know she is not in the class of agents 
who smoke in some non-deliberative way (Horwich 1987, p. 183). 
121 Note that this response is only needed if the deliberative account of causation is extended to cover 
probabilistic causation—see section 4.4a (p. 155 n. 99). Otherwise the fact that the decision isn’t good evidence 
for the past state is enough to rule out the correlation as causal.    
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himself, however complicated his deliberation. But ruling out backwards causation in these 
cases is not required to defend the deliberative account. The defence only needs to show that 
causation does not run backwards in realistic cases—so called ‘medical’ Newcomb cases. 
Recall, the causal asymmetry to be explained concerned cases we actually encounter. We 
needn’t rule out backwards causation in unrealistic cases, where the epistemic capabilities of 
the predictor go far beyond what we ordinarily encounter. While normative evidential 
decision theory may need to issue a recommendation in such cases, a deliberative account 
does not.122  
 
Fourthly, Skyrms (1980, p. 131) and Lewis (1981, pp. 10−11) have argued that the screening 
off defence requires agents to have too much self-knowledge. Actual agents may not have 
credences in the relevant beliefs and desires, even if the beliefs and desires are there. Or she 
may not recognise the significance of her beliefs and desires. Gina may recognise the tickle 
in her throat, but not recognise it as a desire to smoke. So it will not screen off the evidential 
correlation. A fifth concern is similar; we may want decision theory to issue 
recommendations not just relative to an agent’s own beliefs, but relative to another agent’s 
beliefs (Jackson and Pargetter, 1983). The tickle defence only explains why the correlation is 
undermined for Gina—not for an observer, who lacks Gina’s evidence of her deliberative 
states. 
 
                                                
122 But a plausible response, following Price (2012), is to argue that traditional Newcomb cases do involve 
backwards causation (see also Nozick 1969, p. 134). The abnormal evidential structure implies abnormal causal 
structure. This position might be described as being a ‘no-boxer’: denying that we can have traditional 
Newcomb cases which involve no backwards causation. 
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These are significant problems for evidential decision theory—but not for defending a 
deliberative account of causation.123 Evidential decision theory deals in subjective 
probabilities. A subjective notion of evidence makes sense here, since decision theory is 
required to issue recommendations to agents or at least explain their behaviour. But the 
deliberative account of causation appeals to a more objective notion of evidence. Using 
more objective evidential relations, puddles are evidence of rain, for example, regardless of 
what a given agent believes (section 4.4c). These evidential relations may be fixed by the 
standards of an epistemic community, or by physical chances. And they are a significant and 
unavoidable commitment of the kind of deliberative account of causation I am defending. 
For those who prefer sparser ontologies, they may be a significant cost. But these evidential 
relations do important theoretical work in explaining why the causal relations of the 
deliberative account are suitably objective. And they also help explain why ordinary cases of 
deliberation don’t imply backwards causation.  
 
With these more objective evidential relations, if Tamsin has seen the puddles, then she does 
have evidence of rain—even if she has mistaken beliefs about the correlation between 
puddles and rain. Similarly when Gina is deliberating, she need not recognise the tickle as 
evidence of the gene in order for it to provide such evidence. Agents may even have 
evidence when they don’t believe they do. Provided Gina’s tickles, beliefs and desires are 
directly accessible to her, they reasonable count as part of her current stock of evidence and 
provide her with evidence of the past. So the undermining does not depend on what higher-
order beliefs the agent happens to have about her own beliefs and desires. Correlations to 
the past are undermined, even when agents lack full self-knowledge. A similar response 
                                                
123 But for responses, see Eells (1982; 1984; 1985) and Jackson and Pargetter (1983). 
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applies to the case of the observing agent. If Gina is properly deliberating, her decisions for 
the sake of past states aren’t evidence of past states. This undermining doesn’t depend on 
Gina or any observer, having any particular beliefs about Gina’s beliefs or desires. 
 
Finally, it might seem that undermining will not occur if the mediating states aren’t present at 
the start of deliberation, but occur at later stages. If Gina’s initial beliefs and desires aren’t 
evidence of the past and it is only the beliefs that she comes through deliberating that 
provide good evidence, it might seem evidential decision theory will provide the wrong 
advice. In response to this and other more complex cases, Eels (1984) develops a dynamic 
tickle defence—for discussion, see Horgan ([1981]), Price (1986; 1991; 1993) and Horwich 
(1987, ch. 11). Having made an initial judgment of the expected utility of an act, the agent 
doesn’t immediately decide, but returns to deliberate with this judgment as an additional 
input. This process then iterates. At any stage in the process the judgment may screen off the 
relevance of the decision or act for the past state. Evidential decision theory only issues a 
recommendation when the iteration produces no change in the expected utility of the acts. 
This will be after the screening off has occurred, provided the screening off occurs, and a 
recommendation is issued at all.  
 
But such a response is not needed to defend the deliberative account of causation. Unlike 
evidential decision theory, the deliberative account does not require there to be a particular 
point in deliberation by which screening off occurs and a decision is recommended. What is 
required is that when the agent decides, the deliberation is proper and the decision has the 
right evidential relations. This deciding necessarily occurs at the conclusion of deliberation. So 
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any complex adjustments to the agent’s beliefs and desires are necessarily taken into 
account.124 
 
For related reasons, the deliberative account also avoids problems raised by Ahmed (2005) 
against Price’s version of the tickle defence (1986, 1991, 1993). These problems arise when 
undermining or screening off is appealed to in defence of evidential decision theory. Price 
argues that if Gina decides not to smoke because she thinks not smoking is evidence of not 
having the gene, this evidential reasoning provides a competing causal explanation for why 
she decides not to smoke. So her decision will not in fact be good evidence for not having 
the gene, and Gina loses her evidential grounds for making the decision. A decision not to 
smoke on this basis is ‘unstable’. Price argues that evidential decision theory should require 
us to reach equilibrium judgements, where the evidential relevance of our decision is not 
undermined by a judgment that we will decide on its basis. The only stable positions are 
where the agent either takes her decision to be probabilistically irrelevant to past states, or 
suspends judgment on the matter (1986, p. 201). So agents won’t be led to decide for the 
sake of the past. However, as Ahmed (2005) argues, there are cases where evidential decision 
theory, if required to reach an equilibrium judgement, will reach no recommendation, or will 
give the wrong advice, even by evidential lights. These are problems for defending evidential 
decision theory. But not for defending a deliberative account of causation. A deliberative 
account does not have to issue recommendations. To explain causal asymmetry, it is enough 
that, were an agent to decide for the sake of the past, the correlation would be undermined. 
                                                
124 Jeffrey (1981; 1983) uses a similar response to defend evidential decision theory, by considering an agent’s 
attitude towards his decision when the decision is made but not yet enacted. But this ‘ratificationist’ solution 
faces problems of its own as a defence of evidential decision theory—see Horwich (1987, pp. 188−9).  
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There are further concerns to be faced in defending a deliberative account of causation. If 
agents are never able to decide based on beliefs that are meant to track evidential relations, 
then a causal relation that corresponds to evidential relations will not be so useful. But we 
should keep in mind that evidential decision theory does remain a strong candidate for many 
ordinary decision situations. A more serious concern is that the evidential standards the 
deliberative account appeals to are much more stringent than what agents actually use. 
Perhaps merely having a desire does not provide Gina with evidence of the gene, under an 
ordinary notion of evidence. Appealing to overly high standards would place unreasonable 
epistemic demands on agents. And it would also risk making all deliberation improper. If 
merely having beliefs and desires evidentially settles what Gina decides, it seems Gina will 
never be in a position to properly deliberate, even on the future. A similar concern is raised 
against the screening off defence of evidential decision theory. Skyrms (1980, p. 131), Lewis 
(1981, p. 10 n.8) and Price (1986, pp. 204−6) all argue that if an agent has evidence of her 
beliefs and desires, and believes she will choose in accordance with them, as the tickle 
defence standardly requires, deliberation is closed off, even in ordinary future-directed cases. 
The (subjective) evidence always already settles what decision the agent will make, and she 
cannot reasonably deliberate. 
 
To fully respond to such concerns, a defence of the deliberative account would need to 
show that the standards appealed are sufficiently weak, and do not take agents far beyond 
what they can reasonable access and use. But while I won’t attempt to answer these concerns 
in full here, let me point towards two considerations that suggest a sufficiently weak notion 
can be found. Firstly, even if the careful accounting of an agent’s complete set of mental 
states and the relevant parts of the external environment could lead one to predict her 
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decision, it is often unreasonable to suppose that any agent could make these calculations. If 
so, many actual cases of deliberation will remain proper. Unless we think that agents are 
systematically insensitive to their evidence, the epistemic model implies that in many 
ordinary cases, an agent’s evidence does not settle what she will decide and do. 
 
Secondly, deliberation is an iterative process—an agent’s beliefs and desires while 
deliberating can be further inputs to deliberation. This is something that the dynamic tickle 
defence rightly drew our attention to. Because deliberators are complex and self-reflective, a 
deliberative state, even one that provides evidence of the past, is often not enough to settle 
what an agent decides. So deliberation can on the future can be proper. For example, Gina 
may start out her deliberation with a desire to smoke, a desire that strengthens as she 
considers the charms of smoking, until her having the gene is evidentially settled. But her 
deliberation does not stop there. Her beliefs and desires can change from this point, in ways 
not predictable from her earlier states, for a reasonable standard of evidence. She might 
bitterly recant her desire to smoke and decide not to smoke. What she finally decides is not 
settled by her earlier desire (see figure 14). So she can properly deliberate in many ordinary 
future-directed cases, even if she still can’t properly deliberate for the sake of the past.  
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Figure 14: The evidence Gina has while deliberating on smoking (S), given the causal structure in 
figure 12. Even if Gina’s evidence in deliberation settles her having the gene (G) and getting cancer 
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Note that this defence of the deliberative account does require a careful balance—allowing 
that there are ordinary cases of proper deliberation, but none that imply backwards 
causation.  
 
The deliberative account does not imply backwards causation. If decisions are reliably 
correlated with past states of affairs, this goes via agents having evidence of these past states, 
due to observations, other external evidence, or deliberative states like beliefs and desires. 
This evidence makes deliberation on the past improper. It is only when these mediating 
states are absent that deliberation is proper. But in this case we won’t expect decisions to be 
evidence of the past states. So in neither case is backwards causation implied. The situation 
towards the future is very different. Correlations between decisions and states further in the 
future are not mediated by deliberative states. Deliberative states do not provide evidence of 
future states that is independent of what decision an agent makes (except in the case of 
spurious correlations). This means that when deliberation on the future is proper, there can 
still be evidential correlations between decisions and future states. So there can be forwards 
causation. Putting these two pieces together, causal asymmetry is due to the fact that 
correlations between decisions and the past are mediated by deliberative states, while 
correlations towards the future are not.  
 
5.4 The Temporal Asymmetry of Deliberation 
To explain causal asymmetry, I appealed to the fact that deliberation undermines correlations 
to the past, but not (directly) to the future. Deliberation only undermines correlations to the 
future by way of the past (in cases of spurious correlations). I explained this undermining by 
appealing to the fact that only evidential relations between decisions and past states are 
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mediated by deliberative states. Correlations to the future are not mediated by states that are 
part of deliberation. In this section I explain this why this mediation is asymmetric by 
appealing to the fact that deliberation comes before deciding. To explain this asymmetry in 
turn, I’ll appeal to an asymmetry in our epistemic access to the world. It is because we have 
records of the past but not the future that we deliberate before deciding. Statistical-
mechanical accounts also appeal to this epistemic asymmetry to explain causal asymmetry. 
But the epistemic asymmetry will play an importantly different role in each explanation. 
 
5.4a Explaining the Asymmetry of Undermining 
Before I begin, let me consider a competing explanation for the asymmetry of undermining. 
Price uses this explanation to defend his preferred version of evidential decision theory. 
Recall, Price argues that Gina should decide to smoke, because if she decides not to smoke in 
order to avoid having the gene, the correlation between smoking and the gene is 
undermined. Price claims this undermining occurs because Gina’s deliberation provides an 
‘alternative causal explanation’ for why Gina smokes, one that interrupts the evidential 
relation that would otherwise obtain between the gene and her smoking (see figure 15) 
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Figure 15: Price’s explanation of the asymmetry of undermining. Gina’s deliberation provides a 
competing causal explanation for her smoking (S), which undermines the evidential relation that 






The reason only correlations to the past are directly undermined in this way is because 
deliberation comes temporally prior to acting. Deliberation doesn’t undermine causal 
relations to the future (except by way of the past). Ultimately, causal asymmetry is then due 
to deliberation coming before action. 
 
But there are two problems with Price’s explanation. Firstly, he relies on an unexplained 
asymmetry—that deliberation precedes action. Price does not attempt to explain this 
asymmetry, and doesn’t take offering such an explanation to be part of the philosophical 
project of explaining of causal asymmetry. His explanation only begins from our temporal 
orientation as agents (1993, pp. 261−2; Price and Weslake 2009, p. 434). While he accepts 
that science may explain our deliberative orientation, (ibid., p. 434 n. 23), he doesn’t suggest 
how this might be done without presupposing causal asymmetry—as much of higher-level 
science does. More often, Price suggests treating deliberative asymmetry as an ‘ultimate 
contingency’ (1993, p. 260). Price’s stance on this issue makes sense, given his 
‘perspectivalism’. Price’s project is to explain away apparently objective features of the world 
as arising merely from features of our perspective. For this purpose, we don’t need to know 
how the features of our perspective arise. My project is different. I want to account for 
causation in a way that makes sense of its relevance for agents, but still relates causation to 
objective features of the world.  
 
A second more serious concern with Price’s explanation is that it is explicitly causal. 
Undermining occurs when an agent decides on the basis of a belief in a correlation, not merely 
when she believes the correlation holds. It is ‘in virtue of [its] causal role that the judgement 
is self-defeating in the way described’ (1986, p. 201, see also 2007, p. 282). Price’s appeal to 
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causation is not a problem for defending evidential decision theory—evidence may be based 
on causal assumptions. But this appeal to causation is a problem for explaining causal 
asymmetry. If the fact that causes come before their effects is needed to explain why causes 
comes before their effects, we have a viciously circular explanation. This is not how Price 
sees the situation. He claims that his account leaves ‘no asymmetric modal notion left 
unaccounted for’ (1993, pp. 261−2), and that the probabilities appealed to are ‘not 
dependent on a prior modal notion’ (2007, p. 281). But in appealing to causal features of 
deliberation, we do rely on prior modal notions.  
 
To explain undermining, while avoiding Price’s appeal to causation, I suggested the 
following. In cases where an agent’s decision are evidence for external states of affairs, this 
goes via the agent being in a particular state at a time in between. It is only when this 
mediating state is present that we expect the evidential relation to hold. I argued that 
relations to the past are mediated by deliberative states that form part of deliberation, such as 
beliefs and desires. Relations to the future are mediated instead by decisions, intentions, or 
intentional acts. Both these types of mediations between an agent’s decisions and her 
environment are instances of a more general phenomenon: that evidential relations between 
states of affairs at two different times are mediated by states at times in between. While we 
might not know these mediating states, and may reason directly from states at different 
times, if we look closely at the features of the situation, we expect to find a continuous series 
of evidential relations involved.125 In the common causes cases above (figure 12, p. 224 and 
                                                
125 This evidential mediation does relate to a causal phenomenon: that causal relations, at least at our world, are 
continuous through time. If two states of affairs at different times are causally related, we expect to find a series 
of states that occur at times in between that are also causally related. Causal continuity could even explain 
evidential mediation. But as with evidential relations more generally, the fact that they can be explained in 
causal terms does not mean they can’t be appealed to in evidential terms. 
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figure 13, p. 226), for example, we expect there to be mediating states at times between Gina 
having the gene and getting cancer, that are evidentially tied to both these states. This is the 
evidential mediation that we need to explain undermining.  
 
Using evidential mediation, and the fact that deliberation comes before decision, we can 
explain why undermining is asymmetric. If deliberation comes before decision, and not after, 
only correlations to states of affairs further in the past are mediated by deliberative states. So 
only correlations to the past are undermined. If Gina’s deliberation for the sake of the past is 
proper, her decision now won’t be evidence of past states. But correlations between 
decisions and future states are not mediated by deliberative states. So Gina’s deliberation 
may remain proper, even while her decisions are evidence of future states. So evidential 
relations to the future are not undermined by deliberation. If we can explain why 
deliberation comes prior to decision, we will have explained asymmetric undermining 
without relying on causal asymmetry. 
 
Furthermore, even if we explain undermining in a different way, we should still expect to 
appeal to the fact that deliberation comes before deciding. This is certainly the case with 
existing explanations, including those by Price (1993; 2007), Woodward (2003) and Pearl 
(2000). Woodward and Pearl effectively treat actions and decisions as interventions, where 
the deliberation breaks causal relation further upstream. Insofar as these accounts explain 
asymmetric undermining, they rely on deliberation coming not only causally prior, but also 
temporally prior to decision. The situation is similar if one appeals to Reichenbach’s 
common cause principle (1956)—roughly the fact that correlated events must have a 
common cause but not necessarily a joint effect. Unless we appeal to temporal assumptions 
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about deliberation, we will not be able to explain why only correlations to the past are 
undermined by deliberation. Whether one uses an evidential or causal route to explain 
asymmetric undermining, it is crucial that deliberation comes before decision.  
 
5.4b Why Deliberation Precedes Decision 
To explain asymmetric undermining, I appealed to the fact that deliberation precedes 
decision. But why does this asymmetry hold? In this section, I explain this deliberative 
asymmetry using the epistemic model of deliberation from chapter 2 and an epistemic 
asymmetry—that we have memories of the past, but nothing like memories of the future.  
 
Begin with the fact that we have memories of the past but nothing like memories of the 
future. This means that in ordinary cases of deliberating, we are certain about the immediate 
past in our vicinity, independently of what decision we make. As Tamsin deliberates on 
whether to take her umbrella, for example, she is certain she was walking through the hall a 
minute ago. And she is certain of this, independently of what decision she makes now. We 
also have knowledge of our immediate futures. Tamsin may be certain she’ll leave the 
apartment in the next two minutes and that the hall will be in its usual place. But we typically 
have knowledge of the future either by having general beliefs about the present (or past) and 
its reliable behaviour, or by having knowledge of our current decisions, intentions and habits 
and their reliability. Tamsin’s certainty of her own immediate past is not dependent in this 
way—independently of her decisions, intentions, habits or beliefs about the present, she has 
memories of her past. She does not have anything like memories of her future.  
 
 241 
According to the epistemic model of deliberation, an agent can’t deliberate if she is certain of 
what decision she’ll make. Doing so prevents deliberation serving its usual epistemic 
function. So if Tamsin has memories of her past decisions, she can’t deliberate after 
deciding. But because Tamsin does not have anything like memories of her future, she can 
deliberate before deciding. As she deliberates, her future decision remains suitably uncertain. 
As far as an agent’s deliberative structure is generic, and tracks general epistemic features, the 
epistemic asymmetry leads to a temporal asymmetry of deliberation.126 
 
Note that this explanation of a deliberative asymmetry is not available on the competing 
accounts of deliberation considered in chapter 3, including those by Price (2012) and Ismael 
(2007). These accounts deny that there are ignorance conditions on deliberation. So the fact 
that an agent has memories of her decisions does not prevent her deliberating after deciding. 
This gives us an additional reason to prefer an epistemic account of deliberation in which an 
agent must be ignorant of her decision as she deliberates. 
 
One might be concerned that memory is insufficient to rule out deliberation on the past. 
Memory functions reliably only over a limited range. Some of the decisions you made 
yesterday, for example, you have no doubt already forgotten. Can you then deliberate on 
them? The problem is your ‘deliberation’ today would not have an evidential bearing on your 
original decision. The evidential relation between your deliberation and the decision is 
broken by your not having evidence of your decision at times in between, as is required by 
the setup. While you might ‘deliberate’ in some attenuated sense, your deliberation would 
                                                
126 Memories also allow agents to pick up on correlations between decisions and actions, satisfying another of 
the epistemic requirements argued for in chapter 2—that agents take their decisions to be good evidence of 
their results. 
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not serve the epistemic function argued for in chapter 2—it would not be a way of settling 
what you decide and do. 
 
There are also general temporally symmetric features of deliberation that contribute to us 
remaining uncertain of our future decisions. Firstly, we can’t observe the actual physical 
mechanisms that determine how we decide. Our neural wiring is small, complicated and 
hidden from view. Secondly, the correlations between states of the world we respond to and 
our decisions are often complex and difficult to keep track of. While there is some reliability 
in how we decide, humans aren’t simple creatures, and respond to a range of factors in a 
variety of different ways. It is not easy to model how we will decide on any one occasion. 
For example, consider whether a fireman can take the heat of the floor as evidence he will 
decide to leave a burning building—an example from Holton (2006). In order to make an 
accurate inference, he must take into account the nature of his values and desires, the way he 
balances the risks involved against the possibility of saving the building, and the significance 
of all this evidence. His decision will not be amenable to simple modelling. Thirdly, features 
of past deliberations may be relevant to how we later decide. We are self-reflective creatures, 
able to use our previous deliberations as further inputs to our current deliberation. The 
fireman, for example, may be more reluctant to risk his team, if he did so previously. 
Because of these three factors, our decisions are not easy to predict. And so an agent can be 
suitably ignorant of the future so as to deliberate. But memory prevents us being suitably 
ignorant of the past. 
 
We can imagine more complex creatures, where memory or other recording faculties are 
incomplete in certain systematic ways, or sometimes reverse direction. According to the 
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epistemic model, such creatures could sometimes properly deliberate on the past, and 
sometimes properly deliberate on the future. But our cognitive architecture is not like this. 
And so our deliberation has only one temporal orientation. Nor is this a surprising feature. 
As I’ll argue shortly, memory is an example of a more pervasive epistemic asymmetry that 
statistical-mechanical accounts rightly draw our attention to. 
 
5.4c Remembering the Past 
So far my explanation of causal asymmetry has relied on an epistemic asymmetry—that we 
have memories of the past, but nothing like memories of the future. To complete the 
explanation of causal asymmetry, I now consider why this epistemic asymmetry holds. I do 
so by appealing to an initial low-entropy state of the universe. Albert (2000; 2015) and 
Loewer (2007) also use a particular low-entropy state, the Past Hypothesis, to explain an 
asymmetry of records, on the way to giving statistical-mechanical accounts of causal 
asymmetry. But these statistical-mechanical accounts appeal to entropy in a different way 
from the deliberative account—one that makes these accounts harder to defend. 
In section 5.2c, I argued that Albert hadn’t shown that the Past Hypothesis is sufficient to 
explain our reasoning to the past using records. While we might need an initial low entropy 
state to rule out conspiratorial worlds, this doesn’t show that a Past Hypothesis (plus the 
dynamical laws and statistical postulate) is sufficient for records of the past. And it doesn’t 
show that the Past Hypothesis is necessary either. All that’s required to rule out 
conspiratorial worlds is a low entropy initial state (a ‘past state’). To defend a statistical-
mechanical account of causation, Albert and Loewer need to identify necessary and 
sufficient conditions on reliable records of the past—they need an algorithm for evaluating 
counterfactuals that picks up on how we infer to the past and future. But if what we want to 
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do is explain why we have memories of the past and not the future, all we need is to identify 
the relevant difference maker—a feature that allows for records of the past, but not records of 
the future.127 And we have that, in there being a low entropy constraint on the past, but no 
similar constraint on the future. The arguments I considered above all concerned whether 
Albert had identified necessary and sufficient conditions on our normal procedures for 
inferring to the past. None of these arguments attacked the claim that a low-entropy 
boundary condition is a necessary condition on records. 
 
How do records work? Recall, records are local states of affairs in the present that allow us 
to reliably infer to states of affairs at other times, in ways that go beyond what we can infer 
to using the dynamical laws and statistical postulate. Records take us beyond what we can 
infer to by assuming generic behaviour towards the past and future, or tracing what happens 
to the whole system over a period of time, using dynamical laws. For example, say I have a 
memory of being given a toy dog, ‘Penny’, on my 5th birthday.128 Given I have this memory 
now, I can infer that I was indeed given Penny all those years ago. I can infer this, without 
knowing that children are usually given toy dogs on their 5th birthdays, or without knowing 
what has happened to Penny between then and now. I may also infer that my nephew will 
receive a toy turtle ‘Bruce’ on his 5th birthday. But I infer this, either because he likes turtles, 
and children tend to get what they like for birthdays, or because I believe that there’s a turtle 
in the store, that I will buy it, keep it and give it to him—I know what will happen to the 
turtle between now and then. We use records to reason to the past, not the future.  
                                                
127 The idea of difference-making underlies prominent accounts of causal explanation (Woodward 2003; 
Strevens 2008), as well as counterfactual accounts of causation more generally (Lewis 1973a). Strevens, in 
addition, argues that difference-making extends naturally to domains outside the causal, including mathematics. 
Here I use difference-making in giving a non-causal scientific explanation.   
128 There is also a question of how memories come to have the content they do—why my memory is a memory 
‘of’ this event. This may involve causal factors. However that story proceeds, we nevertheless have good reason 
to believe that memories will be reliable indicators of past events. 
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A low-entropy boundary condition is a necessary condition on records. Only with a low-
entropy boundary condition can there be reliable forms of inference by physical means that 
takes us beyond what we could infer to using the dynamical laws and the statistical 
postulate.129 Recall, a low-entropy boundary condition is simply a restriction on the phase 
space that is occupied by the universe at one temporal end. If the restriction goes beyond 
what is implied by the universe’s present macrostate, the dynamical laws and statistical 
postulate, it allows for a form of inferring from the present that goes beyond these as well. 
And it is only with such a restriction that we can infer in ways that goes beyond these. 
 
Given my aim in this chapter is to explain causal asymmetry, I won’t argue for a particular 
account of how we infer to the past using records like memories.130 It is sufficient for my 
purposes that reliable asymmetric forms of reasoning like memory are an instance of the 
more general phenomena of records, and that a necessary condition on records is a low-
entropy boundary state. Whether Albert’s explanation or some other accounts for how we 
reason using records, a crucial feature of these explanations is their appeal to a low-entropy 
condition. The fact that there is a low-entropy condition on the past, but not the future, is 
what explains why there can be records of the past and not the future. And it is records, like 
memories, that give us reliable knowledge of past states of systems beyond generic 
knowledge and independently of tracing out the state of the system between now and then. 
It is this kind of knowledge of our actions, decisions and further states that prevents 
deliberation. And so it is the general fact that we have records of the past, but not the future, 
that explains why we deliberate towards the future, and not the past. Memory remains a 
                                                
129 Noting, as earlier, that the low-entropy boundary condition need not be at the start of the universe. 
130 For possibilities, see Albert (2000, ch. 6; 2015, ch. 2), Reichenbach ([1956], chs. 3−4), Gru ̈nbaum (1963) and 
Smart (1967).  
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particularly important form of reasoning using records because it is both common and 
reasonably reliable concerning the recent past. These features are what make it particularly 
well-placed to prevent deliberation after deciding. But what more generally explains why we 
deliberate before deciding is the fact that we have records of the past, but not the future. 
And this is due to a low-entropy past state. 
 
Conclusion 
Causes come prior in time to their effects because of features of deliberation. It is because 
we deliberate before deciding that evidential correlations towards the past are undermined by 
deliberation. Because causation corresponds with the evidential relations we use in 
deliberation, causation is not directed towards the past. Why are correlations towards the 
past undermined? Because we deliberate before we decide. Why do we deliberate before we 
decide? Because we’re suitably ignorant of the future, but not the past. We have records of 
the past, evidence of the past that is independent of what we decide now. Why do we have 
records of the past and not the future? Because there is a low-entropy boundary condition 
on the past and not the future. Figure 16 summarises this explanatory structure.  
 
The deliberative account traces causal asymmetry back to a low-entropy initial condition—
the same type of feature appealed to in statistical-accounts by Loewer and Albert. But while 
statistical-mechanical accounts aim to reduce causation to other regularities, and so must 
identify necessary and sufficient on reasoning to the past and future, the deliberative account 
does not. Instead, the deliberative account needs to explain why evidential correlations to the 
past are undermined by deliberation, but correlations towards the future are not. And it can 
do this without identifying necessary and sufficient conditions on inferring.  
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Low-entropy past state 
 
Asymmetry of records 
 
Deliberation preceding decision 
 
Asymmetry of undermining 
 
Asymmetry of evidential relations, given proper deliberation 
 
Asymmetry of causation 
 
Figure 16: How the deliberative account explains causal asymmetry.   
 
 
The deliberative account does not aim to reduce causal relations. Instead, it aims to 
illuminate the general explanatory and justificatory structure that underlies any successful 
account of causation. And it identifies, at the most general level, how the evidential structure 





Conclusion: Our Place in Science 
6.1 Making Sense of Causation 
We should understand how causation fits into the world by thinking about its relevance for 
deliberation. It is because we’re agents, reasonably able to deliberate and decide on one thing 
in order to achieve another, that we pick out certain relations as causal. Causal relations in 
fact correspond to the evidential relations that hold between our decisions and outcomes we 
seek. For example, Tamsin’s taking her umbrella counts as a cause of her staying dry just in 
case her deciding to take her umbrella is evidence of her staying dry. Agents like Tamsin can 
therefore use their knowledge of causal structure to make decisions that are evidence of the 
outcome they seek. And this is why causal relations should matter to us. 
 
What does this deliberative account imply about causation? Firstly, the account supports 
non-fundamentalism about causation, where causation is not part of the fundamental 
metaphysical structure of the world. Non-fundamentalism might be true either because 
causation reduces to more fundamental relations or because the world has no metaphysically 
fundamental level. One reason for this support for non-fundamentalism can be found in the 
foundations of the project. In chapter 1, I motivated there being a problem with causation 
by considering Russell’s challenge: fundamental physical theories don’t mention causes. 
Insofar as we want our fundamental metaphysics to be guided by fundamental physics, this 
is a prima facie reason not to take causation to be fundamental. The deliberative account 
further supports non-fundamentalism by showing what role causal relations play, and why 
we should pick out certain relations as causal, even if causes are not needed to push and pull 
things around at the fundamental metaphysical level. I argued that we need causal relations 
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for deliberation. The deliberative account explains why causal relations matter, even if 
they’re not fundamental. While the account is compatible with causation being fundamental, 
it provides more support for non-fundamentalism. 
 
There is another sense in which the deliberative account supports non-fundamentalism 
about causation. The deliberative account cannot be applied to system-wide causation. This 
is a feature it shares in common with interventionist accounts. The deliberative account 
relies on a separation between the deliberating agent (or intervener) and the rest of the 
system, and only directly derives causal relations between states that don’t include the 
deliberating agent (or intervener). If causation were fundamental, there would be no need for 
such a restriction. Fundamentalist views, moreover, have tended to take the whole state of a 
system at one time to cause its state at the next time. Excluding system-wide causation is in 
keeping with a broadly Russellian program. Russell’s challenge shows that system-wide 
causation is not needed for the state of affairs of the system at one time to determine its 
state at other times—non-causal fundamental physical laws can do that work.  
 
The deliberative account also supports non-fundamentalism about causation because it takes 
type-level causation to be more primary than token-level (or ‘actual’) causation. If causal 
relations were part of the fundamental structure of the world, needed to push and pull things 
around, this would suggest that token-level causation would be the more primary 
phenomenon—causal relations would capture the ‘force-like’ relations that hold between 
actual events. If causal relations correspond to the evidential relations of use to deliberating 
agents, this suggests type-level causation is the more primary phenomenon. Evidential 
reasoning is reasoning we often engage in hypothetically—we think about what would be 
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evidence for what, even if neither the evidence nor the state obtains. Deliberation is also a 
hypothetical exercise—we are interested it what would follow from our decisions, knowing 
we will only decide in one way. Both kinds of reasoning require us to identify similar cases or 
types, suggesting causation is also primarily type-based. The deliberative account, 
furthermore, includes an additional counterfactual layer—it appeals what evidential relations 
would hold, were an agent to properly deliberate. I suggested that these counterfactuals 
should also be evaluated in a type-based fashion, by appealing to non-causal similarities 
between systems and laws. For these reasons, while the deliberative account is strictly 
compatible with taking causation to be token-level (insofar as evidential relations can also be 
token-level) it supports a type-based approach—in keeping with non-fundamentalism.  
 
Finally, the deliberative account also supports non-fundamentalism about causation by 
providing important resources for reductive accounts. Firstly, the deliberative account can 
justify why the relations picked out by a reductive account deserve to be called causal. If a 
reductive account reasonably satisfies both sides of the evidential biconditional, relating 
evidence to causation, a defender can appeal to the relevance of causation for good decision-
making to justify their account. Secondly, as I argued in chapter 4, the deliberative account 
can be used as a half-way step to ultimately reduce causation to fundamental physical laws 
and contingent features. If evidential relations are objective probabilities, and objective 
probabilities reduce to laws and contingent features, as Lewis, Loewer, Albert and others 
intend, then the deliberative account supports a reduction of causation to fundamental laws 
and contingent features. If this reduction works out, we have a particular strong answer to 
Russell’s challenge—we have a direct relation between causation and fundamental physical 
laws.  
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However, the deliberative account doesn’t imply that causation is reducible. While I have 
emphasised how the deliberative account is relevant for reductive accounts, it is also relevant 
for non-reductive interventionist accounts of causation. Woodward (2003) and Pearl (2000), 
for example, don’t explain why causation is useful or why causes come before their effects. 
But they do derive evidential relations from causal relations. This means they can appeal to 
the deliberative account to explain why interventionist counterfactuals are useful—they are 
the evidential relations of use to deliberating agents. Interventionist accounts can also appeal 
to deliberation to explain why we select exogenous and endogenous variables as we do, why 
agents approximate interveners and why intervention breaks arrows temporally upstream—it 
is because deliberation effectively severs evidential correlations towards the past that 
deliberators approximate interveners, and so why causes comes prior to their effects, at least 
in deliberative contexts. While interventionist accounts and the deliberative account will 
likely disagree over particular cases, they remain broadly compatible, and interventionist can 
still learn important lessons from the deliberative accounts.  
 
However these further debates about reduction work out, the deliberative account remains 
informative and explanatory. It remains so even if, quite generally, metaphysical notions of 
reduction turn out to be ill-formed. The deliberative account relates causation to evidential 
relations and deliberation. We have a sufficiently independent grasp of each of these for the 
deliberative account to remain interesting, even if causation is not reducible to evidential 
relations. In chapter 2, I presented an epistemic model of deliberation without appealing to 
causal notions. In chapter 4, I argued that evidence could be characterised by its normative 
role in inferential reasoning. Because we have sufficient grasp of deliberation and evidence 
independently of causation, the evidential biconditional remains substantive and 
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contentful—even while it does not settle whether causation is reducible. The deliberative 
account in fact exemplifies a general metaphysical project of connecting various relations to 
one another in interesting and explanatory ways, without taking some relations to be more 
metaphysically fundamental than others.  
 
If causation is not ultimately reducible, does that mean the deliberative account no longer 
relates causation to fundamental laws? Can we no longer answer Russell’s challenge? Not 
necessarily. One can relate evidential relations and objective probabilities (and thereby 
causation) to fundamental laws, without taking these relations to be reductions—without 
taking fundamental physical laws to be metaphysically more fundamental than evidential 
relations. One way to do this is to make use of the explanatory resources within science. 
Fundamental physics aims to explain the success of higher-level sciences, including non-
fundamental physics. If evidential relations and objective probabilities are understood by 
reference to the role they play in higher-level science, scientific explanations can relate 
fundamental laws to evidential relations and objective probabilities. The deliberative account 
would then relate fundamental laws and causation—without implying metaphysical 
reduction. I leave exploring the relation between evidential relations and fundamental laws 
for future work.  
 
I’ve argued that the deliberative account supports non-fundamentalism about causation. 
Does this mean that the deliberative account is thereby anti-realist about causation? No. A 
relation can be real without being fundamental.131 The deliberative account takes causation to 
                                                
131 One could of course define realism as implying fundamentalism. Then the deliberative account would 
support anti-realism, while being compatible with realism. But such definitions tend to do a poor job of 
capturing views like my own. 
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be just as real as other important relations like laws and objective probabilities. By appealing 
to how these relate to one another, the deliberative account aims to give us a better 
understanding of what causation actually is. Nor does the account imply eliminitivism about 
causation: that causation is scientifically or metaphysically suspect, or that we should do away 
with talk of it. While Russell argued for a wholesale rejection of causal notions, that has not 
been my project. The account also does not imply that causal talk is non-representational, or 
non-truth-apt, or otherwise contrasts with ordinary descriptive discourse.  
 
There’s another way in which the deliberative account might seem to imply anti-realism 
about causation. Because the account appeals to agency, it might seem to imply that 
causation is mind-dependent, or otherwise depends on features of agency—such as our 
agential perspectives. But the deliberative account does not imply that causation is mind-
dependent, or perspectival. As I argued in chapter 4, causal relations do not turn out to 
depend on our beliefs, desires, practical abilities or perspectives. Instead, the evidential 
biconditional ensures that causal relations are at least as objective as the evidential relations 
we use when we reason. If we take evidential relations to be objective probabilities, or relate 
them to laws, the objectivity of causation is further secured.  
 
The deliberative account instead supports the following picture. Understanding the relevance 
of causation requires appealing to agency and deliberation. Even though causation might 
have seemed like a deep fundamental feature of the world, something whose importance we 
could make sense of independently of features of ourselves, we should make sense of it by 
reference to us. Causation matters to us because we are agents who can reasonably decide on 
one thing in order to achieve another. While causal relations appear from outside the 
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perspective of the deliberating agent, they are peculiarly relevant for deliberators—and this is 
why conceive of the world in causal terms. There’s a surprising way in which an objective 
and scientific relation (causation) turns out to relate closely to our interests as agents.  
 
This is to take broadly pragmatist or idealist approach to causation. The account does not 
rule out metaphysical accounts of causation. We can take causation to be fundamental, 
otherwise not reducible, or reduce to other regularities. But the account itself makes none of 
these commitments. The explanatory power of the deliberative account derives from the fact 
that it identifies how broad-scale evidential and causal features of our world relate—and 
making clear how deliberative agency is essential in understanding causation.  
 
Similar lessons hold regarding the asymmetry of causation—why causes come before their 
effects. In chapter 5, I argued that causal asymmetry derives from a temporal asymmetry of 
deliberation—the fact that we deliberate before we decide. This means correlations towards 
the past, and not the future, are undermined by deliberation. The direction of causation is 
therefore contingent—causes could have come after their effects (rigidifying on the actual 
direction of time). The temporal asymmetry of causation is not an unexplainable primitive. 
But the asymmetry of causation is not thereby mind-dependent or perspectival. Nor is it the 
case that causation could have ‘easily’ gone the other way. Even though agency is essential to 
understanding causal asymmetry, causal asymmetry still depends on other physical 
asymmetries as well. This is in part because the physical structure of the world determines our 
orientation as agents, including the fact that we deliberate before we decide. Agents are 
physical beings, whose features we can expect to explain scientifically. In chapter 5, I traced 
the asymmetry of deliberation back to an epistemic asymmetry—the fact that we have 
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records of the past, but not the future. This epistemic asymmetry is not up to us or mind-
dependent in any substantive sense. Furthermore, it is an asymmetry we can expect to make 
sense of in terms of other physical asymmetries, particularly asymmetries relating to entropy 
(Albert 2000). Even though agency is essential to understanding the temporal asymmetry of 
causation, causal asymmetry is ultimately due to objective asymmetries in the physical world. 
 
There are limits to the deliberative account of causation. It only applies in cases where we 
can make sense of what an agent’s evidence would be, were she to be properly deliberating. 
We may have difficulty working out what evidential relations would hold for a deliberating 
agent, particularly in conditions that don’t allow for agents—such as at the early universe. 
Reductive accounts may play a useful role in such cases, and help extend causal concepts 
from cases we do ordinarily encounter to those we do not. We’ll also have trouble deriving 
causal asymmetry if we consider very simple universes, with no entropic structure. If an 
agent were in such a universe, would they deliberate before deciding, or the other way 
around? My project has focussed instead on the relevance of causation for decision-making 
in the ordinary cases we actually encounter. While I’ve suggested how the account can be 
extended to cover causal relations where agents aren’t able to properly deliberate (chapter 4), 
recovering our intuitive causal judgments in such cases is not my main concern. I’m more 
interested in why causation matters to us, and so how causation operates in cases we do 
actually encounter. First-order metaphysical accounts of causation may do better at 
recovering our causal intuitions. But the deliberative account does better at uncovering the 
broad-scale explanatory and justificatory structure that underlies these accounts.  
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6.2 Making Sense of Agency 
I began this project with a second motivation—to understand how free agency fits into the 
world, given the picture presented to us by science. More particularly, I aimed to explain our 
apparent ability to deliberate and decide on different options, given that fundamental laws 
and previous states (effectively) determine what we do. The epistemic model of deliberation 
I put forward in chapter 2 answers this aim. The model characterises deliberation by placing 
conditions on the beliefs we can and can’t reasonably have while deliberating. I argued, for 
example, that we must be uncertain of our decisions, and yet certain our decisions settle a 
state of the world. This model explains our apparent freedom in deliberation, by appealing to 
a particular combination of certainty and uncertainty. 
 
In chapter 3, I defended the model against competing epistemic accounts—particularly those 
that explain our apparent freedom in deliberation by appealing to our ‘license’ or justification 
to believe in different ways about what we’ll decide or do. I argued that, despite appearances, 
these accounts don’t actually explain our apparent freedom in epistemic terms. Instead, they 
rely crucially on desire-responsiveness or primitive notions of freedom. I also argued against 
perspectival accounts that separate practical and theoretical reason into two different stances. 
Such approaches can’t explain causation and causal asymmetry without introducing further 
unexplained asymmetries. While my main aims in these chapters was to present and defend 
the epistemic model, I also addressed more general questions about what options are 
available to an agent and how beliefs evolve during deliberation—something of importance 
to the foundations of decision theory and philosophy of action.  
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The epistemic model of deliberation I defended is deflationary in a number of ways. Firstly, 
it privileges the epistemic function of deliberation over its casual and normative functions. It 
takes deliberation and deciding to be ways of settling what will be the case, not primarily 
ways of settling what ought to be the case, or ways of bringing about states of affairs. Secondly, 
the epistemic model doesn’t imply that agents have primitive metaphysical powers, such as 
the ability to decide or determine states in ways not determined by previous states, causes 
and laws. Thirdly, the account, as I’ve employed it, explains why we appear free in 
deliberation—not why we are free. 
 
These deflationary features might suggest that that the epistemic model is anti-realist, and 
that agency and freedom are merely epiphenomenal, and not real features of us or the world. 
Again, this is not what the model implies. While I’ve focussed on explaining why we appear 
free, this doesn’t, by itself, give us a reason to think we’re not free—not without 
presupposing something further about what such freedom must amount to. The model 
identifies structural conditions that are required for deliberation of any reasonable type. 
These epistemic conditions on deliberation are often satisfied. We are often ignorant of what 
we will do, yet certain that our decision settles what we will do. In this sense, deliberation is 
perfectly reasonable. Given existing limits to our beliefs about the world, there is a place for 
deliberation. 
 
The epistemic model does, however, undercut arguments from our apparent freedom in 
deliberation to more robust conceptions of freedom. If we can make sense of apparent 
freedom without appealing to robust normative facts, for example, then our apparent 
freedom in deliberation gives us no reason to commit to such facts. But, again, this result 
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only supports anti-realism if we were already to committed to deliberation involving robust 
normative facts. Without introducing further standards by which deliberation, epistemically 
conceived, counts as less than real, the epistemic model does not support anti-realism.  
 
The epistemic model can even be used to give a compatibilist account of free agency. As 
noted in chapter 2, epistemic ignorance-based models have explicitly defended as 
compatibilist accounts of freedom (Kapitan 1989). The conditions of the epistemic model 
can be satisfied, even though the world operates according to laws and causes, making the 
epistemic model broadly compatibilist. Because the model is compatibilist, it also provides a 
strong answer to the second motivation of the project: to understand how agency fits into 
the world as presented by science. The epistemic structural features required for deliberation 
can be satisfied, given that we live in a world that operates according to laws and causes, and 
given our epistemic limitations as agents. 
 
There is also a sense in which my accounts of deliberation and causation imply we should 
take agency more seriously as part of our picture of the world. I’ve argued that causation can’t 
be understood independently of deliberation. Causal relations correspond to the evidential 
relations of use to deliberating agents. An epistemic account of deliberation is therefore not 
only compatible with a world that operates according to laws and causes—it’s required to 
make sense of that world. Understanding agency turns out to be bound up with 
understanding something of deep importance to our scientific picture. 
 
If agency is required to make sense of causation, then this project provides a further kind of 
reconciliation between science and agency. It may have seemed that the causal structure of 
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the world threatened to leave agents out of the picture. I’ve argued that we can only make 
sense of causation by thinking about agency. Seeing the relevance of agency for causation 
may help reconcile us to viewing the world causally. 
 
6.3 Expanding the View 
I’ve argued that we should make sense of causation by way of deliberation and agency. If I’m 
right, understanding what seems like a fundamental, scientific or metaphysically deep feature 
of the world requires thinking about us—about the features and activities of agents. This is 
to take a broadly pragmatist or idealist stance, in the sense that we understand a putatively 
fundamental, scientific or metaphysical feature of the world by thinking about its relevance 
for our lives. Accounts that relate agency to such features can be surprising and illuminating. 
But they don’t make the features less real or less than fully objective. 
 
If this approach works in the case of causation, where else might it apply? I’d like to end by 
suggesting a broad program for applying this form of pragmatism to other areas of science. 
Firstly, it may help us make sense of scientific laws. We employ standards to pick out laws. 
Fundamental physical laws, for example, are often taken to be universal, exceptionless 
regularities that are both simple in form and general in scope. Lewis (1994), for example, 
explicitly defends a ‘Best Systems Account’ of this form. But why should we expect nature to 
operate by regularities that obey these standards? Under this pragmatist approach, we can 
justify these standards by appealing to agency. It’s because we are reasoners with limited 
cognitive capacities that we reason to laws that are simple and general. This doesn’t make 
scientific laws mind-dependent. But it does mean we can’t understand features of laws 
without thinking about agents.  
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Similar points hold for making sense of scientific explanation and theory choice. Why do we 
seek causal explanations? A pragmatist approach suggests that causal explanations matter to 
us because we are interested in deliberation and control. Causal explanations do not aim at 
uncovering the fundamental structure of the world. Why do we seek explanations based in 
laws? A pragmatist approach might suggest that nomic explanations are useful because they 
help us unify our knowledge of the world, given that laws are appropriately general and 
simple. This approach could be used to defend unificationist accounts of explanation 
(Kitcher 1981), in combination with system-based accounts of laws (Lewis 1994).  
 
This kind of pragmatist approach also suggests that standards of coherence will be important 
for making sense of scientific enquiry—particularly in theory choice. We might expect to 
find these standards at work when we require a theory’s truth not to undermine our reasons 
for holding it—as occurs in ‘Boltzmann Brain’ scenarios in statistical mechanics or versions 
of quantum mechanics. The importance of coherence requirements may also lead us to reject 
a priori constraints on scientific theories, such as requirements to treat spacetime as 
fundamental—as found in some defences of ‘primitive ontology’ in quantum mechanics. 
Coherence suggests that our standard for science should evolve with science. 
 
Altogether, this pragmatist approach aims to make sense of science by thinking about its 
human side—about the ways in which our needs and interest shape the kind of science we 
produce. The deliberative account of causation is one example of where such an approach 
might lead. It is because we are deliberators, reasonably able to decide on one thing in order 
to achieve another, that we view the world in causal terms. And so we can’t make sense of 
causation independently of our concerns and limits as agents.  
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